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   This thesis re-examines London Jewry’s experience of The First World War 
and demonstrates the unprecedented impact of the conflict on the development 
of the community. The thesis examines the impact of the war on Jewish 
nationalism in the British context. It demonstrates how active service during the 
war instilled a Jewish patriotism, fed by the experiences of antisemitism in the 
British Army, the Balfour Declaration and service in Palestine. The reality and 
rhetoric of British antisemitism are examined in the context of highly visible 
events such as the Bethnal Green disturbances of September 1917 and the 
minutiae of Jew and Gentile relations in the trenches and on the Home Front. 
This involves a wider discussion on how British society interacted with its 
minority groups in the conditions of total war, with the London Jewish 
community the primary case study for this discussion. The war provided a 
business boom for Jewish tailors, relaxation of naturalisation laws and for many 
established Jews a vindication of their status as Britons through service and 
sacrifice on the front line. Conversely it saw a sharp increase in antagonism 
towards Jews on the Home Front and a crisis over Russian Jewish conscription 
that threatened to permanently undermine the position of the community in 
British society. The war deepened divisions between the established and 
immigrant halves of London’s Jewish community and accelerated the latter’s 
integration into British society. This thesis re-examines the First World War as 
an important event in the historiography of British Jewry in its own right rather 
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Introduction: Popular and Scholarly 




   The First World War transformed British Jewry more than any comparative 
event in the community’s history since readmission to Britain in 1656. The 
conflict presented challenging questions for British Jews forcing them to engage 
with their home nation based on values of patriotism, loyalty, and national 
identity as a minority group. This went far beyond the usual social pressures 
they faced as individuals in peace time. 41,500 Jewish men served in the 
British Armed Forces during the war, experiencing the trauma and comradeship 
of modern warfare, whilst also battling the negativity of being perceived as unfit 
for military service.1 On the Home Front the Jewish population experienced the 
same daily pressures faced by British society, including rationing, conscription 
and air raids, but the perception that, as a community, they were not ‘doing their 
bit’, continued to pervade the local and national press. The experiences of the 
war highlight the paradox of the Jewish experience, which was by no means 
homogenous across the community, but faced similar tensions about the nature 
of their relationship with Britain, whilst being a part of the war effort.  
   This tension was revealed throughout the years of the First World War. 
Increased antagonism between Jews and non-Jews in the East End of London 
was one such example, where a perception that Jews were profiting from the 
war effort whilst avoiding military service, sparked local violence. Conversely, 
there is also evidence that the war forged closer ties between the working class 
immigrant Jewish community of London and their British counterparts. If 
examined in isolation these experiences of the Jewish community appear to be 
                                                          
1 The total number of Jewish soldiers who served in the British Armed Forces during World 
War One equated to 13.8 per cent of British Jewry, a proportion greater than that of the 
general British population which totalled only 11.5 per cent. See Geoffrey Alderman, Modern 
British Jewry (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1992) p.233 
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contradictory. However, as with British society, there was no homogenous 
British Jewish experience of the First World War, helping to explain these 
contradictions.  A multitude of factors – including longevity of residence, cultural 
attachment to Britain, professional and economic situation, location, age and 
gender – shaped how Jewish people experienced the war. This insight 
demands that analysis of the Jewish experience of the First World War is 
sensitive to the distinctness of the Jewish narrative, whilst being aware of how 
demographic differences within the community affected their perception of 
British identity.   
   Considering the importance of the First World War for the later development 
of British Jewry, the conflict has been relatively underplayed in the 
historiography of the community. In the context of the 20th century, this is 
understandable. The Great War experiences of Anglo-Jewry have been 
overshadowed in public and academic consciousness since the mid-20th 
century by more dominant themes relating to the Holocaust, the Second World 
War and the creation of the state of Israel. In the case of the Second World 
War, this is a phenomenon that encompasses general public consciousness of 
20th century conflict and is not restricted to Jewish memory. Concepts and 
memories of the earlier global conflict are often viewed through the prism of the 
latter, not just by survivors who experienced both wars, but also within 
contemporary media and popular portrayals of the Great War. Rationing, air 
raids, conscription, U-boat blockade, total war economies, and gender equality 
in the war industries: all are associated primarily with the 1939-1945 war, with 
only a dim public consciousness that these ‘revolutionary’ tenets of industrial 
warfare characterised the events of 20 years previously. This is true also in the 
context of remembrance of Anglo-Jewry’s war. The all-encompassing impact of 
the Second World War for the Jewish community and the fight against the evils 
of Nazism draws attention away from the earlier conflict in which arguably 
Jewish interest had a more crucial stake in the outcome. In this regard the First 
World War was a war of catastrophe for Jews that did not end in 1918. As Jay 
Winter has stated, the degeneration of warfare and society that led to the 
Holocaust was only possible in a European society that had been forced to 
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comprehend the previously unimaginable scale of 10 million war deaths in 
1914-1918.2  
   This thesis seeks to re-examine the London Jewish experience of the First 
World War and demonstrate the unprecedented impact of the conflict on the 
development of the community. The study will show a community divided 
across lines of religion, nationality, and class, and the extent to which the First 
World War exacerbated these divisions as well as heightening tension between 
the Jewish community and mainstream British society. The First World War has 
been called a ‘Supremely nationalistic war’.3 This thesis will examine the impact 
of the war on Jewish nationalism in the British context. It will demonstrate how 
active service during the war instilled a Jewish patriotism, fed by the 
experiences of antisemitism in the British Army, the Balfour Declaration and 
service in Palestine. The war deepened divisions between the established 
Jewish community and the more recent immigrant Jewish community and led to 
the serious questioning of the existence of the religious and political authority 
that the former claimed over the latter. By the end of the war, two distinct and 
independent Jewish communities can be detected. The war provided a 
business boom for Jewish tailors, relaxation of naturalisation laws, and for 
many British Jews a vindication of their status as Britons through service and 
sacrifice on the front line. Conversely, it saw a sharp increase in anti-Jewish 
violence and agitation on the Home Front, discrimination in the British Army and 
a crisis over Russian Jewish conscription that threatened to permanently 
undermine the position of the Jewish community in British society. The war 
must be re-examined as an important event in the historiography of British 




                                                          
2 Jay Winter, The Great War and Jewish Memory, lecture given at the Leo Baeck Institute in 
London. 3 July 2014 
3 L.L Farrar jr. ‘Nationalism in Wartime: Critiquing the Conventional Wisdom’. In Fran 
Coetzee and Marilyn Shevin-Coetzee (eds.), Authority, Identity and the Social History of the 
Great War. (London, 1996), p.133. 
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 London Jewry: the Politics of Integration 1881-1914 
 
   This study focuses almost exclusively on the London-based demographic of 
British Jewry during the era of the Great War. This focus was selected primarily 
on the basis that London had the largest population of Jews living in Britain in 
this period and therefore the largest and richest source base for this particular 
history. The highest dependable estimates put the population of London Jewry 
at 180,000 in 1914, compared to a national total of 300,000.4 As Geoffrey 
Alderman has stated ‘Both in numbers and in economic status the Jews of 
London exercised the preponderating influence in ordering the affairs of British 
Jewry’.5 The majority of the Deputies representing London communities on the 
Board of Deputies of British Jews dominated numerically and participatively on 
Board matters, despite attempts in the years before 1914 to extend 
representation and participation to provincial communities.6 The experiences of 
Jews living in other urban centres such as Leeds, Manchester and Glasgow as 
well as in the provinces will be used for comparative discussions, as will the 
conditions and treatment of Jews in the other main belligerent powers to 
contrast and critique the London based Jews’ experience of the war. In 
selecting a specific urban environment for a focus on the issues of patriotism, 
race and split loyalties explored in this study, the importance of place and 
community in remembrance of the Great War can be more effectively utilised in 
the context of London Jewry. 
   This thesis will draw a clear distinction within the scope and experience of 
London Jewry during the First World War: between the older and more 
established Jewish community who maintained a strong English identity and 
was heavily integrated within English society, and the more recent immigrant 
Jewish population, whose residence in London began after 1881 and  can be 
characterised in 1914 as still in the process of transition between the eastern 
European culture of their origin and the British society of their current 
                                                          
4 Alderman, British Jewry, pp.119-120 
5 Ibid, p.16 
6 Aubrey Newman, ‘The Board of Deputies of British Jews, 1760 to the Present’. 
Parliaments, Estates Representation, 25:1, (2005), pp.84-85 
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residence. To account for the problems of the multiplicity of identity and 
experience within the broad categories of established and immigrant Jewries, 
this thesis will refer to the two communities of Jews in London as ‘West End’ 
and ‘East End’ Jews respectively. This may initially appear to confuse the 
definition further, with many ‘English’ born and orientated Jews residing in the 
East of London and, similarly, an entire and numerically dominant community of 
originally Eastern European Jews living in London’s West End districts. 
However, the great majority of Russian Jews who form the focus of chapter 
one, lived and worked and interacted with non-Jews within a relatively small 
geographical area between Aldgate and Bow in London’s historic East End.7 In 
comparison, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the majority of the leading 
families of Anglo-Jewry - notably the Rothschilds, the Montefiores and the 
Goldsmids - had relocated from the City to the fashionable districts of 
Kensington, Belgravia and Mayfair, followed in turn from the East End by the 
increasingly prosperous Jewish small business owners that formed the 
backbone of the London Jewish middle class.8 In discussing both the West End 
and East End Jewish communities in London during this period therefore, 
reference will be made primarily to ‘established Jewry’ and ‘immigrant Jewry’ 
respectively. However, whilst a local perspective to both communities’ war 
experience in regards local and national patriotisms will be employed in this 
thesis, the use of ‘West End’ and ‘East End’ Jewry as shorthand terms of 
differentiation are employed here more significantly as a social rather than a 
geographical delineation between the two groups.9 
 
   The Jewish East End was the most prominent Jewish enclave resulting from 
the great diasporic waves of Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe from 
1881 onwards. There had been Jewish immigration to London from Russia and 
Poland before this date, with a steady trickle of Eastern European Jews settling 
                                                          
7 David Englander (Ed.), A Documentary History of Jewish Immigrants in Britain 1840 – 
1920 (Leicester University Press, Leicester 1994), p.63 
8 Alderman, British Jewry, pp.12-15 
9 In this regards this mirrors the use of the terms ‘West End’ and ‘East End’ to differentiate 
between English and Yiddish speaking Jews in London by Sharman Kadish. See Sharman 
Kadish, Bolsheviks and British Jews: The Anglo-Jewish Community, Britain and the Russian 
Revolution (Frank Cass, London 1992), p.9 
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in the city since the 18th century.10 In 1850 the total Jewish population of Britain 
stood at less than 40,000, of whom approximately 18,000 were thought to 
reside in London.11 The Jewish East End both as a term and an entity did not 
yet exist, however there were several thousand Jews residing between the east 
of the City where the bulk of London’s mid-19th century Jewish population 
resided and the suburban environs of Stepney Green and Mile End.12 The 
district of Bethnal Green that flanked Stepney had a particular concentration of 
Jewish migration into the neighbourhood prior to this period, a map of the area 
in 1850 reveals a local synagogue with an adjacent Jewish school, a ‘JewsW’ 
road and three Jewish cemeteries that marked the eastern fringe of London in 
the mid-19th Century.13  
   The Jewish population of London, approximately 46,000 before the 1881 
pogroms, had risen to 135,000 by 1900, of which an estimated 120,000 lived in 
the East End.14 In an area of less than two square miles lived nine-tenths of the 
Jewish population of turn of the century Britain.15 Motivation for Jewish 
immigration from Russia was multifaceted. For some such as the parents of 
East London carpenter Sam Clarke, the violent anti-Jewish pogroms that 
followed in the wake of Tsar Alexander II’s assassination in 1881 convinced 
                                                          
10 Todd Endelman, The Jews of Britain 1656 to 2000 (University of California Press, London 
2002), p.128 
11 J. A Green, Social History of the Jewish East End in London 1914-1939 (The Edwin 
Mellen Press, Lampeter 1991), P.35 
12 An entry in the ‘Dickens Dictionary of London 1888, an Unconventional Handbook’ 
complied by Charles Dickens Jr (1837-1896) lists the Jewish settlement in London as being 
geographically limited: ‘Within the memory of living man the Jews of the metropolis were 
scarcely ever to be found resident outside their own quarter, at the east end of the City, 
embracing Bevis Marks, Aldgate, Houndsditch, the Minorities, Haydon sq…Goodman’s-
fields, Whitechapel. Petticote Lane (since called Middlesex-st, but dear the heart of Isreal as 




14 Alderman, British Jewry, pp.117-118. John Marriot puts the number of immigrants from 
Tsarist Russia arriving in London at 9,000 in 1881 rising to 63,000 by 1911. See John 
Marriott, Beyond the Tower: a History of East London (Yale University Press, London 2012), 
p.228. Marriot concedes that these numbers reflect only those Russian and Polish 
immigrants that had been processed entering East London between these years, and does 
not accurately reflect the number of immigrants who subsequently stayed. The Jewish 
Board of Guardians and other concerned institutions worked to have a sizable proportion of 
Jewish immigrants repatriated or provided passage on to the U.S.A. Marriot concludes that 
immigration exceeded emigration into the area by approximately twice as much. 
15Englander, History of Jewish Immigrants, p.63 
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many Jews that their future safety and prosperity could no longer be assured.16 
As John Klier and Jonathan Dekel-Chen have shown in recent works on anti-
Jewish violence in Russia during the 19th century, state officials neither desired 
nor organised pogroms against Jews (although they displayed an indifference 
in preventing the violence), but the contemporary belief among Jewish 
immigrants and their descendants in state sponsored anti-Jewish violence in 
Russia remained powerful, and would animate responses to state authority and 
mob violence during the First World War.17 Despite this, most decisions to leave 
their homeland were motivated predominantly by the lack of economic 
opportunities for Jews in Imperial Russia than the direct experience of violence. 
The systematic repression of Jews rather than the destructive acts of organised 
violence was cited by the majority of Jewish migrants as the reason for their 
journeys when asked by the House of Lords Select Committee on the Sweating 
System in 1888.18  
   The decision to choose Britain as the destination to start a new life was also 
wide-ranging among migrant Jews. The established Jewish community in 
Britain and particularly the Russian and Polish Jewish migrants more recently 
settled in East London offered the prospect of familial support upon arrival and 
the friendly protection of wealthy English Jews sympathetic to their plight. In 
reality, many Russian Jews arrived in the East End bearing little more than an 
address for the Poor Jews’ Temporary Shelter in Leman Street, and despite the 
philanthropic support provided by Anglo-Jewry from which the shelter itself was 
a product, the general sentiment of established Jews was to discourage further 
immigration.19 The two-week residence limit for new arrivals at the shelter on 
Leman Street was an indication of this. Many were drawn by the promise of civil 
and political liberties and economic opportunities in Britain for which Jews were 
disbarred under the Tsarist state and were not deterred by worrying accounts of 
                                                          
16 Sam Clarke, Sam: an East End Cabinet-maker (Inner London Education Authority, 
London 1979), p.12 
17 John Klier, Russians, Jews, and the Pogroms of 1881-1882 (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2011) p.384, p.414. Jonathan Dekel-Chen, David Gaunt, Natan Meir and Israel 
Bartal (eds.), Anti-Jewish Violence: Rethinking the Pogrom in East European History 
(Indiana University Press, Bloomington 2011) 
18 John Marriot, Beyond the Tower, p.228 
19 William Fishman, East End Jewish Radicals 1875-1914 (Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd, 
London 1975), p.33 
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the overcrowded streets and labour markets of the East End and the anger of 
the local populous towards Jewish immigrants hinted at in letters from already 
established relatives.20 For many, the United States was the preferred 
destination,21  but the expense of the transatlantic journey often saw travellers 
split their trip with a stop in a British port, many subsequently remaining due to 
lack of funds for the remaining journey.22 This contributed to the transitional 
status of London’s immigrant Jewish community, increasing the detachment to 
British society to which a significant number of the new arrivals did not intend to 
settle in long term.  
   Eastern European Jews arriving in Britain settled predominantly in urban 
areas with an already established Jewish community with a penetrable industry 
to support them - Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham and Glasgow all had 
small but vibrant Jewish contingents that provided the institutional and cultural 
support the new arrivals sought and burgeoning clothing industries satisfied the 
labour aspirations they had left Russia in search of. But it was London that the 
bulk of post 1881 Eastern European Jewish immigrants - perhaps as many as 
70% - established themselves, and the majority settled in the Eastern part of 
the city.23 Bill Belmont, born in 1910 in Old Montague Street, East London, 
recalled his father’s and other Jewish immigrant’s experience of arriving in 
London for the first time: ‘On disembarking, the mass of Jews carrying bundles 
containing all their worldly possessions were taken by representatives of the 
London Jewish Board of Guardians, who met every ship, to the Jews’ 
temporary shelter in Leman Street. There they waited, hoping that some friend 
or relative who had already established himself in London would turn up and 
help. My father was lucky; one of his relatives from Druja arrived who 
introduced him to another Jewish exile who had already started a clothing 
factory. Dad was taken on as a tailor.’24 
                                                          
20 ibid 
21 Robert Winder, Bloody Foreigners: the Story of Immigration to Britain (Little, Brown, 
London 2004), pp.175-176 between 1881 and 1924 2,800,000 Jews emigrated from Europe 
to the United States. See Rhoda G Lewin, ‘Stereotype and reality in the Jewish immigrant 
experience in Minneapolis’ Minnesota Historical Society 46 (1979),  p.259 
22 Todd Endelman, The Jews of Britain 1656 to 2000 (University of California Press, London 
2002), p.128 
23 Endelman, Jews of Britain, p.129 
24 Bill Belmont in Venitia Murray, Echoes of the East End (Viking, London 1989), p.169 
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   East London has long been the point of arrival for newcomers to Britain. In 
the late 1680s large numbers of French Huguenots sought refuge from religious 
persecution in the wake of the repeal of the Edicts of Nantes in 1685 that 
effectively made Protestantism illegal in France. Many of them found it in 
Spitalfields and the adjoining areas, close to but conveniently located outside 
the perimeters of the City of London so that they could establish a silk weaving 
industry free from the restrictive legislation of the City Guild.25 Despite being 
welcomed with a warmth experienced by few refugee groups arriving in 
England before or since - a public subscription raised £200,000 for their plight - 
their skill and success as weavers quickly led to complaints from their English 
equivalents.26 As the Huguenot community in East London dwindled in the 18th 
century through assimilation, resettlement elsewhere in London or repatriation 
to France, the ire of the local populace’s economic resentment was drawn 
instead to the large number of Irish labourers who had settled in the area willing 
to take work as journeyman weavers at low wage rates that undercut English 
workers.27 The subsequent ill feeling revealed itself in a series of anti-Irish riots 
through the course of the century, the summer of 1736 for example witnessing 
a 4,000 strong mob marching through Shoreditch and Spitalfields chanting 
‘down with the Irish’ and attacking Irish owned houses and businesses.28 As 
John Marriot has stated, ‘at moments of particular tension the [East London] 
labour force turned in on itself to reveal fissures along lines of race’.29    
   150 or so years later, anti-alien sentiment in the East End orientated around 
the perceived economic threat posed to non-Jews in the tailoring industry by 
the new arrivals.30 Excluded from the civil service and other more sedentary 
professions in Russia, many Russian Jews acquired work in trade and 
commerce industries, particularly tailoring and shoemaking.31 Upon arrival in 
London the sweated trades - usually clothing industries structured around small 
                                                          
25 Marriot, Beyond the Tower, p35 
26 Chaim Bermant, London’s East End: Point of Arrival (Macmillan Publishing Co, London 
1975), p.31 
27 Marriot, Beyond the Tower, p.80 
28 Ibid. 
29 ibid 
30 William J. Fishman, East End 1888 (Five Leaves Publications, Nottingham 1988), pp.80-
81 
31 Marriot, Beyond the Tower, p.229 
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workshops employing cheap and plentiful low skilled labourers - provided the 
only means of employment for many immigrant Jews, swallowing up as many 
as 70% of new migrants. The majority found residence in the crowded streets of 
Whitechapel in which a high proportion of the workshops were situated.32 
Employment in these workshops were characterised by dismal working 
conditions, long hours and low pay -  attracting concern and condemnation from 
social and public health reformers, but also resentment among union officials 
and local anti-alien agitators that immigrant labour was flooding the labour 
market, undercutting English workers and producing poor quality goods.33 
Walter Southgate, born in 1891 in Bethnal Green and whose father was an 
English cabinet maker, recalled ‘they [Eastern European Jews] had invaded the 
East End as had other races in the past and were exploited by their 
compatriots, cheapening their labour products to the detriment of the East End 
English cabinet makers. As employers of labour they were ready to exploit this 
new penniless immigrant labour which the government did little to control’.34 
Southgate was incorrect in implying ‘sweating’ was an exclusively Jewish 
problem, as the practice was widespread within the largely deregulated East 
London industries associated with the practice, however his hostile sentiment 
was a fairly typical and historic response within an East London working class 
facing a perceived economic threat from an immigrant community.35  
   Anne Kershen in her 2007 article ‘The Construction of Home in an Imagined 
Landscape’, shows how three successive immigrant communities in the East 
End - the Huguenots in the 17th century, Russian Jews in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries and the later Bangladeshi community in the 1970s onwards - 
constructed imagined versions of the lost homeland in their new residence in 
the East End base on the three cornerstones of language, diet and religion.36 
By 1914 Whitechapel alone boasted four daily Yiddish newspapers. As Julia 
Bush has stated ‘Despite dialect variations which reflected divisions of culture 
and nationality among the Jewish East Enders, Yiddish was a unifying factor 
                                                          
32 Ibid 
33 Endelman The Jews of Britain, pp.134-135 
34 Walter Southgate, That’s The Way It Is. A Working Class Autobiography 1890-1950 (New 
Clarion Press, Oxted 1982), p33 
35 Marriot, Beyond the Tower, p.225; p.80 
36 Anne J. Kershen, ‘The Construction of Home in a Spitalfields Landscape’, 
Landscape Research, 29:3, (2004) pp.261-275 
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because it was universally understood’.37 Yiddish language musical comedies, 
melodramas and operettas were regular features of the halls and clubs across 
the East End, the most famous being the Pavilion Theatre on Whitechapel 
Road.38 There were 35 synagogues in East London by 1914, providing an 
integral community network that provided not only the daily support and 
religious needs of their congregations but the perpetuation of Judaism and 
knowledge of Hebrew through religious education.39 And the 126 kosher 
poulterers in Spitalfields alone attest to the perseverance of the staple chicken 
loksun soup, a transferred recipe from the Shetl.40 This transfer of culture 
allowed for an imagined construction of the lost homeland to be created within 
the alien and hostile environment of East London in which a collective identity 
could be continued, albeit one which could be attacked for creating isolation 
from the host society.41 However, this was far from a crystallised process - as 
Kershen shows the reimagined homeland was continually shaped by the forces 
of assimilation, and this was most evident in the school rooms and playing 
yards of East London schools. Only 20% of immigrant Jewish children attended 
Jewish schools, the rest attending nondenominational state-supported schools 
where they interacted and socialised with English children and were introduced 
to the language, customs, literature and traditions of English culture.42 Sam 
Clarke, born in Bethnal Green in 1907 several years after his parents emigrated 
from Russia, recalled his school experiences: ‘I went to Teesdale St. School in 
Hackney Rd… Almost a third of the boys in my class were Jewish, apart from 
an occasional fair fist-fight between two boys we were friendly to each other.’43 
    The Jewish East End was not a homogenous community but one containing 
many divergent national backgrounds, experiences, levels of religious 
observance, stages of British integration and aspirations. There was, as Anne 
Kershen has noted, a number of ‘intellectual, social and communal divisions 
that existed within the Eastern European immigrant community’ which 
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problematises attempts to characterise the Jewish East End acting with one 
aim.44 This study will focus primarily on the Russian Jewish community post 
1881 but many non-Russian Jews lived in and characterised the Jewish East 
End of this era. Within this community, a further generational distinction can be 
drawn. The first generation of mostly Russian Jewish immigrants displayed 
indifference - bordering on hostility - towards both the prospect of further 
acculturation within British society and Britain’s war cause. Yiddish was widely 
spoken throughout the Jewish East End, particularly by first generation 
immigrants, and was a prominent barrier to social interaction with non-Jewish 
residents. The majority of these Jews adopted an immigrant perspective of their 
adopted home, retaining the language and culture of the shtetl and conscious 
and mutually desirous segregation from their English neighbours.  
   The identity and aspirations of the second generation of this community is 
more ambiguous. Born and schooled in Britain (although not necessarily 
naturalised citizens, as the process of naturalisation was expensive and time-
consuming) and with a greater grasp of English and the finer nuances of British 
society, this younger generation were also heavily influenced by the cultural 
customs and expectations of the elder generation. This younger generation of 
immigrant Jews in the East End - the majority of who were of military age by the 
later stages of the war - would become the subject of intense national pressure 
and local hostility during the conscription crisis of 1917. Overall, Jews of 
Russian origin in the East End of London were largely indifferent to concepts of 
British patriotism and displayed hostility towards attempts to mobilise them into 
Britain’s war effort. Whilst the fifteen years or so before the outbreak of the 
Great War saw a gradual process of acculturation within the Jewish East End, 
the community in 1914 could still be broadly characterised as a community in 
transition. However, as the thesis will demonstrate, the processes of the war 
and in particular the effects of serving in the British Army within the Jewish 
Battalions, created a sense of Britishness, albeit with numerous conditions, that 
did not exist before 1914. Both aspects of the London Jewish war experience 
were tied together in part by English hostility. The Jewish Battalion scheme 
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brought together these experiences and nurtured both a new British patriotism 
or refocused connection to Britain whilst paradoxically instilling a renewed 
Jewish nationalism through involvement in Zionist activities.   
 
   I have eschewed for the most part using the terms integrated or assimilated 
for describing London’s West End Jewish community, as this would give the 
impression that all West London Jews had supplanted a Jewish identity for a 
notional religious one and this was not universally the case. The employment of 
the term ‘established Jewry’ and ‘West End Jewry’ are used here to describe 
English Jews, belonging predominantly to the upper and middle classes of 
Edwardian Britain’s stratified society. As already noted, the majority of English 
Jews in London resided predominantly, albeit far from exclusively, in the central 
western districts of the metropolis. Again, the majority though certainly not the 
entirety, of these Jewish ‘West Enders’, considered themselves to be English in 
nationality and culture, and were bound together by a loose local communal 
patriotism centring in part on the activities and influence of the West London 
Synagogue and the larger United Synagogue, despite the ecclesiastical divide 
between the two congregations.45 The separation between the Liberal Judaism 
of the West London Synagogue and the continued orthodoxy of the United 
Synagogue was a point of division within the communal life of Jewish West 
Londoners in the years before 1914, but as Alderman has stated there was a 
‘remarkable similarity in social class between the membership of the West 
London congregation and that of the larger United synagogues, coupled with 
the high degree of social and professional contact between the lay and 
ecclesiastical leaderships of both’.46 The majority of this ‘West End’ Jewish 
community overwhelmingly felt themselves to be English, and engaged in the 
war effort with unqualified patriotism. However, the repeated controversies 
during the war that placed emphasis on their status as Jews rather than 
Englishmen and women, to an extent diminished this patriotism. 
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    The Jewish East End can be more easily identified geographically and 
demographically than its West End equivalent. The high proportion of Jewish 
residents of the various East End districts, their relatively recent arrival, and 
their distinctive difference in appearance and culture from the surrounding 
indigenous population allows a more accurate if problematic delineation of a 
distinct community, defined primarily by its Eastern European customs and 
continued orthodoxy. Established Jewry could be defined less readily − by key 
individuals, prominent families and powerful institutions rather than 
geographical boundaries and cultural stereotypes. Political and financial 
leadership within London’s Jewish community had passed from the Sephardi to 
the German immigrant element in the early to mid-nineteenth century - a 
process perhaps best demonstrated by the success of the bonds trading 
company N M Rothschild & Sons. The Rothschild family and a small group of 
other prominent Anglo-Jewish families exerted a powerful influence over this 
Jewish community based loosely around the West End districts of Mayfair, 
Bloomsbury and Belgravia.47 These families were far from atypical of course. 
The majority of anglicised Jews in London were middle class, involved in 
sedentary professions48 and whose attire and demeanour was akin to the rest 
of middle-England.49 In contrast, the majority of Jews living or working in the 
West End of London at this time were low-paid immigrant workers, indistinct 
from their East End equivalents other than their local attachments to street and 
kin. As Gerry Black in his history of the Jewish West End stated ‘Nowhere else 
covers such a wide diversity of nationalities, wealth and poverty, poor housing 
and mansions. Other areas may claim one or more attributes but only the West 
End has them all. Established wealthy families lived close by the majority of 
immigrant workers… At the end of the 19th century Montefiores, Rothschilds 
and Mocattas lived around the corner from the tailors and small traders of Soho 
and Fitzrovia’.50 The term ‘West End Jewry’ is therefore a somewhat 
inadequate catch-all term, but for the purposes of this thesis it will refer 
exclusively to the ‘Montefiores, Rothschilds and Mocattas’ and the bulk of the 
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acculturated Jewish middles classes, rather than the ‘tailors and small traders 
of Soho and Fitzrovia’. 
   There were a number of openly orthodox West End Jews, whose Jewishness 
was absolutely public and visible. Prominent examples in this period include 
Samuel Montagu, 1st Baron Swaythling and Liberal MP for Whitechapel 
between 1885 and 1900. However, for many of these bourgeois and elite Jews, 
Jewish practice was largely transferred to the private sphere.51 As Sam 
Johnson has argued ‘in terms of Anglo-Jewish ambition, the greatest 
achievement was to be wholly unrecognisable as a Jew’.52 Johnson perhaps 
exaggerates the process of Jewish acculturation in this period here, yet David 
Feldman has demonstrated that Jewish achievement of civil liberties in 1858 
led to greater pressure on Jews ‘not only to justify the persistence of Judaism 
within a Christian society but also to show themselves worthy of inclusion within 
the nation’.53 Attempts within Anglo-Jewry to reform Judaism and reduce 
cultural ties to the level of other Protestant denominations was one result of 
this, as was a parallel conscious attempt to reduce differentiation and integrate 
successfully into the nation, made more pressing by the collectivism promoted 
both by the ideology of New Liberalism and Conservative Imperialism. Chaim 
Lewis, a Jewish resident of Soho at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
recalled: ‘Many of the Jews who came into the West End began to show early 
signs of assimilation. They no longer observed the Sabbath. Well, it happened 
in the East End too, but because they had greater numbers there was always a 
stronger reservoir of orthodox Jews who adhered to the strict tenets of Judaism. 
Whereas in the West End you saw the loosening of religious ties even among 
the newly arrived immigrants’.54 The Central Synagogue on Great Portland 
Street was renowned for its anglicised congregation. Chaim Lewis recalled ‘My 
father used to call them the Englischer Yehudim, the English Jews’.55 The 
indistinctive features of the integrated Jewish community in early 20th century 
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London were in fact a point of distinction, and the product of a nuanced but 
concerted process of ‘De-emphasising foreignness’ within London Jewry.56 
   The acceleration of Jewish immigration into Britain from Russia and Tsarist-
controlled lands after 1881 threatened to reverse this process. As a result the 
established London Jewish community created and shaped social institutions 
such as the Jewish Board of Guardians, the Jews’ Free School, and the Jews 
Temporary Shelter, as well as the Board of Deputies of British Jews ‘through 
which to introduce to poor and alien Jews the values of the English middle 
class’.57 The Anglo-Jewish Association and other philanthropic institutions were 
active in nurturing the new arrivals on humanitarian grounds but anxiety 
remained within Anglo-Jewry regarding British concerns covering such issues 
as poverty, crime and degeneration, and the belief of British public opinion that 
it was Anglo-Jewry’s responsibility to police the immigrant population.58 Harder-
edged attempts to dominate the religious, economic and political leadership of 
the new arrivals included attempts to absorb immigrant congregations in the 
East End under the authority and model of the United Synagogue, the union of 
British orthodox Jewish synagogues that formed the dominant force in religious 
and communal organization within British Jewry.59 Politically, the BoD and the 
AJA spoke (and spoke often) on behalf of all Jews residing in Britain, and the 
Jewish Chronicle competed with Yiddish papers to become the organ of the 
‘East End’ as well as the ‘West End’ of London Jewry.60  
   Attempts to anglicise, reform and influence the new arrivals also took the form 
of initiatives such as the formation of Jewish youth movements in the East End. 
One example of this was the establishment of the Jewish Lads Brigade, which 
attempted to instil supposed British virtues of modesty and military discipline in 
immigrant youth.61 Established in 1895 by the vice chairman of the influential 
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Anglo-Jewish Gentleman’s club the Maccabeans, the brigade aimed to 
‘Cultivate the sound spirit in the sound body which marked the well trained 
soldier… and to spread amongst Jewish working lads the habits of smartness 
and obedience, while augmenting their growth and general vigour’.62 Members 
of the JLB would account for 27% of Jewish deaths in the British Army during 
the war (525 of 1,949).63 The Brigade went some way to altering the negative 
image of the Jew as soldier in both Jewish and non-Jewish perceptions, but its 
popularity amongst East London Immigrants remained low in the years before 
the war due to the legacy of the brutal treatment of Jews under military 
conscription in the Tsarist Empire. Girls were only belatedly inducted into the 
Brigade in the late 1950s and 1960s to form The Jewish Lads and Girls’ 
Brigade. However a similar youth club, The Jewish Girls’ Club preceded the 
JLB, forming in 1886, and provided the inspiration for the formation of a male 
equivalent.64  
    The dominant motivation behind these Anglo-Jewish initiatives was the fear 
that the continuing ‘foreignness’ of immigrant Jews threatened to ‘Drag it 
[Anglo-Jewry] down in a wave of popular anti-Semitic resentment’.65 The 
increased size of the Jewish community in Britain − 65,000 in 1881 to nearly 
300,000 by 1914 − coincided with a period of deep reflection and anxiety 
concerning the state of the nation amongst certain circles of British intellectuals 
and nationalists.66 British society had purportedly entered a general malaise 
induced by debilitating conditions for the working classes, Imperial overstretch 
and, fundamentally in many nationalist perceptions, the creeping calamity of the 
‘encroaching alien hordes’.67 The agitations of anti-alien campaigners such as 
Arnold White, who sought to ‘eliminate aliens whose living and work habits 
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undermined the health and welfare of the nation’, led inexorably to the Aliens 
Act of 1905 that greatly restricted the further entry of ‘undesirable’ immigrants.68  
   Despite Colin Holmes’ famous statement that ‘at no point between 1876 and 
1914 did any [government] introduce discriminatory legislation specifically 
against Jews’,69 the groundswell of low-level agitation headed by the likes of 
Arnold White that led indirectly to the Act were anti-Jewish in nature, and as 
Lara Trubowitz has argued, many of the parliamentarians involved in its 
passing were guilty of ‘Civil’ antisemitism.70 Among the front ranks of anti-alien 
campaigners calling for tougher legislation against immigration was the 
Conservative MP for Stepney Major William Evans-Gordon. After a successful 
military and diplomatic career in British India, Evans-Gordon was elected MP 
for Stepney on an anti-alien platform in the 1900 general election. Stepney, as 
will be discussed in more detail in chapter one, was a hotbed of anti-alien 
sentiment as a result of high immigration into a historically poor London 
constituency. Evans-Gordon used his position as an East End MP to promote 
and strengthen the local connections of his personal project, the anti-alien 
group the British Brothers’ League.71 Despite attempts by Evans-Gordon and 
other high ranking members to present the League as anti-immigrant rather 
than specifically antisemitic in intent, Jews were highly prominent amongst the 
immigrant communities targeted by the group, and many of the BBL’s larger 
meetings were characterised by anti-Jewish rants by affiliated speakers.72 
Established Jewry challenged the excesses of anti-alienism and exposed the 
exaggeration in certain arguments: the MP Stuart Samuel pointed out that only 
1,753 aliens depended on Government assistance in 1903, a fraction of the 
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number quoted by White.73 The Jewish Chronicle vigorously opposed the bill, 
consistently attempting to expose anti-alien sentiment as thinly disguised 
antisemitism, warning in 1904: ‘We cannot believe that the Home Secretary has 
seriously considered the danger of generating such dangerous distinctions in 
the popular mind, and of creating the beginnings of an anti-Jewish sentiment 
under government patronage’.74 In the context of the later Aliens Acts of 1914 
and 1919, the Act of 1905 did not drastically limit the possibility of immigration 
into Britain - instead, as Colin Holmes has put it, the historic tradition of free 
entry for aliens into Britain was now a ‘discretionary, rather than an absolute 
right’.75 However, the 1905 Act served as a psychological and symbolic 
deterrent to further immigration, and immigration into Britain from Tsarist Russia 
fell from more than 12,000 in 1906 to less than 4,000 by 1911.76 The Act may 
not have been outwardly prejudiced towards Jewish immigrants, but as John 
Garrard has pointed out, it was less important whether the Aliens Act was 
antisemitic in intent than that the public thought it might be.77 
   The Act also greatly increased the anxiety of communal leaders regarding the 
damage to the reputation of the community and resulted in increased 
intervention into the functioning of the Jewish East End to further root out the 
‘foreignness’ of the immigrant Jew.78 To quote the historian William Fishman, 
this can be summarised as a plea to immigrant Jews to ‘Eschew your Yiddish 
language and culture. Adopt the English language with its civilising customs’.79 
These attempts at control were increasingly frustrated in the years immediately 
preceding 1914 by the growth of Jewish trade unionism, political movements 
and the vigorous defence of congregational integrity. The growing confidence 
and security of Russian Jewish political institutions and the increasing 
prosperity of the tailoring trade provides evidence that two autonomous camps 
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within British Jewry had been formed before the outbreak of the war. By 1914, 
established Jewry’s interventions in the Jewish East End were ‘increasingly 
defensive and, at moments, desperate’.80 
 
 The First World War in British Jewish Memory 
 
   To mark the centenary of the First World War in 2014, the Jewish Museum of 
London put on a major exhibition: For King and Country? The Jewish 
Experience of the First World War. Running from March to August 2014, the 
exhibition demonstrated the multifaceted impact the war had on the Jewish 
community and Jewish individuals, set to a background narrative of a Jewish 
community experiencing acute social and demographic pressures to ‘fit in’ with 
British expectations of their perceived role in the nation. As the curator of the 
exhibition Roz Currie said in a talk at the Leo Baeck Institute in April 2014, the 
exhibition concerns directly Jewish ‘motivations for service’ in the British Armed 
forces, particularly its split loyalties.81  
   The exhibition marked the first large-scale representation of the Jewish 
experience of the Great War in the museum’s eighty-three year history, 
dovetailing neatly with the public’s heightened interest in everything World War 
One in the centenary year. Many of the props and show piece exhibits were 
lifted from the lesser known Jewish Military Museum in Hendon, and little 
attempt was made to utilise the incredibly rich and varying source material in 
the collections at the Imperial War Museum or the National Archives at Kew 
relating to Jewish life and the war. There was an overemphasis on the 
contemporary experience of 1914-1918 for the ‘Jewish voices’ on display, but 
little focus on how the war exacerbated pre-war conditions, or significance 
accorded to the legacy of the war for the Jewish community, an absence of 
emphasis true also within British Jewish studies as a whole. However, the 
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exhibition succeeded in providing a public narrative of Anglo-Jewry’s Great War 
experience that simply did not previously exist. Public consciousness on the 
subject of Jews, war and antisemitism were restricted in the main to discourses 
on the interwar struggles with fascist groups and the impact of the Second 
World War.  
  This re-examination of the war from an Anglo-Jewish perspective and the 
broader connection of British society and Empire to the First World War 
coincided with an increased media scrutiny on Jewish life in Britain, centring on 
the intensity and nature of 21st Century antisemitism. In the summer of 2014 
newspapers reported on ‘the rising tide of anti-Semitism in Britain’ connected to 
the recent Gaza conflict.82 Since the Gaza violence British antisemitism has 
continued to rise - the Metropolitan Police revealed the number of antisemitic 
crimes in London rose 61% between November 2014 and November 2015 
compared to the same period the previous year, and on 2 April 2016 a group of 
far right protesters held an anti-Jewish demonstration in front of a war memorial 
in Golders Green.83 Remembering the Jewish experience of the Great War − 
with Jews attacked and abused on the streets of London within the context of a 
wider conflict − is therefore directly relevant today. The war presented many 
flash points of high tension between Jews and non-Jews. A particularly nasty 
anti-Jewish incident occurred in September 1917 in Bethnal Green; Jewish 
businesses were looted and vandalised, and hundreds of immigrant Jews 
subjected to violent attacks in the streets. In determining the motivation driving 
the English crowd to violence against their Jewish neighbours, documentary 
analysis has uncovered several key determinants. Anger at a perceived non-
commitment on behalf of the Jewish community to Britain’s war cause; war-
strain and shortages on the Home Front; economic xenophobia resulting from 
Jewish encroachment in traditionally English industries such as tailoring and 
cabinet making. In truth all three factors – their perception as much as reality – 
blended together to create the conditions for local fury to pour forth. Local 
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memory mythologised how English tailors serving in the war were muscled out 
of their territory by entrepreneurial Jews ‘shirking’ their responsibilities, making 
quick bucks whilst East London families starved.84 
   The memory of Bethnal Green in 1917 has been invoked many times since, 
particularly in the struggles with fascist groups in the periods before and after 
the Second World War. It remains a relevant issue in 21st century London, with 
violent attacks on London synagogues and Jewish individuals spiking during 
the 2014 conflict in Gaza and fuelling high levels of antisemitic crime in Britain 
in the subsequent years.85 Again, a war situation is seen to degrade Jewish and 
non-Jewish relations in Britain, despite the comparatively small number of 
incidents involved. With the centenary celebrations in 2014, World War One 
studies have gained a greater public prominence with the British public that will 
culminate in the centenary of the Armistice on 11 November 2018 (with a 
postscript in July 2019 to mark the centenary of the Versailles peace 
conference). During this prolonged period of commemoration and reflection, 
how much of Britain’s public and media-driven remembrance should be focused 
on unpalatable aspects of Britain’s war, in particular its treatment of minority 
groups during periods of intense war strain? In remembering the First World 
War, how much significance should historians of Anglo-Jewry attach to events 
such as Bethnal Green in 1917, as relevant or even central to an understanding 
of the Jewish war experience in London?86 It is striking for instance, that no 
mention of the disturbances in Bethnal Green appear in the Jewish Museum’s 
King and Country exhibition. 
   The focus and debates within Anglo-Jewish history have changed 
fundamentally in the past fifty years or so. When Cecil Roth, in his 1964 work 
The History of Jews in England, spoke of Jewish immigrants arriving in 
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Edwardian England being greeted with ‘a measure of freedom which has been 
the case in scarcely any other [nation]’87, he was affirming an entrenched 
tradition of viewing Anglo-Jewish history as a success story to be held up 
proudly against the continental Jewish communities’ experience of persecution 
and pogroms. This narrative of ‘success’ was first constructed near the end of 
the 19th century, with the holding of the first Anglo-Jewish Historical Exhibition 
in 1887 and the creation of the Jewish Historical Society of England in 1893, 
established as part of a drive to take Anglo-Jewish history more seriously by 
members of the Jewish elite (Lucien Wolf, Joseph Jacobs, Israel Abrahams and 
others) and the urgings of the Jewish Chronicle.88 Although many of the themes 
discussed were similar to those picked out by later historians − that Anglo-
Jewish history was interesting and worth studying and that the study of it 
illuminated English history − the historians associated with the JHSE embraced 
the notion that their writing ought to serve the interests of the Jewish 
community.89  Hence, the achievements of the community and the liberalism of 
the adopted land were accentuated over the negatives such as the poverty of 
the immigrant Jewish communities and the anti-Jewish nature of the anti-alien 
laws, for example. However the American scholar Lloyd Gartner’s 1960 study 
The Jewish Immigrant in England 1870-1914 ushered in a period of renewed 
professional interest in Anglo-Jewish history that explored themes the JHSE 
have in the past  found unpalatable.90 This included a renewed interest in the 
effects of immigration, urbanisation, gender issues and most overtly, discussing 
the existence and prevalence of antisemitism in British society.91     
   Luminaries of this ‘new school’ within British Jewish studies such as Tony 
Kushner (1989), David Cesarani (1990), and Mark Levene (1992) continued to 
question the ‘myth of English exceptionalism’ from Jewish prejudice.92 However 
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William Rubinstein (1996) challenged what he saw as the ‘systematic 
exaggeration of both the volume and significance of modern anti-Semitism’ in 
their works combined with a ‘equally notable insensitivity to philosemitism’, and 
characterised the group as ‘the school of the Jew as a victim, an interpretation 
obviously central to understanding the history of the Jews in Germany or 
Russia, but almost entirely irrelevant to the Jewish experience in Britain’.93 
Rubinstein has also argued antisemitism was ‘virtually unknown’ in Britain 
before the First World War.94 This is a gross understatement of British 
antisemitism on Rubinstein’s part, but does reveal the problematic nature of 
identifying and interpreting acts of antisemitism in the British case that differ in 
tone and violence, if not scale, from continental comparisons. Specific cases of 
violent antisemitic activity were quite rare, and those who outwardly 
campaigned against Jews were generally marginalised within British society 
and culture.95 Instead, Kushner (2013) largely abandons the term ‘antisemitism’ 
as too limiting and provocative, preferring the concept of British ambivalence – 
‘supporting some Jews or their alleged activities and opposing others’ − and 
emphasising intolerance to difference in English society.96 English Jews were in 
effect given the choice of shedding their Jewishness or face being shunned, 
ridiculed and lampooned by the English establishment many of the Jewish elite 
believed themselves to belong to; a type of ‘Garden party’ antisemitism, as 
Todd Endelman (2002) refers to it.97 Concurrently, English Jews were driven to 
appear unimpeachably English, a loss of Jewishness, or what makes Jewish 
cultural identity, that has been attacked by David Cesarani among others as 
‘unnatural’.98   
                                                                                                                                                                   
Making of Modern Anglo-Jewry (Blackwell, Oxford 1990); Mark Levene, War, Jews, and the 
New Europe 
93 William D Rubinstein, A History of the Jews in the English-Speaking World: Great Britain. 
(Macmillan Press Ltd, London 1996), p.32 
94 Ibid, p.34 
95 Tony Kushner.  ‘Anti-Semitism in Britain: Continuity and the absence of a resurgence?’ 
Ethnic and Racial Studies, 36 (2013), p.441 
96 Tony Kushner, ‘Remembering to Forget: Racism and Anti-Racism in Post War Britain’. In 
Bryan Cheyette and Laura Marcus, (eds.), Modernity, Culture and “The Jew”, (Polity Press, 
Cambridge 1998)  
97 Todd Endelman, Jews Of Britain 1656-2000, (University of California Press, Berkley 
2002), p.262 
98 David Cesarani, ‘Dual Heritage or Dual Heritages’ in, Tony Kushner (ed.). The Jewish 
Heritage in British History. (Frank Cass, London 1992), p.37 
P a g e  | 31 
 
   The theme of national identity and to what extent Jewishness and 
Englishness were interconnected has been re-examined in this context, most 
directly by David Feldman in his 1994 work Englishmen and Jews in which he 
argues that many of the key developments in late Victorian and Edwardian 
British society, such as the growth of the collectivist state and the politicisation 
of the working class, can be better understood through a close examination of 
the Jewish minority and vice versa.99 Examination of these themes of national 
identity and patriotism, immigration and urbanisation, is essential in order to 
comprehend the Jewish community’s experiences during the First World War 
and are central to this thesis. The patchy record of voluntary enlistment into the 
armed forces from the predominantly immigrant population of the Jewish East 
End must be set against the enthusiasm for the war effort of the upper and 
middle classes of Anglo-Jewry, the Jewish Chronicle and the Jewish elders. 
Does the respective enthusiasm and apathy of the integrated and immigrant 
Jewish communities for Britain’s war cause reveal an acceptance on one hand 
and a rejection on the other of the necessity to anglicise by the British state; a 
more subtle but no less destructive form of anti-Jewish prejudice than that seen 
in Germany or Russia? 
   The themes and controversies within Anglo-Jewish historiography already 
discussed – simplistically, whether Anglo-Jewry can be ascribed a success or a 
failure − can be mapped directly onto a discussion of the historiography of the 
Anglo-Jewish experience of the First World War. In the traditional interpretation, 
the war represented a positive trial of strength for London Jewry that the 
community passed with flying colours. 41,500 serving Jewish troops 
represented an irrefutable and highly visible British patriotism and contribution 
to the war effort, whilst the wartime boost to political Zionism that culminated in 
the Balfour Declaration of 1917 saw British Zionists walking unobstructed down 
the corridors of power in Whitehall for the first time. 
   In this discourse, Jews and non-Jews worked side by side in the trenches, the 
factories and the halls of Westminster to deliver victory for a Liberally-minded 
and tolerant Britain, where incidents of friction such as the Bethnal Green riot of 
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September 1917 were isolated and rare, the result of localised regional 
considerations that did not illuminate the true conditions of tolerance and co-
existence between Britain and her minority groups. This is the perspective 
pushed at the end of the war by the Reverend Michael Adler in his valedictory 
and triumphalist history of the Jewish war effort, the British Jewry Book of 
Honour in 1922, and became the bedrock on which Cecil Roth and his acolytes 
promulgated the benign Jewish war experience in the mid twentieth century, 
supported with revisions by historians such as Rubinstein near the century’s 
close.100 Rubinstein himself states that ‘It can be persuasively argued that no 
event in modern British history so positively affected the acculturation of British 
Jewry in a brief period of time as did the First World War’.101 
   This happy consensus did not sit well with the ‘new school’, most prominently 
David Cesarani, who interpreted the war as a negative episode that 
‘engendered a serious deterioration in the position of the Jews in British 
society’.102 Geoffrey Alderman in his history British Jewry since Emancipation 
(originally published in 1992 as Modern British Jewry but revised and updated 
in 2014) has also stated that ‘The outbreak of war in 1914 led to a sharp 
deterioration in the social position of Jews, and especially Jewish aliens, in 
Britain.’103 English Jews, belonging to a community stretching back to the 
admittance of a Jewish colony under Cromwell in 1656, participated in a 
struggle that was defined by issues of marginalised national identity, questioned 
                                                          
100Michael Adler, British Jewry Book of Honour (Caxton, London 1922). Roth, Jews in 
England In particular see the Epilogue: ‘The alembic of English tolerance has operated by 
now on the newer arrivals as well. Their sons have taken part in English life, contributed to 
English achievement, striven for the England’s betterment, shed their blood in England’s 
wars. In this happy land they have attained a measure of freedom (and thereby 
collaboration) which has been the case in scarcely any other. That this has been possible is 
due in no slight measure to the process of Anglo-Jewish history—a gradual acceptance 
based on common sense rather than on doctrine, consolidating itself slowly but surely, and 
never outstripping public opinion.’ William D Rubinstein, Philosemitism: Admiration and 
Support in the English-Speaking World for Jews, 1840-1939 (Palgrave Macmillan, London 
1999) 
101 William Rubinstein, A History of the Jews in the English-Speaking World: Great Britain 
(Macmillan Press Ltd, Basingstoke 1996), p.194 
102 David Cesarani, ‘An embattled Minority: The Jews of Britain during the Great War’, In 
Tony Kushner and Kenneth Lunn (eds.) The Politics of Marginality. Race, the Radical Right 
and Minorities in Twentieth Century Britain (Frank Cass, London 1990), p.61 
103 Geoffrey Alderman, British Jewry since Emancipation (The University of Buckingham 
Press, Buckingham 2014), p.233. For the earlier edition see Geoffrey Alderman, Modern 
British Jewry (Clarendon, Oxford 1992). Both versions have been used in the course of this 
thesis 
P a g e  | 33 
 
loyalty and forced patriotism that embittered and discoloured many English 
Jews’ concepts of Britain, the Empire and the questionable sacrifice of the 
3,000 Jewish soldiers who forever remained on Flanders field, Gallipoli beach 
and the Jordan Valley.  
    British treatment of Jews could not simply be judged against the Tsarist and 
Nazi models of Jewish persecution and be deemed enlightened; anti-Jewish 
prejudice existed in the subtle and consistent methods of differentiation − be it 
snide press remarks or glass ceilings barring Jewish officers − as it did in the 
extreme occasions of violence, such as the Bethnal Green disturbances. 
Indeed, David Cesarani has argued that ‘a focus on the riots has blurred the 
continuity of anti-Jewish feeling and led to the irruptions of hostility being 
treated as the expression of particular interactions, with discrete causes, rather 
than as nodal points for long running waves of antipathy’.104 
   It is the intention of this thesis to explore and evaluate these competing 
interpretations of the war’s impact on the Jewish community and to show the 
high degree of complexity involved in identifying appropriately the legacy of the 
war for London Jewry.  
   The reality and rhetoric of British antisemitism will be examined in the context 
of highly visible events such as the Bethnal Green disturbances and the 
minutiae of Jew and Gentile relations in the trenches and on the Home Front. 
This will involve a wider discussion on how Britain interacted with and behaved 
towards its minority groups in the conditions of total war, with the London 
Jewish community the primary case study for this discussion. This thesis will 
employ the term antisemitism to refer to the deliberate discrimination or 
prejudice against Jews based on their status as Jews, and will apply the term to 
cases of ambivalence as well as outright hostility and violence. There is 
substantial evidence that antisemitism in Britain during the First World War was 
both prevalent and pervasive in every strata of British society, and is no less 
relevant in explaining the experience of Jews in Britain because it lacked the 
sustained violence and prejudice towards Jewish communities on the continent. 
However, the experience of antisemitism does not wholly characterise the 
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British Jewish experience of the First World War. Whilst being sensitive to the 
trauma memory associated with Tsarist pogroms - in which the significance for 
Russian Jews experiencing hostility from their English neighbours must be 
analysed - the antagonism towards Jews in the East End must also be 
examined within the context of the history of immigration in the area and labour 
relations, and the particular circumstances of the war. This thesis will seek to 
show the complexity of the British Jewish war-time experience; it was not the 
success story championed by Cecil Roth and William Rubinstein, nor was it 
undermined by British antisemitism as perceived by David Cesarani. It is the 
sum of a community gripped by an acute societal crisis exacerbated by the high 
stress situation of war. 
 
 British National Identity and War Experience 
 
   It is important at this juncture to assess the uniqueness of the British 
experience of the First World War before placing the peculiarities of the British 
Jewish experience within it. British national identity from the end of the long 18th 
Century has been shaped by a perception of the uniqueness of the character 
and qualities of the British nation and individual – springing from an 
appreciation of the mythic virtues investing ‘free born Britons’ which nourished 
the patriotism of 18th century radicals. British national character was also 
hardened by the creation of a perceived ‘other’, particularly the French during 
the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars (the robust, generous and pragmatic 
‘John Bull’ the antithesis to the unscrupulous, malnourished and humourless 
French revolutionary), and contact with other cultures and civilisations during 
the imperial expansion of the later 19th Century. As Linda Colley has shown, 
patriots in England, Scotland and Wales, forged a sense of ‘Britishness’ that 
diminished the historic enmity between the Celtic nations and England, 
accentuating the social, cultural, economic and political links that united the 
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three kingdoms and which prided itself on its differentiation from continental 
culture and idioms.105  
   British identity was also strongly influenced by interactions with and 
responses to migrants. In both contemporary and subsequent assessments of 
Britain’s historical interaction with migrant groups, the emphasis tends towards 
accentuating the tolerance of British society. As British patriotism was forged 
against the continental antithesis or ‘other’, so too was British attitudes to 
migrants often contextualised by a positive comparison with an intolerant ‘other’ 
– in the case of Jewish immigration, the Tsarist state before WW1 and 
Germany under the Third Reich.  This positive perspective highlights the largely 
supportive welcome of persecuted French Huguenots in the 17th Century, the 
accommodation of hundreds of thousands of Eastern European Jews in the late 
19th Century and the Kindertransport in the late 1930s. This narrative neglects 
the often hostile treatment of Huguenot migrants once their economic threat 
was identified, the raft of anti-alien rhetoric and agitation that characterised the 
British response to large scale Jewish migration from the 1880s onwards, and 
the disastrous ambivalence of the British public and state that saw the 
Kindertransport rescuees the lucky few of the tens of thousands of Jews fleeing 
Nazi persecution in the 1930s and 1940s.106 
   As an island nation and the supreme naval power in the world, Britain was 
less concerned by the threats of aggressive conquest by its continental 
neighbours and therefore could forego the reassurance and safety of diplomatic 
alliances. However the unanimous international condemnation of Britain during 
the 2nd Boer War (1899-1902) and the relatively poor performances of the 
British armed forces during the conflict alarmed British strategists and 
politicians who realised the inherent weakness and isolation of the policy of 
‘splendid isolation’ coined by the Prime minister Lord Salisbury as recently as 
1896. In 1902 Britain attempted to break its isolation by seeking an alliance with 
Japan, and in 1904 and 1907 reached diplomatic agreements with France and 
Russia respectively. On the domestic front however, another potent force was 
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shaping national identity, the rise of anti-German agitation. Economic rivalry, 
the invasion scares of the preceding decade and concerns over the number of 
German waiters and shop assistants strategically placed along the east coast 
had created a virile anti-German sentiment in British society in the years up to 
1914.107 The course of the war was to witness widespread anti-German riots 
attended by virulent newspaper attacks and the extension of pre-war anti-alien 
legislation.108 Prussianism increasingly became the ‘other’ which British 
character was defined against. 
   War during the period 1899-1918 had a profound impact on British society 
and to notions of national identity. The frailties of British manhood and military 
power exposed by the Boer War produced furious debate on the necessity for 
improved defence over constitutional rights that were still brewing in the 
summer of 1914. Experience in the First World War redefined attitudes to and 
the role of both sexes; masculinity was no longer expressed through sport and 
leisure but through patriotic defence of the home and nation, symbolically 
collectivised in the revitalised image of ‘Tommy Atkinson’. Women’s sacrifices 
on the Homefront brought greater civic responsibilities that would be 
reciprocated after the war in partial enfranchisement. Given the fractious social 
tensions in British society during this period over labour issues, Home Rule in 
Ireland, women’s suffrage, the House of Lords debates, and external 
distractions in the form of Empire, it is perhaps a true analysis from Grainger 
that ‘unlike Germany, England/Britain did not bring a cultivated patriotism to the 
conflict’.109 The war however shaped within many in Britain a personal 
patriotism sure of what Britain was and its cause in the war, through personal 
experience and sacrifice for its end.  
 
   Having assessed the shaping of British patriotism and national identity 
through war in this period, the continuing significance of the First World War 
and its legacy for the British public will now be discussed. The subsequent re-
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emphasis of the Jewish community’s Great War experience − demonstrated by 
the Jewish Museum’s popular exhibition and the proliferation of Jewish 
Chronicle articles marking the Jewish contribution to the war effort − is in line 
with broader centenary events which combined public and academic 
commemoration.110 With 8,000 English language books and numerous 
academic articles and theses on the First World War already, the public and 
scholarly interest in the centenary has added to an already extensive field. The 
undeniable success of the Tower of London’s porcelain poppy commemoration 
for every one of the British Empire’s 888,246 soldiers who failed to return from 
the conflict is perhaps the most visually striking national contribution to this 
process. This has been ably supported by a plethora of state-funded initiatives 
such as the ‘Flanders Fields 1914-2014’ Memorial Garden near Buckingham 
Palace, the Western Front Association’s own For King and Country exhibition in 
Halifax that will run until 2018, and the 1400 television, radio and online 
programmes the BBC produced in 2014 alone to mark the centenary.111 In 
addition, November 2014 saw a huge increase in mourners for many local 
Remembrance Sunday services across Britain; the service in Streatham for 
instance had an estimated six hundred attendees paying their respects as 
opposed to the fifty or so who usually attend, causing more than a few logistical 
problems for the volunteers overseeing the service. 
   The last few decades have witnessed a highly impassioned and sometimes 
volatile revisionist assault on the legacy of the war on British society, 
particularly the perception of the war as a futile muddy bloodbath. By 
challenging the Blackadder Goes Forth (1989) and Alan Clarke (1961) versions 
of Britain’s war effort, Gary Sheffield’s Forgotten Victory (2002) began the 
dismantling of the ‘Lions led by Donkeys’ perception of the British Army in 
World War One, whilst historians from Zara Steiner (2003) to Max Hastings 
(2013) have in the last decade or so robustly demonstrated the necessity of 
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Britain’s entry into the war in August 1914.112 Indeed, Adrian Gregory (2008) 
has argued persuasively that in assessing justification for intervention and 
moral prosecution of the war effort, Britain in 1914-18 compares favourably to 
the 1939-45 conflict. Britain’s pledge to defend Belgian neutrality from German 
aggression in 1914 was as defensible a geopolitical policy as the similar pledge 
made to Poland in 1939, and the suffering inflicted on the German population 
by the Grand Fleet’s naval blockade paled into comparison with the horrors 
unleashed by the bombing raids on German cities in the last years of the 
Second World War.113 Jay Winter’s seminal study The Great War and the 
British People (1986) argued that the development of a civilian war economy 
based on community consensus on health and a greatly expanded state 
apparatus paradoxically improved and prolonged the great majority of British 
civilian’s lives.114 Equally, historians such as Daniel Todman (2005) and David 
Reynolds (2013) have improved on the work of Paul Fussel (1975) by exploding 
ingrained myths relating to the impact of the war on British culture and society, 
demonstrating how the strains and pressures of total war led to a complex 
interrelation of positive and negative transformations, both short and long term, 
within British society.115 Todman has shown how Britons have continually 
recast the meaning and legacy of the war to fit contemporary concerns 
regarding the state of British society. Such arguments go sharply against the 
grain of considered popular perspectives of the war and its legacy in Britain, 
shown in the overly negative and vitriolic popular responses to Gary Sheffield’s 
work, and the incandescent fury that engulfed the Education Secretary Michael 
Gove early in 2014 when he declared ‘The First World War may have been a 
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uniquely horrific war, but it was also plainly a just war.’116 As Ross Wilson 
(2013) highlights, the emotive pull of the Great War for the British public refuses 
to dim despite the passing of the generations directly connected to it, and the 
endurance of the ‘Donkeys’ interpretation is a constant of the public’s 
assessment of the war passed down through the ‘frames of remembrance’.117 A 
potent summary of this sentiment can be found in the recollections of the 
veteran WH Williams, interviewed in 1980, relating how when a wounded friend 
‘received his service medals, he took hold of them and slung them down the 
garden path and forbade his wife to touch them. That is what he thought of the 
war to end all wars.’118  
   How the British public responded to the outbreak of war has enjoyed a lively 
historiography of its own. Contemporary accounts in August 1914 stressed the 
excitable and organic nature of the crowds that flocked to the Mall and Trafalgar 
Square to demonstrate an unequivocal support for war. The jingoism of the 
London crowds was affirmed in the raft of politician’s memoirs in the 1930s, 
Lloyd George notably felt the pressure of expectation hanging over the actions 
of the cabinet by the ‘multitudes of young people concentrated in Westminster 
demonstrating for war against Germany’.119  ‘War enthusiasm’ became as 
entrenched in the public consciousness of the war as the bad generalship, mud 
and futility – cheering crowds in Westminster and cries of ‘over by Christmas’ 
are central anecdotes of the British public’s war memory. This has only 
comparatively recently been challenged within academic history. Arthur 
Marwick upheld the ‘war enthusiasm’ argument in 1965, writing ‘a great 
concourse of people gathered in Trafalgar square and Whitehall waving Union 
Jacks, singing patriotic songs and displaying “marked tendencies towards 
Mafficking”’.120 Hew Strachan (2001) wrote that the picture of ‘war enthusiasm’ 
stood ‘in need of modification and of amplification’ but, perhaps revealing his 
intended readership, stated ‘its fundamental message remains unequivocal. 
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The belligerent peoples of Europe accepted the onset of war’.121 More recently, 
Adrian Gregory (2008) has forcefully challenged the existence of a united 
enthusiasm for war in Britain during August 1914, in particular drawing attention 
to the importance of chronology in this discussion - signs of enthusiasm 
occurred most frequently after the outbreak of war became an established fact, 
not before.122 Catriona Pennell (2014) has shown how Britons responded to war 
as individuals as a result of a diverse set of factors - be it class, gender, age, 
profession, and location - which precludes a universally typical response.123 
Therefore the thorny subject of ‘war enthusiasm’ has been shown to be far from 
an acceptably nuanced concept to assess the reactions to British - not to 
mention the nation’s minority communities - by this recent scholarship. This 
study will build on these more nuanced interpretations of Britain’s war legacy by 
examining the complexity of experience thrown up by the war from the 
perspective of the Jewish minority. Jews living in Britain in 1914 reacted to and 
experienced the crucial first weeks of war on an individual basis that defies a 
homogenous assessment. For Jewish soldiers, tailors, politicians, mothers, 
war-workers, Zionists, rabbis, civil servants, and children, the war presented a 
wave of unique problems and pressures but equally opportunities and victories 
that illuminate a fuller understanding of the Jewish war experience. The thesis 
will also assess the British response to the war and analyse the impact of this 
on both the immigrant and established Jewish communities of London. In 
dismissing the notion of a collective ‘war enthusiasm’, Pennell authoritatively 
acknowledges the existence of  a ‘War culture’ that permeated many different 
strata of British society by September 1914, that collectively judged both 
individuals and groups as to their patriotism and contribution to the war effort.124 
The responses to the outbreak of war and actions during it of Jewish individuals 
and the community as a whole were scrutinised through the specific prejudices 
of this war culture, to which at various points the London Jewish community 
stood within and alternately at odds with. 
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   A metropolitan bias stands centrally within the literature of British society and 
culture in the First World War, despite a proliferation of works presenting a 
regional focus on the conflict published to coincide with the centenary.125 
London in 1914 arguably occupied a more dominating position at the heart of 
strategic concepts of nation and empire than it did at any other stage of its 
history, and far more so than in 1940.126 The war effort in every theatre was 
directed centrally from London; the greater part of munitions were 
manufactured in the capital, almost every British and Imperial soldier passed 
through en route to the continent or returned via the city on leave or as 
casualties of war, and in an era of rudimentary communication technologies 
London’s proximity to the front made it an information nexus for the rest of the 
nation. Gregory (2008) and Pennell (2014) both show the unique contribution of 
London communities and institutions – be it the Victoria Street offices of the 
National War Aims Committee or the over-proportion of Londoners as soldiers, 
civil servants and industrial agitators − in shaping a collective British response 
to the peculiar conditions of war that were a continuation rather than an 
interruption of pre-war societal norms.127  
   The importance of how an individual community’s experience of war, and their 
attachments to location animate broader constructions of national perspectives 
of the conflict, is a central theme binding a series of excellent studies collated 
within Jay Winter’s 2007 anthology Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin 
1914-1919.128 Individual contributors collectively demonstrate how 
contemporary Londoners, Berliners and Parisians experienced and understood 
the global conflict and the national war effort through an attachment to ‘specific 
locales and venues’.129 Winter emphasises this correlation between local and 
national loyalties with an amusing anecdote: a uniformed soldier on leave in 
London in 1916 was asked if he was fighting for the Empire, to which he 
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enthusiastically replied yes. The empire he had in mind however was the 
Empire Music Hall in Hackney.130 This thesis too will focus on how concepts of 
nation, empire and patriotism were refracted through the prism of local loyalties 
− in particular London loyalties. It will consider for instance how notions of the 
national war effort and patriotism in East London synthesised with local loyalties 
and concerns on race, economy and community identity.  
   From the local perspective, issues of gender and race were central to how 
communities experienced the pressures of total war. Joyce Marlow131 (1999) 
and Susan Grayzel132(2002) have presented illuminating insights into the 
experiences of women during the war in a national context, but less has been 
said about the peculiar pressures on Jewish and Gentile women in East London 
during the conflict. Similarly, whilst there have been some excellent national 
studies on the impact of the war on male psychology and concepts of 
masculinity, particularly from Jessica Meyer (2009)133 and Joanna Bourke 
(1996),134 this study will explore masculinity and war in the context of 
community, race and local patriotisms. How significant were cultural 
stereotypes of Jewish men as weak, effeminate and unsoldierly in the 
experiences of Jewish soldiers in the British Army?  To what extent did these 
slurs on Jewish manhood influence desires to fight and to demonstrate British 
patriotism in a martial setting, and how much was the process of the reinvention 
of Jewish masculinity driven by the legacy of both civil and military persecution 
of Jews in the Tsarist Empire?  
   This analysis evolves from many excellent recent works such as Gavin 
Schaffer’s study of Jewish soldiers in British war service (2012) which 
demonstrates that Jewish military service in the British context (and the revival 
of Max Nordeau’s concept of the ‘muscle Jew’) were reflections of a deeper 
Jewish desire for British integration and to ‘present Jewish soldiers as equal to 
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their non-Jewish equivalents’.135 The extent to which this is another symptom of 
a peculiarly British intolerance - pressuring its minority elements to integrate 
through displays of excessive patriotism - will also be examined. In contrast, the 
issue of Jewish non-enlistment in the East End will be examined in the context 
of Jewish aversion to militarism fostered by experiences of Tsarist persecution, 
as discussed perceptively by Jonathan Dekel-Chen and other contributors to 
the recent study on anti-Jewish violence in East European history (2011).136 
The legacy of anti-Jewish discrimination within the Russian army was a 
pressing influence for many London-based Jewish men resisting to the last 
military service in the British Army. 
 
 Thesis Overview: Sources and Structure 
 
   This thesis is based on a diverse array of source material, incorporating the 
accounts of Jewish and non-Jewish experiences to establish a coherent and all-
encompassing examination of London Jewry during the First World War. These 
accounts take the form of diaries, memoirs, letters, official military and political 
transcripts and communiques, as well as extensive use of both local and 
national newspaper reports.  
   There is an inherent problem involved in the use of memoirs and accounts of 
the First World War that have been written many years after the events 
described. The passage of time naturally dims the powers of recollection of any 
author writing from memory, and the influence of later events further distorts the 
memories of the former. Indeed, the phenomena of memory distortion relating 
to the First World War and in particular personal remembrance of it through the 
prism of the later and more all-encompassing experiences of 1939-1945 poses 
a considerable challenge to the historian of the earlier conflict. As Adrian 
Gregory has bluntly put it ‘there are serious problems with people trying to 
                                                          
135 Gavin Schaffer, ‘Unmasking the muscle Jew: the Jewish Soldier in British War Service, 
1899-1945’ Patterns of Prejudice, Vol 46, Nos. 3-4, (2012) 
136 Dekel-Chen, Anti-Jewish Violence 
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reconstruct their attitudes in 1914-1918 in interviews after 1945.’137 A case in 
point are the testimonials of the veterans of the Jewish Legion stored at the Beit 
Hagudim Museum in Avichail, Israel, used in chapter three of this thesis. The 
testimonials provide invaluable clues as to the men’s motivations for enlistment 
but they can only tell us so much. In the majority they reveal information on the 
veterans’ lives such as the place and date of birth and brief descriptions of their 
activities before, during and after their time in the Legion. Written personally or 
by family members, they are rendered problematic by the many years that 
passed between service and the writing of the testimonials in the late 1950s. 
They provide however, illuminating clues as to the soldiers’ personal and 
political interest in the Battalions and their experiences of active service as 
Jewish soldiers fighting for Britain. The collection of so many accounts of 
Jewish soldiers fighting in the same unit allows for a more thorough 
assessment of these collective experiences for the purposes of demographic 
data than the relatively sparse and unconnected voices of Jewish soldiers 
scattered across the various battalions of the British Army. The testimonials 
allow us to tally up collective information on important topics such as 
motivations for enlistment, attachment to Zionism before and after service and 
involvement in London society post-war, allowing wide ranging and insightful 
assessments of the impact of the Battalions on the continuing development of 
London Jewry.  
   The problem of refracted memory also relates to the use of recorded 
interviews with veterans used for this thesis held at the Imperial War museum, 
the National Archives in Kew and the extensive collection of sound recordings 
online on the British Library’s Europeana project. The majority of these 
interviews were performed in the 1980s when the individuals recorded were of 
significantly advanced age and the powers of recall potentially greatly 
diminished. However, the value inherent in these recordings is the essential 
human narrative of events that all too easily can be reduced to mere footnotes 
in the archival records. For instance, Jacob Plotzker, interviewed by the IWM in 
1992 at the grand old age of 91, reveals fascinating detail of the experiences of 
the Jewish soldiers serving in the 47th Royal Fusiliers battalion in France, for 
                                                          
137 Ibid, p.6 
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which there is scant evidence for outside of a rather dry War Office directive in 
June 1919 ordering the closure of the Jewish Battalion depot in Plymouth and 
the reassigning of the remaining 300 Jewish soldiers for service with the 47th to 
relieve demobilised soldiers.138 Plotzker’s recollections adds flesh to the 
skeletal information of the official correspondence whilst confirming the mutual 
authenticity of both sources, revealing the duties, hardships, and the trials and 
tribulations of a sizeable contingent of Jewish soldiers that would otherwise be 
limited to a statistic.139    
   The thesis relies on the social and political commentary provided by a wide 
range of national and local newspapers during the war. As the historian Edward 
Royle stated when discussing the divergence of opinion between two local 
newspapers in their assessment of the same Chartist meeting in 1842: 
‘Newspapers reports are important sources for the historian but they have many 
drawbacks.’140 An example can be found in the polar-opposite assessments of 
the Bethnal Green disturbances presented in the reports of the Jewish 
Chronicle and the anti-immigrant East London Observer, even though both 
papers relied heavily for information on the same police report. Newspapers 
intrinsically represent the natural bias of their editor and readership. However 
use of a variety of diverse newspapers offering distinct opinions of events can 
provide an invaluable source for social commentary on day to day events.141 
This thesis makes use of the editorials and correspondence letters of fifteen 
national and London based newspapers to provide an authentic contemporary 
account of the issues transforming Jewish lives and society during the First 
World War. 
   The minutes of important communal meetings recorded in the Board of 
Deputies of British Jews stored at the London Metropolitan Archive reveal the 
thoughts and decision making process of established Jewry on the issues of 
poor relief, Jewish enlistment, rationing and the prospect of rising antisemitism 
during the war. Combined with the personal correspondence of influential 
                                                          
138 PRO, WO 33 11352 June 1919, cited in Martin Watts, The Jewish Legion and the First 
World War (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2004)p.232 
139 Jacob Plotzker, IWM Cat.No11188 
140 Edward Royle, Chartism (London, 1980), p.102 
141 Pennell, Kingdom United, p.5 
P a g e  | 46 
 
English Jews such as the Chief Rabbi Joseph Hertz and prominent journalist 
and Zionist Meyer Landa held at the Anglo-Jewish Archives in Southampton, 
these sources provide an important insight into how the elites of established 
Jewry responded to the pressures of war and in particular the increasing 
anxiety over the issue of Russian Jewish enlistment that threatened to 
overshadow and characterise London Jewry’s response to the war as a whole. 
However, it is important to combine these official sources with a cross section 
of the bulk of Jews in London during the war who experienced the stresses of 
war on the battlefield and the Home Front, and who experienced directly the 
consequences of the decisions made in the meeting rooms of the institutions of 
Anglo-Jewry. Therefore the thesis considers and uses the experiences of 
English Jewish soldiers recorded for posterity in the IWM and the recollections 
of Jewish East Enders who lived through and experienced the shortages during 
the war and the antagonisms of their non-Jewish neighbours. The thesis also 
makes use of Foreign Office and Home Office files accessed at the National 
Archives in Kew, which reveal key insights into the British Government’s 
handling of sensitive issues central to the Jewish war experience, particularly 
Government decisions relating to the Jewish conscription crisis and the 
formation of the Jewish Battalions. Through this combination of sources - the 
wartime policy of the institutions of established Jewry, personal perspectives of 
ordinary Jews and the official decision making of the British government 
regarding Jews in Britain - this thesis will be able to present an engaging 
assessment of the realities of life in First World War Britain for a minority 
community experiencing the pressures associated with total war. 
    
   The thesis is divided into three distinct areas of focus. Chapter one ‘The 
Jewish Home Front: Prosperity and Pressure in the East End’, will focus on the 
wartime experiences of the Jewish community of London’s East End. The 
chapter will explore the extent to which the experiences of 1914-1918 
transformed the situation and direction of the Jewish immigrant community of 
East London. Non-Jewish responses to the outbreak of war will be assessed in 
order to contextualise the widely held notion that Russian Jews in London 
reluctantly embraced the war effort. It will be argued that East London 
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responses to war were far from the textbook patriotic reaction that the East 
London press would later portray, with many examples of anti-war sentiment up 
to, and to a lesser extent after, the declaration of war on 4 August 1914. Social 
relations between Jews and non-Jews in the area will be examined through a 
close focus on economic competition - economic and social tensions between 
Jews and non-Jews were exacerbated by the disruptive conditions imposed by 
total war. Conversely, there is also evidence the war led to greater co-operation 
and integration between Jewish and non-Jewish workers in the East End. It will 
be argued that the war presented as many scenarios for incorporating closer 
communal ties as it did opportunities for friction. The shared hardships of 
rationing and zeppelin bombing acted as an important harmoniser of relations 
within the working class districts of the East End. Finally, the causes, context 
and consequences of wartime violence between Jews and non-Jews will be 
assessed. The disturbances in Bethnal Green in September 1917 were the 
direct result of the agitation caused locally by the issue of Jewish non-
enlistment. The events in Bethnal Green will be analysed within the context of 
rising pre-war tensions but also the high stress conditions imposed by the 
rigours of total war, and important questions surrounding the significance of the 
violence will be asked. In particular, it will be asked whether they represent 
localised and short lived anti-Jewish sentiments within the East End or a more 
ingrained intolerance towards the Jewish community based on derogatory racial 
stereotypes and historic economic competition. This chapter will seek to show 
how as a result of these factors, the First World War greatly accelerated the 
breakup of the old Jewish East End and the integration of Eastern European 
Jews into London society. 
   In comparison to the immigrant communities’ experience presented in chapter 
one, chapter two ‘West-End Jewry and the Great War: Patriotism Under Fire’ 
focuses on the struggles and strains the war imposed for London’s more fully 
integrated and predominantly West London based Jewish community. 
However, whilst in many respects representing polar opposite experiences, the 
fortunes of both communities were intrinsically and indelibly connected by 
wartime British hostility. This chapter will assess the extent to which established 
Jewry’s response to the outbreak of war in August 1914 matched or 
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significantly differed from the metropolitan and national reaction. The war 
presented several highly challenging situations in which the Jewish 
establishment simultaneously experienced accusations of split loyalties 
regarding its commitment to the British war effort and criticism for a perceived 
failure to defend the rights of their co-religionists both at home and abroad. This 
chapter will employ a deeper historical approach to assess and explain the 
experience of established Jewry in the First World War through a discussion of 
the pressures associated with the changing nature of British patriotism as a 
consequence of the growth of militarism and imperialism in British society in the 
period 1899-1918. The coupling of imperialism and patriotism during these 
years and the accompanying clamour for a spiritually and physically strong 
population to protect nation and empire, placed added pressure on Britain’s 
minority groups to demonstrate not only patriotic endeavour but martial prowess 
in a society increasingly concerned by the concept of degeneration and the 
decline of its world standing. Jews were under increasing scrutiny to 
demonstrate their national loyalty towards Britain during this period of 
heightened discussion regarding the nature of British patriotism. The chapter 
will also focus on the physical and psychological experience of soldiering for 
English Jewish soldiers on the front line. Oral and diary records from the 
Imperial War Museum and the Jewish Museum of London will be used to argue 
that, while individual examples of antisemitism towards English Jews did occur, 
there is a lack of convincing evidence suggesting a widespread and 
indoctrinated policy of prejudice against Jewish recruits within the British Army. 
In addition, the growth of political Zionism in Britain during the war will be 
scrutinised, and particularly how this development impacted on the wartime 
fortunes of the Jewish establishment. It will be argued here that the growth of 
political Zionism in Britain during the First World War split established Jewry 
and further deteriorated the ability of the community to find consensus on non-
Zionist Jewish matters.  
     In chapter three, ‘The Jewish Battalions: Russian Jewry and the 
Conscription Crisis’, the focus lies on the part played by the creation of the 
Jewish Battalions in the transformation of Jewish society and politics in London 
during the war. In 1917 the British Government created the 38th Battalion of the 
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Royal Fusiliers (known colloquially as The Judeans), to be recruited mainly 
from the Russian Jewish population of London’s East End. The Jewish 
Battalion scheme has been selected for in-depth scrutiny in this chapter as it 
represents an important case study encapsulating in microcosm many of the 
dominant themes of conflict and integration already presented in the previous 
chapters. The battalion scheme played a central role in the wartime 
deterioration of intra-communal relations between established and immigrant 
Jews. The importance of the unit within the context of the Russian Jewish 
conscription crisis was also a fundamental agent in straining Jewish and Gentile 
relations in the East End, and it represented an integral cog within the British 
Zionist movement without which the Balfour Declaration in November 1917 
would probably not have come to pass. The chapter will show that heavy 
handed attempts on the part of established Jewry to pressure Russian Jews 
into enlisting into the Battalion project further alienated the immigrant population 
from Jewish leadership, who, it was perceived, were not acting in their interests 
or defending their rights in the face of British hostility. The motivations and 
circumstances of English East Enders for volunteering will be assessed and 
compared with their Russian Jewish neighbours, as well as with the 
volunteerism of English Jews discussed in chapter two. It will be shown that 
both established and immigrant Jews volunteered for service for largely 
analogous reasons as their non-Jewish equivalents. 
   The chapter will explore the British Government’s role in the creation of the 
Jewish Battalions and its evolving attachment to Zionism as the war 
progressed. Despite initial scepticism of the concept, the need to assuage 
national anger created by the Russian Jewish conscription crisis saw the War 
Office sanction the creation of the Jewish Battalion in 1917, in line with the 
passing of the Military Convention with Russia. These two decisions effectively 
forced Russian Jews to choose between deportation to Russia or enlistment in 
the Jewish Battalion. It will be argued in this chapter that, whilst bitterly 
resented at the time, the government ultimatum physically and psychologically 
succeeded in incorporating the Jewish East End into Britain’s war cause, in 
which the community now held a valid stake. The experience of the men that 
served in the Jewish Battalion will be discussed in detail here. It will specifically 
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examine their motivations for enlisting in an all-Jewish unit tasked with 
liberating the Holy Land, and also how service shaped their attitudes not just 
towards Zionism but to Britain as their adopted home. This will involve using 
veterans’ testimonials from the Jewish Legion Museum in Avichail Israel, and 
an examination of the motivations and experiences of Jewish transferees into 
the Battalion from other British Army units. For Jewish transferees and recruits 
from the East End alike, the Jewish Battalion provided meaning for their 
involvement in the war, and instilled in many a layered set of identities: a 
community-based identity centred on their professions, but also a Jewish 
identity built on pride in participation with a Jewish cause and concurrently a 
British identity shaped by service - however reluctantly for many - in the British 
Army. 
 
   In many ways the experiences of established and immigrant Jews during the 
war are intrinsically linked – the British Jewish war story could be characterised 
as the extension and acceleration of the tensions existing between established 
and immigrant Jews in peace time but under the suffocating glare of public 
scrutiny examining the commitment of both English and Russian Jews to 
Britain’s war cause. The same set of factors – British chauvinism, Jewish 
nationalism, sacrifice and death on the battlefield, and the shortages on the 
Home Front – impinged on both Jewish communities, but in different ways and 
different levels of intensity. However, in many other ways the wartime 
experiences of English and Russian Jews were diametrically opposed, based 
on length of residence and integration into British society, occupation and social 
status, that determined the acuteness of the impact of the war on their position 
and aspirations. By splitting the focus between the immigrant and established 
Jewish experience of the war, the thesis will compare and contrast the 
diversities in experience within London Jewry during the war. Broadly, these 
two chapters are concerned with an examination of the treatment of Jews by 
British society during the conflict; in chapter one this will focus on the 
interactions and antagonisms between Russian Jews and English East Enders; 
in chapter two the focus lies on the relationship with and treatment of British 
Jews by the British government. By examining separately the war experiences 
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of the more recent Jewish arrivals and the more established Jewish community, 
the thesis will provide a balanced assessment of the trials and tribulations 
experienced by London Jewry during the First World War. Chapter three will 
bring these two narratives together through an in-depth focus on the Jewish 
Battalion project that in many ways was the defining link between immigrant 
and established Jewry during the conflict, encapsulating in microcosm the 
strained and complicated relationship between the two communities and the 
extent to which these tensions were stretched by involvement with the project. 
English Jewish officers served alongside Russian Jewish recruits in a Zionist 
project initiated by the British Government despite the acute anxiety it caused 
within established Jewry and the hostility shown to the initiative by Russian 
Jews in the East End. With a focus on the Jewish Battalion story, the discussion 
of the war’s impact on West End and East End Jewish communities will be 
combined in the assessment of how the creation of Jewish only unit’s impacted 
on both Russian immigrant Jews in the East End and the Jewish elites of 




   In 1914 the more integrated elements of British Jewry wielded a loose but 
tangible political, social and religious control over the immigrant Jewish 
community. Relations between Jews and non-Jews on the streets of East 
London remained tense, but had dissipated somewhat through attempts to 
regulate the tailoring industry led by Rudolph Rocker, and the slowing of 
immigration from 1905 onwards. Anti-immigrant organisations such as the 
British Brothers’ League remained active but marginalised indicators of 
continuing discontent. The Jewish East End in 1914 retained a ‘Shtetl’ 
appearance distinct from the general London population and which was in stark 
contrast to its highly integrated and politically influential ‘West End’ counterpart. 
However, four catastrophic years of world conflict between 1914 and 1918 
transformed the political and social position for London’s Jewish community as 
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a whole, and radically shifted both immigrant and established Jewry’s 
connection to and identity with Britain as their adopted home.        
   The First World War transformed irrevocably the appearance and position of 
London’s Jewish community. The conflict split decisively the delicate bond 
between established and more recent immigrant Jews living in the metropolis. 
The war also had a profound impact on Jewish and non-Jewish relations in the 
capital, redefining British concepts of the position of the Jewish community 
within London society, as well as individual Jews’ notions of identity and 
patriotism in connection with Britain. The changes to London’s Jewish 
community in the years 1914-1918 were a complex mix of the subtle and 
dramatic, and the war cannot adequately be cast as a wholly negative or 
positive catalyst for societal regeneration in the Jewish case. The legacy of the 
war must be examined only in the immeasurable political, social, economic and 
geographic changes to the community in the period 1880-1945, and only then 
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Chapter One 
The Jewish Home Front: Prosperity and Pressure in 




   The coming of war in 1914 would test the fragile foundations of the Jewish 
East End, straining the economic, social and political roots and religious 
infrastructure of the community built up over the last forty or fifty years. The 
tense and often hostile relations between immigrant Jews and the wider Gentile 
population of the East End were put to the ultimate examination under the 
peculiar conditions of total war. Language, religion, naturalisation status and 
even dietary customs were issues for the local East End press to attack Jewish 
differentness, as well as rallying points for a community under intense public 
scrutiny of its position within a wartime economy. For the Jewish establishment 
these were points of concern highlighting the limited substance of the post-
emancipation era. For East End Jews the animosity of their neighbours and the 
cajoling by established Jewry to toe the line only accentuated the separateness 
of their war experience. This chapter will seek to examine the impact of the war 
on the Jewish community of East London, specifically focusing on how the 
same set of wartime circumstances led to heightened tensions between Jews 
and non-Jews whilst ultimately accelerating the integration process of the 




   This chapter will begin with an assessment of the East London public’s 
reaction to the outbreak of war in August 1914. East London society displayed 
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a complex and ambiguous response to the outbreak of war that contradicts the 
popular contemporary image of a patriotic and united community. The 
patriotism of English East Enders would frequently be cited by the local press in 
negative comparisons to the apparent disloyalty and indifference of the Jewish 
East End. Having set the background of the broader East End reaction to the 
outbreak of the First World War, the chapter will next examine the economic 
impact of the war on the East End Jewish economy and the implications of 
economic change for Jewish/non-Jewish relations in the area. The Jewish East 
End was economically dependent on low-wage industries such as tailoring. The 
majority of the 100,000 Jewish residents of East London in 1914 lived in 
cramped, unsanitary and distressed tenements that characterised the poorest 
conditions of London’s working class life.142 Economic rivalry with British 
workers was rife; the large pool of cheap Jewish labour and the deregulated 
state of the tailoring industry allowed the workshop owners to keep pay and 
conditions for workers at a minimum, thus undercutting the competition from 
English tailoring businesses. The area had witnessed sporadic episodes of 
industrial unrest prior to the outbreak of war in 1914. This was due in part to an 
embryonic but increasingly sophisticated and protectionist labour union 
movement seeking a cessation to unfair and exploitative working conditions 
amongst East London’s various small workshop-based industries, of which 
Jews made up a significant proportion of the workforce.143 The Rudolf Rocker-
led Jewish tailoring strike of 1912 was the most recent occurrence of pragmatic 
labour action within the East London Jewish community, but its impetus and 
impact were short-lived and decidedly mixed, ultimately succeeding only in 
stoking tensions with non-Jewish tailors who saw the strike as further attempts 
to encroach on their share of the industry.144 Prior to 1914 therefore, the Jewish 
working class lacked committed leadership, and there was little prospect of co-
operation and unity with English labour movements within the East End.  
                                                          
142 ‘Report of the Lancet Special Sanitary Commission on the Polish Colony of Jew Tailors’, 
The Lancet, 3 May 1884 
143 See Bernard Waites, A Class Society at War: England 1914-1918, (Berg, Oxford 1987) 
and Arthur Marwick, The Deluge: British Society and the First World War, (Little Brown, 
London 1966) 
144 See Rudolph Rocker, The London Years (translated by Joseph Leftwich). (Robert 
Anscombe & Co, London 1956) 
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   The East London Jewish economy was disadvantaged economically in the 
early months of the war by its heavy involvement in the tailoring industry that 
relied on materials imported at the London Docks. The dislocation of world 
trade in 1914 led to the virtual cessation of activity at the dockyards, leading to 
financial ruin and high unemployment amongst Jewish tailors.145 Early wartime 
animosity towards the community revealed itself in the rejection of Jewish 
appeals to relief committees in Stepney and other East London districts, on the 
grounds they were ‘not naturalised British subjects’.146 Jewish applicants for aid 
were instead referred to the Jewish Board of Guardians who begrudgingly 
covered the burdens of their co-religionists, anxious to prevent the East London 
immigrants becoming a ‘potential weak link in the solid front of Anglo-Jewish 
patriotism’.147 Economic distress was short-lived, as the securement of 
government contracts for army uniforms solved the stagnation in the Jewish 
tailoring industry and led to a significant wage increase for the majority of 
Jewish tailors, even unskilled youths.148 The reaction amongst the local 
population to the prosperity of the Jewish working class was fierce, the East 
London Observer and the East London Advertiser led campaigns to enforce 
military service for immigrants, railing against Jewish ‘shirkers’ profiting at the 
expense of the English worker absent through service at the Front. Following 
the passing of the Military Service Bill into law in June 1916, attention turned 
towards Jewish conscientious objectors. Many objected on religious grounds. 
By joining the army, they would inevitably have to break the Sabbath as well as 
struggle to procure kosher meat or infringe on religious teaching in numerous 
other ways. The resulting military tribunals across the East End witnessed 
theatrical clashes in the courtrooms between Jewish applicants and their 
supporters and Gentile protestors, scenes retold in their entirety in the local 
press adding to the impression of unpatriotic behaviour on the part of the 
Jewish community.149  
                                                          
145 Anne Kershen. Trade Unionism amongst the Jewish Tailoring Workers of London 1872-
1915. (London Museum of Jewish Life, London 1988) 
146 Cited in Julia Bush. ‘East London Jews and the First World War’, London Journal, 6 
(1980) p.149  
147 Ibid p.148 
148 Jewish Board of Guardians Report 1915 (1915)  
149 East London Observer (hereafter ELO), 18 March, 1 April, 16 September 1916; East 
London Advertiser (hereafter ELA) 20 May 1916 
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   This chapter will next examine the role of the First World War on accelerating 
the integration of London’s immigrant Jewish community, and will employ the 
anglicisation of Jewish food during the war as a parameter for the wider 
process of integration. Wartime food shortages and the introduction of rationing 
in 1917 greatly impeded the ability of Jews to comply with Jewish dietary laws. 
The limited Government concessions to rationing cards for the procurement of 
kosher meat opened up the Jewish community to accusations of special 
treatment during the severest period of want on the Home Front in the winter of 
1917/1918. Due to the furore over the amendments and the overall difficulty in 
obtaining kosher food, there is evidence that many Jewish families did not 
comply with Jewish dietary laws until at least the end of rationing in 1920, and a 
significant number permanently.  
  The final part of this chapter will consider the effects of air raids on 
Jewish/non-Jewish relations in the East End and analyse the extent to which 
the war was responsible for a breakdown in these relations, evidenced in the 
anti-Jewish rioting in Bethnal Green in September 1917. Police reports reveal 
that 300,000 Londoners were taking shelter in the Underground stations during 
Zeppelin raids, with close proximity leading to friction between Jews and non-
Jews. A crush caused when thousands rushed to an air raid shelter at Liverpool 
Street station in February 1918, leaving seventeen people dead, was reported 
in the Advertiser under the headline ‘Cowardly Aliens in the Great 
Stampede’.150 Reports of Jews escaping the air raids by retreating to the 
suburbs and the Kent and Sussex coasts are widespread in popular press 
reports and people’s memories of the time. A concurrent theme in many of 
these accounts is the perception that Jews on the whole reacted in a cowardly 
and undignified way to air raids compared to the stoic response of English 
citizens. Local anger in the wake of heavy bombing in the summer of 1917 built 
on the resentment towards the Jewish community created by economic 
competition and Russian Jewish non-enlistment. This led to the worst incident 
of anti-Jewish disturbances in London since the sinking of the Lusitania in May 
                                                          
150 ELA, 9 Feb 1918 
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1915 which saw many Jews caught up in a wave of Germanophobia.151 Bethnal 
Green in September 1917 witnessed armed clashes between Jewish and 
English youths as well as the looting and vandalism of Jewish businesses, with 
Jews deliberately targeted and not mistakenly victimised as in the Lusitania 
disturbances.152 
  
   The cumulative effects of these controversies appeared to challenge the 
position and security of East End Jewry, creating the impression of a systematic 
campaign of hostility on behalf of the London population towards the Jewish 
community, leading to a degradation of its fortunes as perceived by David 
Cesarani and others.153 The truth was somewhat more complex than this 
assessment. Whilst certain events such as the violence witnessed in Bethnal 
Green in September 1917 can be represented as extreme examples of anti-
Jewish behaviour on the part of the London populace, this does not necessarily 
equate to antisemitism in its starkest form - a sustained visceral hatred of the 
Jewish race. The worst excesses seen in Bethnal Green pale in comparison to 
antisemitic riots in Russia, Germany and even France in 1914-1918. Hostility 
towards the London Jewish community during the war can be interpreted more 
accurately as the exacerbation - under the stress of war - of a historic and 
indiscriminate xenophobia characteristic of the London working class up to and 
beyond the Second World War.154  
   The flashpoints of violence and the sensationalism of the local press 
obscured real evidence of co-operation and co-existence during the war 
between Jews and non-Jews in the East End. The philanthropic work of the 
Labour M.P George Lansbury’s Herald League and Sylvia Pankhurst’s The 
Worker’s Dreadnought helped significantly reduce Jewish suffering in the hard 
early months of the war and both organisations championed the rights of 
                                                          
151 For an account of the Lusitania disturbances, see CS Peel, How We Lived Then 1914-
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152 Police report Public Record Office (hereafter PRO) Home Office files (hereafter HO) 
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Jewish conscientious objectors.155 The inaugural meeting of the Stepney 
Central Labour Party in June 1918 brought together delegates from both Jewish 
and British trade unions offering ‘the prospect of Jewish and Gentile political co-
operation on a much larger scale than within any of the existing socialist 
groups’.156 ‘Post-war alien problems’ failed to become a major election issue at 
the end of the war, despite the best efforts of the East London Observer.157  
   In many respects, the war accelerated the integration of the East London 
Jewish community. The profits of the war years provided the basis and impetus 
for the later movement away from the East End for many Jewish families and 
businesses. The Russian Revolution saw the departure of thousands of the 
most radicalised and anti-integrationist members of the Jewish intelligentsia, 
and the chaos and horror that followed the Bolshevik coup severed for many 
the final links with the old country.158 A more subtle path of integration 
accelerated by the First World War was the process of anglicisation of Jewish 
food - or rather, the anglicisation of Jewish food tastes. Wartime shortages and 
the imposition of rationing restricted the ability of many Jewish families to 
uphold Jewish dietary laws and forced them to adopt British culinary habits. 
This was compounded by returning Jewish soldiers used to daily bacon rations 
in the Army - the senior Jewish chaplain of the British Army, Reverend Michael 
Adler, having issued a special exemption from observing Sabbath and dietary 
laws for the duration of the war for Jewish troops.159  
   The fact that integration was in part a product of many of the wartime 
processes that attracted hostility towards - and the isolation of - London’s 
Jewish community reveals the complexity of the situation. Therefore observing 
the war’s impact in a purely positive or negative light is unhelpful to developing 
a clearer appreciation of the wider experience of Jews in London during the 
conflict. This chapter will seek to show how the impact of the war on the Home 
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Front had a wider transformative impact on the position of the Jewish 
community of London during the war. 
 
 Responses to the Outbreak of War in the East End 
of London August 1914 
 
   The perception that the Jewish East End collectively displayed a lack of 
loyalty to Britain and indifference to the nation’s war cause was a popular 
accusation in the years 1914-1918, especially from the vociferous East London 
press. In highlighting the deficiencies in the Jewish war response, opponents 
often cited the apparently unshakeable patriotism of the English East End as a 
counterweight. This section will test this assertion of a patriotic and united East 
End. The assessment of non-Jewish responses to war and displays of 
patriotism will provide a comparative framework for the chapter’s main focus - 
the closer examination of Jewish reactions and experiences of war in the East 
End - and provide context to the vitriol and vehemence of local anger. A full 
account of the East End’s war experience in 1914-1918 is beyond the scope of 
this project, so this section will focus on the first month of the war, to assess the 
veracity of popular war enthusiasm before and after the outbreak of war on 4 
August 1914, and how the East End subsequently mobilised for war in the 
proceeding weeks. It will be shown that whilst support for Britain’s cause was 
strong within the East End, there was powerful evidence of anti-war sentiment - 
at least up to the German invasion of Belgium - and thereafter isolated but 
determined displays of pacifism that dent the proud image of a patriotic East 
London community justly outraged by the indifference and disloyalty of its 
Jewish contingent.    
   
   On 1 August 1914, the foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey communicated his 
convictions to the German Ambassador in London that: ‘If there were a violation 
of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it 
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would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country’.160 The 
issue here is not if Grey himself believed this to be true or was merely engaging 
in a game of brinkmanship within European power politics. The question that 
will be asked instead is whether the British public, and East London in 
particular, did believe in the justice of fighting for ‘plucky little Belgium’ once 
Germany had deprived her of her neutrality? Was there widespread support for 
the Government’s stance that ultimately took Britain to war at 11pm on 4 
August, demonstrated by large flag waving crowds in the Capital, or was this 
merely an exaggeration of the bank holiday spirit caused by the crisis as well as 
a product of persuasive press rhetoric? The level of direct anti-war feeling 
prevalent in East London before and during the initial outbreak of war must also 
be examined (unsurprisingly the full reality of the existence of war dampened 
anti-war agitation as the nation rallied together, but opposition to the war still 
remained). Does the presence of well-attended and numerous anti-war 
meetings and rallies in the East of London and in other parts of the capital cast 
doubt on the image of a patriotic and jingoistic London eagerly and impatiently 
accepting war?  
   Albert Conn - born 1897 in Newham, East London, and son of a labourer in 
Milwall docks - believed firmly in the coming of war in 1914, citing that the 
growing German threat represented by her burgeoning navy and expanding 
foreign trade meant ‘it was no surprise to most people when war was declared 
in the month of August 1914’.161 However it would appear from the absence of 
even moderate references to the European crisis in the local newspapers in late 
July 1914 that the threat of war remained a dull but oppressive background 
presence in East London life, relegated to an afterthought by the preparations 
for the bank holiday weekend fast approaching.162 Arthur Marwick has sought to 
quantify the transformation of the British psyche from peace to war, stating that 
before August 1914 ‘war was widely expected as an eventual probability, but it 
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was scarcely visualised at all as an immediate contingency. This explains why 
the breaking of war brought both a sense of long sought release and an 
atmosphere of panic and untempered emergency’.163 
   The growing animosity between Germany and Britain that led to this expected 
probability of war has been well documented. Perhaps of more interest here, 
particularly in the East End, was that the fast unravelling European situation 
had been offset in many people’s minds by thoughts of leisure. Whilst 
politicians in Whitehall, at least up until 24 July, were chiefly concerned with the 
growing threat of civil war in Ireland, the predominantly working class region of 
the East End were preparing for the upcoming bank holiday celebrations for the 
first weekend of August.164 As Julia Bush relates ‘August Bank holiday was 
traditionally celebrated with great zest by East Londoners. In the week before 
war was declared the approach of the summer holiday dominates the columns 
of the local press’.165 
   Stating many years later in the House of Commons, Lloyd George attempted 
to defend the decision to declare war on Germany by invoking the size and 
passion of a war fevered crowd of thousands gathered around Whitehall 
demanding vengeance for Belgium.166 For W J Reader, the lack of popular 
support in favour of war prior to the German violation of Belgian neutrality 
demonstrates the importance the public placed in such a transgression allowing 
scenes such as E.C. Powell witnessed on the August Bank Holiday as he 
ventured into London: ‘when we emerged into Marylebone Road, we found 
London in a state of hysteria. A vast procession jammed the road from side to 
side, everyone waving flags and singing patriotic songs... We were swept 
along... bitten by the same mass hysteria. Westward we poured in a torrent of 
frenzied humanity... on to Buckingham Palace, where the whole road in front of 
the palace was chock-a-block with shouting demonstrators. Police were 
powerless to control the flood as people climbed the railings; sentries were 
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clapped on the back and even chaired. “The King! The King!” They yelled and 
chorused, and then broke into the National Anthem’.167 
   Such apparent mass enthusiasm towards the outbreak of war was not unique 
to London, and was matched in spirit in the Dominion countries of the British 
Empire, Toronto witnessing a typical response: ‘cheer after cheer from the 
crowds of people who had waited long and anxiously for the announcement of 
great Britain’s position in the present conflict’.168 Large patriotic displays 
gathered across the East End after war had been declared - large cheering 
crowds occupied Stratford Broadway late into the night of 4 August, after the 
government’s ultimatum to Germany had expired.169 For many reflecting on 
events later it was the memory of these crowds and flags that defined the 
outbreak of war in London. Albert Conn recollected ‘I can remember that 
August of 1914 though, pretty warm it was, all those straw hats and the band in 
the park. I can remember the outbreak of war too, all the union jacks waving 
and the blokes lining up at the recruitment offices’.170 The contemporary press 
were not slow to emphasise this image of an out flowing of visible patriotic 
enthusiasm; the East London Advertiser for instance relating: ‘Patriotism in the 
East End is everywhere most marked. It is impossible to mistake the tenor of 
conversation in public places. Even the youngsters have caught the infection 
and the Union Jack was of a certainty never in such great prominence that it is 
at the present time’.171 
   But the extent to which this demonstrates true war enthusiasm must be 
questioned. How much were such crowds the product of traditional bank 
holiday spirit, and to what extent were such patriotic displays influenced by the 
atmosphere and excitement created by the rapidly escalating European 
situation? It is useful to compare the similarities between the description of 
many of the crowd scenes that have come to characterise popular enthusiasm 
for war and Arthur St. John Adcock’s 1903 description of a London Bank 
Holiday: ‘up the road, in a word, come boys and girls, men and women, old and 
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young, in rags and in finery, married and single, with babies and without; and all 
the way by the roadside vendors of “ladies tormentors” long feathers known as 
“ticklers”, penny bagpipes and tin trumpets, stand contributing to the general 
uproar... in a word, everywhere to-day where there is any entertainment to be 
found a crowd is there to find it’.172 
   It is not too hard to imagine such a raucous crowd flocking to the free 
entertainment provided by the busy and nervous ministers scuttling back and 
forth to Whitehall preparing for war on 4 August. Adrian Gregory also makes the 
point that the figures for the size of the crowd, given by various sources as 
somewhere between 6,000 and 10,000 people outside Buckingham Palace on 
3 August and the crowd of around the same figure the following day at Whitehall 
have to be set within the context of a city of 7 million inhabitants. Even these 
figures pale in comparison to the estimated 100,000 people who swelled the 
streets of Central London upon the signing of the armistice in November 
1918.173 It would appear then that the raucous crowds, jingoistic flag waving 
and patriotic invectives which have become the dominant recollection of the 
outbreak of war in August 1914 is in the case of London limited to localised 
gatherings of a size unfit to measure the mood of such a sizeable metropolis 
and to some extent fuelled by the Bank Holiday spirit surrounding the opening 
weekend of the war.  
 
   Another important aspect casting doubt upon the popular image of a rush to 
join the colours is the existence, particularly in East London, of misgivings 
towards and open opposition to the war. Among the various religious 
communities within the East End there was significant disquiet at the prospect 
of European war. The Reverend C.H. Vine, speaking at the Ilford Men’s 
meeting on Sunday 3 August, according to the East London Advertiser ‘Spoke 
with a very anxious heart and perplexed mind, for we are in the presence of a 
national danger, such as we have never known before - the horrible possibility 
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of a terrific war overshadows all else, and the state of affairs the most trying we 
have ever experienced. Continuing, Mr Vine, appealed to his hearers to cherish 
no bitterness of spirit against the German Emperor, for he believed he had 
striven for peace and above all to pray to God that if possible peace may be 
preserved’.174   
   Similarly, the East End News and London Shipping Chronicle reported the 
offering of prayers for peace in the numerous synagogues dotting the East End, 
stating on 4 August ‘there is little evidence in the East End of London of 
sympathy or concurrence with Russia in her present situation... sons, parents, 
near and dear relatives are scattered throughout these lands of turmoil, and 
that is why the East End is watching the situation from hour to hour and praying 
earnestly in its synagogues that peace may yet prevail’.175 It is interesting to 
note the conformity in the Jewish and Gentile responses at this stage of the 
war. In the unsympathetic response to Russia’s plight, the congregations of the 
East End synagogues matched the hostility towards the prospect of a Russian 
alliance displayed by certain sections of the Jewish establishment and which 
will be discussed in greater detail in chapter two. The shift in popular sentiment 
in favour of the Russian alliance after Britain’s entry into the war would cause 
problems for both communities, as opponents equated historic Jewish enmity 
towards tsarism as an anti-entente and therefore anti-British sentiment.  
   These examples must be treated carefully, especially Reverend Vine’s 
sermon as we cannot know the reaction to it from his congregation, but 
evidence certainly exists as to the influence of religious institutions within the 
East End during this period. For instance the reflections of John Blake, a 
contemporary resident of Poplar, upon the war memorial erected at St Michael 
and All Angels Church in Poplar: ‘Large numbers of them [casualties listed by 
the memorial] were members of the congregation, and were baptised there or 
were married at its altar. There used to be packed congregations, and many 
workers for the church. Many of those whose names are recorded on the 
memorial went there. I can remember how great a part religion played in the 
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lives of the Poplar people years ago’.176 Religion remained an important force 
and guidance amongst Edwardian society, its continuing significance 
demonstrated by the controversy surrounding the Education Reform Act of 
1902, and the preaching of impassioned pro-peace sentiments by various East 
End clerics would no doubt factor in shaping East London’s attitudes to the 
coming of war. 
   Sentiment ran deeper than mere anxiety at the prospect of war. Open 
opposition to Britain’s involvement in a European conflict was prevalent in the 
East End of London during the first few days of August 1914. This opposition 
centred around, although not exclusively, the activities of the East London 
Federation of the Suffragettes, led by Sylvia Pankhurst. Pankhurst, concerned 
over the accusation that the suffragette movement sought votes only for ‘ladies’ 
and not the common woman, desired to attract working class women towards 
the movement and therefore established her new group in Bow East London.177 
Bow had precedent as a centre for anti-war activity. George Lansbury 
organised a meeting at the Bow and Bromley Institute denouncing war and 
calling for disarmament as far back as February 1899.178 
   Like many of East London’s population at the beginning of August 1914, 
Pankhurst was caught unawares by the outbreak of the European conflict. 
Britain’s declaration of war coincided with a visit to Ireland to support victims of 
a recent shooting in Dublin. The news quickly determined her return by boat to 
England and back to East London and also her stance; writing for her news 
sheet The Woman’s Dreadnought she said ‘Europe is indeed “rattling back” to 
the barbarism that should be past and gone… our people are plunged into war 
with as little choice or fore-knowledge as is allowed to those who live under the 
most absolute of the old despotisms. Sir Edward Grey told Parliament that this 
country would lose no more by joining the war than if she stood aside. He was 
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considering only the commercial interests involved… The men in power have 
plunged us into war for their commercial interests’.179 
   Not for the defence of ‘plucky little Belgium’ was war being waged, but to 
protect the financial interests of a state disregarding the wishes of its people. 
Pankhurst’s views were echoed by certain sections of London’s intellectual 
community, in particular emanating from Bloomsbury; Lytton Strachey suggests 
in a letter to a friend the existence of outside interests controlling the decisions 
of Grey and other cabinet members: ‘it’s like a puppet show, with the poor little 
official dolls dancing and squeaking their official phrases, while the strings are 
being pulled by some devilish Unseen Power’.180Although Strachey’s attempt to 
assess the public’s mood - ‘So far as I can make out there isn’t the slightest 
enthusiasm for the war’181 - should perhaps be treated with caution, anti-war 
sentiment across both the East and centre of London amongst anti-
establishment circles enjoyed consensus and was clearly intent on influencing 
opinion. 
   The same edition of The Women’s Dreadnought listed a number of anti-war 
meetings held in the previous week that were supported by the suffragettes and 
which drew popular and enthusiastic attendance.182 In particular, the East 
London suffragettes firmly backed the anti-war meeting held in Trafalgar 
Square on 2 August 1914. Whilst more conservative minded newspapers 
generally attacked the meeting as dangerous and subversive - enthusiastically 
reporting its disruption by patriotic groups - the middle ground Daily Chronicle 
provided a fairer and less partisan reflection of the meeting, describing a united 
and organised crowd passing a resolution ‘Calling on the British government in 
the first place to prevent the spread of the war and in the second place to see 
that the country is not dragged in to the conflict’.183 It is interesting to note the 
East London Advertiser’s observation that the crowd at Trafalgar Square 
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‘represented the poorer section of the population’.184 In 1890 the London based 
Marxist philosopher Freidrich Engels described East London as ‘the largest 
working-class district in the world’.185 Charles Booth’s 1903 study of the 
demography of East London revealed in greater detail both the working class 
nature of the region and its intense poverty, with over nineteenths of the 
population of Shoreditch, Bethnal Green, Stepney, Poplar and Hackney being 
workers, and a third of those living below an ungenerous ‘poverty line’.186 It is 
possible to assume that given the predominantly working class make up of East 
London that the crowd was to a sizeable extent swelled by the rank and file of 
the East End, and given the limited evidence available for gauging the general 
sentiment towards war over the weekend in East London this could be a useful 
barometer for identifying a generally pacific trend.187  
   The Trafalgar Square meeting was not the only anti-war demonstration to 
experience opposition, particularly following the official declaration of war. The 
East End News and London Shipping Chronicle reporting on 7 August how ‘At 
East Ham a socialist orator got into trouble. There was a crowd round his stand 
who greeted his remarks with shouts of “cheers for France and for the King”. 
The crowd at length grew tired of singing and booing, and proceeded to deeds. 
They rushed and broke up the platform, and would doubtless have broken up 
the speaker as well but for the presence of the police, who succeeded in getting 
him out of the crowd, a sadder and we hope a wiser man’.188  
   Such reactions to anti-war sentiment were increasingly common following the 
German invasion of Belgium and the British declaration of war, but other factors 
contributing to such acts of ‘war spirit’ must be considered as well, in particular 
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the nature and role of the press. Pankhurst, upon arriving back in East London 
after the declaration of war, attributed enthusiasm for war to be the result of 
‘minds all dazed and glamoured by the torrents of press rhetoric, and the 
atmosphere of excitement and rumour growing apace in every seat’.189 Julia 
Bush echoes this sentiment: ‘How deep rooted was the patriotism of East 
Londoners? Only time would tell. Too much importance certainly should not be 
attached to the flag waving of the first week of August 1914. Such 
manifestations proved merely that government propaganda about Britain’s ‘just 
cause’ and honourable duty to defend ‘plucky little Belgium’ spread rapidly and 
successfully’.190 The East London newspapers enthusiastically carried the 
official government line to their local community, invoking the injustice of 
German actions and the duty of East London to support the cause of the nation, 
but also through the printing of patriotic songs and advertisements. The East 
London Advertiser published the song ‘Britons United and True’, containing the 
war glorifying verses: 
‘Our Navy the envy and dread of the world, 
Our flag is the pride of the free: 
But once let those colours in war be unfurled 
We’ll show them what Britons can be’191 
Whilst the East London Observer with ‘Hoch, Der Kaiser’, chose a more 
personal attack on the German head of state to demonstrate to East Londoners 
the trueness of Britain’s cause: 
‘At last we know you, War-Lord. You that flung 
The gauntlet down, fling down the mask you wear. 
Publish your heart, and let its pent hate pour. 
And not by Earth shall he be soon forgiven 
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Who lit the fire accurst that flames to-day’.192 
   This pertinently jingoistic sentiment played strongly within a working class 
community that since the 1867 Reform Act and Disraeli’s second administration 
of 1874-1880 had flirted with a popular Conservatism purporting imperialism 
and trade protectionism, but also displayed a history of radical activity 
supporting notions of ‘Fair Play’, which Germany’s invasion of Belgium had 
clearly not adhered to.193 However it is dangerous to overplay any notions of 
political consensus favouring the Conservatives in East London given Marc 
Brodie’s work demonstrating the consistent success of the Liberals in seven of 
the East End’s constituencies in the period 1885 to 1906, and the power of 
conservative newsprints to influence the population at large.194  
   Overall, it can be argued the bank holiday spirit first masked and then 
heightened East End sentiments to the coming of war, and local anti-war feeling 
was both organised and popular before 4 August.195 But as Arthur Marwick 
attests, attitudes - both in favour and against war - became firmly crystallised 
after its actual declaration.196 The non-response from the German Government 
to the British ultimatum was witnessed in Whitehall and Trafalgar Square by a 
great gathering of people ‘waving Union Jacks, singing patriotic songs… when 
the British declaration of war upon Germany was issued at the Foreign Office it 
was greeted with ‘round after round of cheers’’.197 A correspondent in the East 
London Observer wrote later in the month how to his satisfaction the outbreak 
of war had led to a ‘revival of certain “Jingo” songs by the music-hall 
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managers… in line with a very deep note of patriotism’ prevalent in East 
London society.198 
   On the opposite end of the scale, Sylvia Pankhurst and the East London 
Federation of Suffragettes continued to voice their opposition to the war in the 
weekly paper The Woman’s Dreadnought, and other anti-war demonstrations 
continued for several days following the outbreak of war up to the point of 
attracting violent censor.199 It can be assumed that popular support and 
enthusiasm did exist in East London for the war, but that in volume and 
consistency it did not match the popular image of a population united in this 
support, such as Arthur Marwick’s assertion that ‘British society in 1914 was 
strongly jingoistic and showed marked enthusiasm for the outbreak of war’.200 
East London society showed signs of first indifference and then great anxiety 
towards the building crisis, only transferring towards general support following 
the German invasion of Belgium and the jingoism of the popular press. The 
support and presence of motivated anti-war groups within the East End 
demonstrating a complex reaction to the war by the East End of London.  
   This ambiguous response to war casts doubt on the later image of an 
impenetrable patriotism on behalf of EastEnders that was regularly compared 
by the local press to the apparent indifference and contempt for Britain’s cause 
demonstrated by East London Jews. Relations between Jews and non-Jews 
were often highly influenced by sensationalist press rhetoric on both sides, and 
the high stress and stakes of the war years increased the jingoist and 
chauvinistic tone of the commentaries. However, economic factors had 
historically dictated the treatment of minority groups in the East End of London, 
and wartime tensions between Jews and non-Jews in the area were 
exacerbated by economic competition that occasionally boiled over into outright 
violence. 
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 Total War? Jewish and Gentile Labour Relations in 
the East End 1914-1918 
 
   The 1901 Census reveals that amongst the Jewish population of East 
London, about 40 out of every 100 gainfully employed men (and 50 out of every 
100 women) worked in the tailoring industry (compared to 12 for cabinet 
making, and 13 involved in work at the Dockyards).201 If we trust investigators 
from Toynbee Town Hall that put the total East End Jewish population at 
100,000 in 1900, it seems likely the total number of Jews employed in tailoring 
matched or exceeded the often-quoted figure of 20,000 English tailors in the 
East End prior to 1914.202 Many Eastern European immigrants arrived in 
London with little or no assets and a limited skills base, thousands of whom 
were subsequently swallowed up by the East End tailoring industry based 
around the markets in Spitalfields, Whitechapel and Brick Lane. These new 
arrivals often found themselves working in tailoring workshops run by eastern 
European Jews already established in the area. Having settled in the East End 
prior to 1870 and risen up the hard way from ‘sweated’ to ‘sweater’, these 
Jewish tailoring entrepreneurs had few scruples in exploiting the desperation of 
fellow migrants following their path into the industry.203 Conditions in the 
tailoring workshops were abysmal even by Victorian standards. The medical 
journal The Lancet reveals a typical scene in 1882: ‘We visited one tailor's 
workshop in Hanbury Street. There was only one toilet, which flushed its 
contents outside the pan and across the yard. In the top room 18 people were 
working. In the heat of the gas and stoves, surrounded by mounds of dust, 
breathing an atmosphere of wool particles containing dangerous dyes, it is not 
surprising that tailors' health breaks down from lung diseases.’204 
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   There were more than a 1000 such workshops in Whitechapel alone by 1888, 
the development of the cheap Singer sewing machine in the 1860s making it 
possible to set up a tailoring workshop almost anywhere: backrooms, attics, 
basements.205 The large pool of cheap labour and the de-regulated state of the 
industry allowed the workshop owners to keep pay and conditions for workers 
at a minimum, thus undercutting the competition from English tailoring 
businesses. The working day for immigrant Jewish tailors was invariably long 
and arduous. Aubrey Rose, the son of a Jewish tailor living in Dempsey Street 
in Shadwell, recalled: ‘At nights when I went to sleep, the sound of the Singer 
sewing machine whirred away in the workshop next to my bedroom. When I 
awoke in the morning I heard the same busy sound. The Singer sewing 
machine was my lullaby at night, and my alarm clock at dawn. My father worked 
15 or more hours a day, making waistcoats for the fashionable City of London 
retail tailors’.206 Jewish tailors were not completely defenceless in this period 
however, and after a few abortive attempts to establish a united Jewish tailor’s 
trade union, the 1889 ‘London Tailors Strike’ successfully brought about an 
improvement in employment conditions for Jewish workers, reducing the 
working day to ten and a half hours and placing a limit on overtime work.207 The 
support for the interests of Jewish tailors in the strike by English trade unions - 
with an estimated six thousand workers taking action in the strike - belies the 
growing friction between Jewish and Gentile tailors, and was based primarily on 
the desire to block the underhand tactics that allowed Jewish workshops to 
outcompete their English equivalents.  
   Support for the strike also came from a number of Anglo-Jewish 
establishment grandees, who identified an improvement in the material position 
of immigrant Jewry with an acceleration of their acculturation and a reduction in 
the growing antagonism created by their presence in the East End. The Jewish 
MP for Whitechapel Samuel Montagu and the notional leader of Anglo-Jewry 
Lord Rothschild contributed both time and money to bring the strike to a 
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successful conclusion. Interestingly, the next major strike of Jewish tailors in 
1912 saw little direct involvement from established Jewry.208 Anne Kershen, in 
her study of Jewish trade unionism in the East End tailoring industry, has 
hypothesised that this was a consequence of the 1905 Aliens Act that saw 
direct government intervention into the issue of Eastern European immigration 
for the first time. Prior to this intervention, established Jewry had felt pressured 
to resolve the issue independently. Relieved of the primary role of solving the 
conundrum that had plagued established Jewry since 1881, the absence of 
involvement in the Jewish tailoring strike of 1912 is for Kershen indicative of a 
conscious decision to withdraw their public role in the industrial affairs of the 
Jewish working class. As will be seen later in this section, the Jewish 
establishment would unwelcomely have to reverse this position with the coming 
of war in 1914 and the onset of economic dislocation that would gravely impact 
the Jewish tailoring industry.209 
   Conditions improved for the Jewish workers, but resentment from English 
tailors towards the domination of the industry by Jewish workshop owners 
remained. Walter Southgate, the son of an English tailor, recalled the anger 
amongst his father’s colleagues towards their Jewish counterparts: ‘When you 
come to experience, as he and others did, that your standard of living was 
menaced and pride in your craft going down the drain because of this 
unregulated influx of penniless people, who were being exploited, this was quite 
another thing, which no professional body of people would tolerate’.210 By the 
summer of 1914, tensions between English and Jewish tailors in the East End 
were bubbling over into violence, the police intervening to break up fights 
between the two groups on several occasions in July alone.211 Despite calls for 
national and local unity following the declaration of war in August 1914, the 
animosity between the two groups worsened further with the economic strain 
the conflict brought.  
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   It is important at this juncture to explore an integral element of the East End 
economy that would have a large impact on the wartime fortunes of the Jewish 
tailoring industry: the East London dockyards. It is no surprise that, given the 
nature of war’s ability to dislocate and detract belligerent economies, an 
impoverished and working class area like East London was deeply affected by 
the onset of war in 1914. Rises in food prices and a fall in employment levels 
affected most regions of Britain during the war. However the importance of the 
East London docklands to the country’s war effort as a port for trade and ship 
building which sustained a great number of the population, and the high number 
of industrial workers lost to enlistment, put the plight of the region into sharper 
focus. The effects of the war on the economy of East London was not slow to 
materialise. The Eastern Post and City Chronicle reported on 8 August that 
‘The East End has been greatly affected by the war. The army and navy is 
largely recruited from this part of the metropolis and the orders calling out the 
reservists in both branches of the service and mobilising the territorials has 
made great inroads on the male population of the district. Thousands of men 
have re-joined their units’.212 
   The shambolic nature of the system for recruiting volunteers in 1914 meant 
that many essential workers that were required to keep the nation’s industry 
running, and consequently ensuring the continuation of the war effort, were lost 
to the army.213 One such group of essential workers were the men who worked 
in and around the East London dockyards. The docks were the economic 
lifeblood and mouth of the city, where much of Britain’s worldwide foreign trade 
and food stuffs arrived and was processed. Julia Bush states that ‘’in 1914 
dockers were the largest group of workers in West Ham and Poplar, and the 
second largest in East Ham and Stepney’.214 The Eastern Post and City 
Chronicle reported that ‘East End dockers are showing remarkable enthusiasm 
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for the cause of England and her allies. Mr Ben Tillet states that they are joining 
or re-joining the army in hundreds’.215  
   Whilst this was good news for the nation’s cause on the battlefield in France 
and Belgium it significantly slowed the arrival of goods into the city due to the 
lack of anyone to unload them, contributing to the severity of the food crisis in 
East London. Measures were taken to relieve the situation; the Chairman of the 
Dock, Wharf, Riverside, and General Workers Union, Ben Tillet, proposed to 
Winston Churchill and the Admiralty that ‘Members of the Union in the ports 
would be prepared to undertake ordinary labour in the matter of defences and 
similar work in preference to receiving relief while the work was done by the 
Territorials or other military forces’.216 Measures such as this did relieve the 
pressure to an extent. The use of military personnel in the importation of goods 
into the docks allowed trade in the area to continue, albeit at a reduced level. 
The effects of the war were not also universally recognised; the East London 
Observer wrote as late as 15 August: ‘As to the effect of the economic pressure 
in the East End of London, it is clear that no abnormal conditions are prevailing. 
“We are having what might be called a slack time” a well-known social worker in 
Canning Town put it, “but no real distress”. There may be a few discharges at 
local factories, but many of these, on the other hand, are very busy indeed. 
Even the dockers still have plenty of work, and so long as the navy can keep 
the port of London open, there is not much ground for apprehension’.217 
   As the situation developed however, finding any work for the remaining 
dockers became a real concern, with the cessation of trade with the Central 
Powers and the dislocation of foreign trade in general greatly reducing the 
amount of traffic flowing into the docklands. The financial impact on the 
docklands companies from the reduced trade led inevitably to pay cuts and 
unemployment amongst the dockers: ‘The effect of the war upon the trade of 
the docks is already very noticeable. Most of the berths are occupied, but there 
is little work being done upon the boats, the chief trouble being, it seems, that 
the firms are unable to obtain money to pay the men. There are rumours 
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abroad that several firms will close down altogether’.218 Although the East End 
suffered greater distress in August 1914 than rural areas where the necessity of 
bringing in the harvest ensured continued employment, other urban areas 
suffered similar difficulties, and it is interesting to compare the experiences of 
London to the enemy capital of Berlin; Jay Winter has shown that ‘In Berlin 
unemployment amongst male trade unionists rose from 6% to 19% in the first 
two weeks of the conflict and was probably more severe amongst unorganised 
workers. The rise in London was more modest’.219  
   Overall though, recruiting and the effects of the war on foreign trade coming 
through the East End dockyards led to a general decline in the local economy 
of the East End that could only prove disastrous for an area already suffering 
from high levels of poverty. The wartime decline of the dockyards had important 
ramifications for the Jewish East End. Much of the produce of London’s tailoring 
workshops went via the East London dockyards en route to the continent. 
Britain’s declaration of war on Germany and Austro-Hungary in August 1914 
not only removed the Central Power’s economies as markets for British tailored 
goods but the threat of U-boat activity forced the immediate closure of the 
London docks. This had disastrous economic consequences for East London 
industry as a whole and the tailoring trade in particular: unemployment amongst 
Jewish tailors rocketed as firms cut back on costs.220 The Jewish East End 
economy would eventually recover due to the procurement of government 
tailoring contracts for army uniforms, as will be discussed in more detail in the 
following section. The impact of the continued decline of the dockyards during 
the war would prolong the impoverishment of English East End families and 
would fuel resentment towards their Jewish neighbours as profits within the 
tailoring industry were increasingly flouted. 
 
    To return briefly to the economic impact on the Jewish East End in the weeks 
after August 1914, the plight of the Jewish poor proved an issue of contention 
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between the local East London authorities and the Jewish establishment as to 
who was responsible for their relief. Reactions to the plight of the Jewish poor 
on the behalf of the local East London authorities reveal the extent of local 
resentments towards the community. The Labour Party formed the War 
Emergency Workers National Committee (WNC) in the first days of the war to 
relieve economic distress, and it was not long before reports reached the 
committee of anti-Jewish discrimination.221 A member of the London Trades 
Council wrote to the committee concerning ‘the curious manner in which 
Stepney of all places is behaving towards its distressed people who are not 
naturalised British subjects’.222 The same committee reported cases of Jewish 
women refused work at the Stepney borough relief workshops and Jewish trade 
unionists barred from positions on East London war committees.223 Although 
some cases of refusal may have been misunderstandings, there is considerable 
evidence to suggest the existence of ‘hostility to assisting even friendly aliens, 
and Jews in general’.224  
   The Jewish Board of Guardians took on the cases, the Jewish Chronicle 
reporting that it had ‘undertaken to hold itself responsible for the relief of foreign 
born Jews, so that they should not come upon the rates or public charity at a 
time when the national resources are being seriously strained’.225 The Jewish 
elite were anxious to prevent any accusations that the Jewish immigrants of 
East London were a strain on Britain’s war effort, conscious in the belief that 
‘War breeds the feeling of prejudice from which the Jew, placed as he is, is 
bound to be the keenest sufferer’.226 It proved a controversial decision. The 
means tests used by the Board to decide applicant’s cases was condemned by 
the WNC as ‘being of such a character as to make applicants feel that they 
were begging’ and added to the distrust felt by immigrants towards wealthy 
Jewish institutions’.227 Many Stepney Jews simply refused transfer to the 
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Board’s care.228 English Jews also heavily questioned the Board’s policy on this 
issue. The minutes of the Jewish Board of Guardians meeting on the 14 
October 1914 reveal that cases of poor relief in the previous six weeks had 
doubled from the same period in 1913 - 796 to 1,832 - and costs had risen from 
£770 to £1716.229 The rise in costs, as well as the resentment by immigrant 
Jews of the Board’s methods, led to subscribers to the Guardian’s funds 
questioning whether their contributions were being used effectively.230 The 
question of economic relief for East London Jews proved an unsavoury episode 
for all involved. The issue revealed the anti-foreigner prejudice of many of the 
East London constituency authorities, and the misguided actions of Anglo-
Jewish philanthropists served not only to sow further mistrust between 
themselves and the immigrant community but also burdened those 
organisations with the financial and moral guardianship of the immigrant Jewish 
poor.    
   With the securement of new markets in North and South America for British 
garments and the temporary reduction of the U-boat threat, the fortunes of the 
London tailoring trade gradually revived in the spring of 1915. The restructuring 
of the British economy to face the rigours of total war and the expansion of the 
armed forces saw an increase in the number of government contracts for 
uniforms rewarded to tailoring firms, ushering in what was known colloquially as 
the ‘The Khaki Boom’. Voluntary enlistment and the introduction of the Military 
Service Bill had severely depleted the number of English tailors still operating in 
the East End by 1916. The government contracts for Army uniforms were 
therefore enjoyed almost exclusively by the Jewish tailoring businesses, the 
profits unlike the pre-war years now trickling down to the workers. The Board of 
Guardians reported ‘the working classes have had a more prosperous time than 
for many years past’. Even unskilled boy and girl workers were provided the 
chance to earn ‘abnormally high wages’.231 
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   Towards the end of 1915 military service for friendly aliens emerged as the 
dominant issue of tension between East London Jews and the local population, 
with the prosperity of the tailoring trade at the heart of the controversy. The 
visibility of Jewish prosperity on the streets of East London was the source of 
local anger, and the accusations that Jewish men were ‘shirking’ their military 
duty linked with fears that immigrants were replacing British soldiers in local 
jobs and businesses.232 Local newspapers took up the issue with outraged 
energy. The East London Observer stated in July 1915: ‘A great deal has been 
said as to Jewish effort in the War, but there is a strong local feeling that the 
“Jew boys”, as they are termed, who hang out about street corners and public 
houses, the cheap foreign restaurants and similar places, ought to be made to 
do something for the country they honour with their presence’.233 The 
newspaper’s readership appears to have strongly supported its stance. A 
typical example from the Observer’s correspondence columns comes from an 
anonymous Stepney councillor: ‘Since the war began I can honestly say that I 
have not come across a dozen Jewish soldiers. I have been told in many 
quarters that they are earning heaps of money in consequence of the shortage 
of men. If this is so, it is a despicable advantage to take, and the sooner it is 
brought to an end by conscription the better.’234 
   As will be discussed in more detail in chapter three, the lack of push factors 
such as the enlistment of friends, sense of patriotic duty, conscription and 
family pressure to join all prevented Russian Jewish enlistment but the relative 
success of the Jewish trades in wartime represented the major incentive not to 
volunteer. As Eugene Black put it, Russian Jews ‘regarded recruitment as a 
thinly disguised scheme to take away their hard-won East End homes, jobs and 
sanctuary’.235 
 
   It will now be assessed the extent to which Jewish applicants for military 
service exemption were treated differently from non-Jewish applicants in the 
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East End. In particular, it will be examined whether any evidence of prejudice 
towards Jewish applicants was motivated by their status as Jews, or as a 
consequence of the prevailing hostility towards the Jewish community resulting 
from the ‘Khaki Boom’.  
   The Military Service Bill appeared before Parliament on 27th January 1916 
and passed into law two months later. The Act enlisted all unmarried British 
males between the ages of 18 and 41 into the British Armed forces, with further 
exceptions or objections to be heard under the authority of local military 
tribunals.236 It is worth noting that the cases heard in 1916 up to the Military 
Convention with Russia concerned Jewish East Enders who had been granted 
full British citizenship and therefore fell under the jurisdiction of the Military 
Service Act, unlike their non-naturalised co-religionists. However, the cases of 
East End Jewish applicants were invariably portrayed by the local press as 
representative of the Russian Jewish community as a whole. Jewish applicants 
to East London tribunals on conscientious objector grounds or for religious 
reasons, fell victim to vehement press attacks directed at themselves and the 
community as a whole despite their small number proportionately. Jewish cases 
attracted large and often hostile galleries, and witnessed insults and violence 
between the applicant’s supporters and the local populace.237 They acted as a 
stage to vent local economic grievances and anti-alien sentiment, but they were 
not, as has been insinuated by David Cesarani, show trials of prejudice 
effectively putting the Jewish community as a whole on trial.238 They were little 
reported nationally and where they were, press reports aligned Jewish cases 
with the proportionately larger number of Gentile applicants in a wider concern 
for why British men refused to fight. The controversial issue of conscription was 
a divisive factor in British politics and society in the years leading up to the war 
and will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter two, in the context of the 
reception of Jewish volunteer soldiers.  However the historic British aversion to 
conscription is perhaps relevant to discuss here briefly in relation to the high 
                                                          
236 Adrian Gregory, 'Military Service Tribunals: civil society in action', in Jose Harris, Civil 
Society in British History (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003), pp. 177-191. See also, 
James McDermott, British military service tribunals, 1916–18. (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester 2011) 
237 ELO, 1 April 1916. 
238 Cesarani, Embattled Minority. p.70 
P a g e  | 81 
 
number of applications for exemptions recorded nationally. The imposition of 
conscription contributed to a sense of wartime upheaval within the British state. 
The alien and distinctly un-British concept of conscription, with all the hall marks 
of continental despotism associated with standing armies, had been thrust on 
the British public. Indeed, of the 1.2 million men now deemed to be enlisted 
following the Military Service Act, approximately 750,000 applied for exemption 
of some sort or other.239 
   The Jewish cases are illuminating for revealing the depth of local anti-Jewish 
sentiment whipped up by incendiary local press reports, and the motives 
provided by applicants for seeking exemption. They reveal that such motivation 
often derived from a hatred of militarism connected to experiences of 
conscription in Tsarist Russia - as well as religious objections - as much as the 
suspected concerns to protect their fiscal position. Such cases also provide 
indicators of motivation for the larger numbers of non-naturalised Russian Jews 
who fought conscription after July 1917 but were deprived of the chance to 
explain their position publicly in front of the military tribunal system, which 
stopped hearing Russian Jewish cases after the signing of the Military 
Convention with Russia. 
   The Stepney tribunal heard the majority of the most high profile Jewish cases 
in the East End, the district that led the rejection of Jewish applicants for aid 
during the first months of the war. The majority of applicants to the Stepney 
tribunal were Jewish, and in its first session in March 1916, twenty-nine 
applicants were refused out of thirty-three cases, a much higher rate of refusal 
than national averages.240 Tribunal members were a mix of local councillors, 
military representatives and local businessmen.241 They did not represent a 
broad cross-section of the local population, containing few women, labourers or 
minorities. John Rodker, a Jewish poet born in Whitechapel who resisted 
enlistment on conscientious objection grounds, questioned the authority of the 
military tribunal system: ‘somehow I made [war] non-existent till 1916 and 
Conscription, with the Tribunals beginning to sit, and they too I refused to 
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believe in, I was not going to have my conscience arbitrated on by retired 
soldiers, tradesmen, and professional men, all over age’. 242 The last point, 
indicating a generational clash, conforms closely to sentiments revealed 
nationally across the military tribunals that refusal to fight was a protest act.243 
Conscientious objectors such as Rodker however made up only a small 
percentage of the overall cases seen by the military tribunals between 1916-
1918. Adrian Gregory has estimated that as little as 2% of national appeals 
were made on the grounds of conscientious objection, with the majority of 
cases centring on domestic and employment considerations.244 
   The London tribunals and the East London Observer preferred to interpret 
Jewish motives for not fighting as part of an economic conspiracy. Jewish 
workers were accused of maliciously attempting to protect their war profits as 
Englishmen bled serving their country. The Observer even insinuated that 
disturbances in court by the applicant’s supporters were pre-meditated acts of 
sabotage which ‘might tempt one to suspect that German gold has been at 
work’.245 Many Jewish appeals were indeed made for economic reasons, but a 
significant number were made on religious grounds. Joining the army would 
mean breaking the Sabbath, eating non-Kosher food and many other religious 
trespasses.246 The number of Jewish religious ministers applying for exemption 
(religious ministers were omitted from the Military Service Act) was noted in the 
national press, where the relative weight of Jewish versus British loyalties and 
the competing claims of religious observance over the duties of citizenship were 
discussed at length.247 This was a matter of concern for the BoD, who 
discussed strategies for attesting the credentials and sincerity of religious 
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applicants in several meeting between April and June 1916.248 At length, the 
Chief Rabbi of the United Kingdom, Joseph Herman Hertz, declared that there 
were no specifically Jewish grounds for conscientious objection to war.249 Hertz 
feared that high numbers of  Jewish exemptions from military service would 
harm Jewish interests nationally, and actively supported the enlistment of 
Jewish ministers falling under the jurisdiction of the Act, even the priestly 
lineage of Cohanim who were forbidden from coming into contact with the 
dead.250 Anglo-Jewry’s failure to defend the position of those Jews who rejected 
war on religious grounds led to accusations that the communal leadership were 
jettisoning their fellow co-religionists for the sake of keeping up wartime 
appearances, further rupturing relations with the Jewish East End as a result.251  
   Fear and hatred of military conscription was also the basis for numerous 
appeals, one man citing that ‘he was opposed to warfare, his parents having left 
Russia so that he should not be conscripted’.252 The Stepney tribunal however 
gave his appeal little credence, factoring in his profession as a tailor making 
khaki uniforms as grounds to reject his case.253 Economic fears were central to 
how tribunals approached Jewish cases, and religious or other motivations 
were given short shrift. Examples of Jewish applicants attempting to trick the 
tribunals appeared frequently in the local press, the Southern Reporter 
providing a typical example in June 1916 with an account of the recent 
experiences of an East London tribunal member: ‘The other day an old Jewish 
tailor applied on behalf of his son, who he said, ran the business. He (the old 
man) had nothing whatsoever to do with the show; and if the young man was 
called up he would be ruined. He got an exemption, so a few days later I called 
at the shop. The young man was behind the counter, and I ordered a suit of 
clothes. “VAT Price?” inquired the exempted one. “Oh, I shall want credit”, I 
explained. “Fader,” called the young Jew. The old man promptly appeared from 
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the back room. It was as I suspected. The old reprobate ran the business 
himself.’254 This particular case hints at the widely held suspicion in the East 
End that Jewish businessmen were attempting to falsely exempt themselves or 
their sons primarily to maintain their business interests. Both the Stepney and 
Bethnal Green tribunals put forward resolutions to the government in the 
summer of 1916 which railed against aliens who were ‘allowed to strengthen 
their industrial position without any sacrifice’’.255 
    The anti-alien sentiment arising from the tribunals inadvertently stimulated 
the growth of a counteractive group known as the Foreign Jews Protection 
Committee. Established in the summer of 1916 to defend the rights of foreign 
Jews from the Military Service Act and later the Military Convention with Russia, 
the committee claimed to represent the interests of a large number of Jewish 
organisations, as well as sympathetic socialist groups and labour interests. Julia 
Bush states the number of Jewish organisations represented by the FJPC as 
22, with 7 socialist groups and 12 trade union branches also appearing under 
the FJPC umbrella.256 By October 1916 the Observer reported that the FJPC 
claimed to represent 120 organisations, but this was beyond their resources 
and the real number was certainly much lower. Despite this, the FJPC could 
boast real sway within Jewish East London labour organisations, and the group 
could legitimately claim to represent the mouthpiece and defender of 
disassociated Russian Jewish youth in the East End. The FJPC were 
moderately successful in uniting local resistance to national service, and the 
group’s activities were a significant thorn in the side of the organisers of the 
Jewish Battalion scheme in 1916 and 1917, as will be discussed later in chapter 
three.257 The FJPC also played an important part in establishing communication 
and cooperation between Jewish and non-Jewish labour groups during the later 
war years. The agitation surrounding military service and economic competition 
had previously prevented any significant collaboration between the groups, but 
the Russian Revolution of March 1917 galvanised the British Labour movement 
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and encouraged sympathy from trade union leaders towards the plight of Jews 
fighting the Military Service Act.258  
   A tribunal in Shoreditch during September 1916 was interrupted mid-session 
by emotive talk of ‘alien job-snatchers’.259 It is noticeable however that 
economic avarice, and alien status predominate in the rhetoric directed against 
the Jewish applicants, and little or no direct attacks were made concerning their 
Jewishness - either in casual antisemitic sneers identified with a background 
antisemitism of British society noted by Todd Endelman and David Cesarani, or 
in more overt terms by connoting refusal to fight with old diatribes against 
Jewish cowardliness.260 Such scenes were in line with similar attacks against 
Irish immigrants in the 1840s and Bangladeshi immigrant families in the 1970s, 
identified by the local community above all as an economic threat rather than a 
threat to the demographic ethnicity of the area, despite the best attempts by 
some anti-alien agitators.261 East End attacks on the Jewish community was 
influenced by a certain ‘economic xenophobia’ rather than driven by a prevailing 
anti-Jewish sentiment, although antisemitic incidents did occur.  
   It was not the case that East End military tribunals were inherently prejudiced 
against Jewish applicants, as Julia Bush implies.262 Jewish religious ministers 
were often granted exemption, if they could prove their credentials.263 Figures 
for the Bethnal Green, Shoreditch and Aldgate tribunals reveal a higher 
proportion of refusals of Jewish applicants but not so pronounced as to imply a 
distinct anti-alien bias, the Stepney tribunal withstanding. When John Rodker 
                                                          
258 Bush, East London Jews War, p.153  
259 ELO, 16 September 1916 
260 Cesarani has referred to ‘A general level of anti-Jewish feeling, the ‘background’ anti-
Semitism of the pre-war years’ of the British public that was the basis for an escalation of 
anti-Jewish activity during the war; Cesarani, Embattled Minority,  p.65. Endelman identifies 
a prevalent aloofness towards Jews on the behalf of English Aristocratic society that he 
terms ‘Garden party anti-Semitism’. Todd Endelman, The Jews of Britain 1656-2000 
(University of California Press, Berkley 2002) Intro 
261 W. Evans-Gordon, The Alien Immigrant (1903). For more on the Aliens issue see David 
Glover, Literature, Immigration, and Diaspora in Fin-de-Siècle England: A Cultural History of 
the 1905 Aliens Act (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012) For an examination of 
East London attitudes towards immigration through the ages see Anne J. Kershen ‘The 
construction of home in a spitalfields landscape’, Landscape Research, 29:3, (2004) pp.261-
275 
262 Bush, East London Jews War. ‘There is no shortage of evidence that the East London 
tribunals were prejudiced against Jewish applicants because they were Jewish and 
‘foreign’’, p.151 
263 Cesarani, Embattled Minority, p.67 
P a g e  | 86 
 
eventually ended up in front of a tribunal, he found an unlikely sympathiser. The 
ultra-patriotic Anglo-Jewish Officer Henry Myer was adjourning conscientious 
objector cases in August 1916 and found himself sitting on Rodker’s case: ‘His 
name was Rodker. He described himself as a poet and an agnostic, but he was 
of Jewish birth and claimed it was against his conscience to kill anybody… At 
the time I knew that those who had been killed or maimed for life,…had been 
motivated by not only patriotic feelings, but had done what the leaders of all 
religious denominations had declared to be right (Quakers, perhaps, excepted). 
In retrospect however, I feel that there was much to be said on Rodker’s behalf, 
if it were possible to define a poet’.264 It was however a rarity for elements of the 
Jewish establishment to sympathise with immigrant Jews refusing to fight, and 
the Board of Guardians as well as the Jewish Chronicle tried desperately to 
minimise the fallout from the cases, deeply anxious to avoid further negative 
publicity for the community.265  
 
   Overall, economic competition led to a wartime deterioration in Jewish/non-
Jewish relations. Jews were accused of resisting enlistment to protect their 
economic position, built upon the wartime profits arising from the tailoring 
trades, and at the expense of English workers fighting in France. The fallout 
from Jewish applications to East London military tribunals contributed to the 
worsening animosity between Jews and non-Jews in the East End. However, 
prejudice against Jewish applications were predominantly the result of the 
economic tensions between the two groups, rather than evidence of ingrained 
antisemitism in the East End. This theme of economic conflict would continue to 
dictate events, and directly influenced the violence witnessed in Bethnal Green 
in September 1917. There were however, factors resulting from the war that 
eased ethnic tensions in the East End and ultimately contributed to the 
integration of the Russian Jewish community. The following section will assess 
the role the war played on the anglicisation of Jewish cuisine in the East End, 
and will discuss the importance of food as a contributor to migrant communities’ 
integration, with war an external accelerating factor.  
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 Kosher War? The Anglicisation of the Jewish East 
End 1914-1918 
     
   The case for war acting as catalyst for technological change on the battlefield 
has become a truism, but the role of military conflict in accelerating social and 
cultural trends on the Home Front is equally compelling, especially concerning 
the effects of war on the acculturation of a transitional community within the 
dominant community.266 Food is increasingly used as a signifier of national and 
immigrant identity by social historians, with Jewish food in particular revealing 
substantial evidence of cultural transfer experienced during the diaspora.267 The 
rigours of total war that were thrust on the belligerent nations during the First 
World War ensured food supply a central place within state war planning - the 
supply of butter and bread to the cities became as important a strategic concern 
as supply of bullets and shells to the front line. And yet it is only comparatively 
recently that academic interest in the relationship between food and war has 
stirred. The symposium on ‘Food and War in Europe in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries’ held at the University of Paris-Sorbonne in September 2009 
may yet prove a significant landmark addition to the understanding of warfare 
as an agent of societal transformation. An excellent and wide-ranging volume 
Food and War in Twentieth Century Europe followed up this conference in 
2011, encompassing the work of 18 scholars examining the impact of war on 
food production, allocation and consumption.268 This section will build on these 
works, and apply a close focus of the relationship between war and food as a 
transformative social agent onto the case study of the East End Jewish 
community during World War One. There is evidence to suggest that the years 
1914-1920 initiated a sharp acceleration in the anglicisation of Eastern 
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European Jewish food in Britain, a process usually viewed as occurring 
gradually over the course of the twentieth century.269 It will be argued here that 
this process contributed to the wartime acceleration of integration of the 
community into British society.   
   For Orthodox Jews in Britain, the First World War greatly interfered with their 
ability to adhere to the Jewish dietary requirements of Kashrut. As we have 
seen, Jewish butchers and their customers fell victim to discrimination in the 
fall-out from local anger at the profits being accrued by the ‘Khaki Boom’. Food 
shortages saw the price and scarcity of kosher meat rise, and rationing 
restricted Jews’ ability to purchase it. Jewish soldiers on the whole were unable 
to secure kosher in the British armed forces, leading amongst many serving 
soldiers to a slip in the adherence of Kashrut that continued upon their 
readjustment into civilian life after the war. There are no precise figures 
available to say for certain, but it can be deduced from this that the war at least 
in part reduced observance of Kashrut within the East End, and accelerated the 
anglicisation of Jewish food. And yet to date there has been no major study of 
the effect of the First World War on these processes. Panikos Panayi in his 
article The Anglicisation of East European Food in Britain, saw this process 
gradually occurring over a period of a hundred years or so from the primacy of 
the Jewish food halls in the late 19th century to their eclipse in the 1980s under 
the onslaught of the modern supermarkets.270  
   Overall, this approach demonstrates the general process of cultural transfer 
to - and acculturation within - the dominant society that Eastern European Jews 
in Britain experienced through the course of the century. However, Panayi does 
not attempt to investigate the impact on this process within the context of high 
stress short-term events such as the First World War. Interestingly most major 
studies in the last 20 years or so of British Jewry in the twentieth century - 
including the works of Todd Endelman, Geoffrey Alderman, and David Feldman 
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- fail to consider the relationship between food, identity and assimilation.271 
Changing perceptions of and levels of adherence to Jewish dietary laws, where 
they are mentioned at all, are usually combined with a discussion of the 
declining religiosity of the Jewish immigrant, especially among second 
generation Eastern European Jews. However, the centrality of food as an 
indicator of identity, and the importance of dietary laws within the fundamental 
tenets of Judaism, makes the changing nature of Jewish food tastes of great 
importance in any discussion of the integration and acculturation of the Eastern 
European Jewish community within wider British society. 
 
   Late nineteenth century Jewish immigrants arriving in East London brought a 
blended diet of Eastern European cuisine - bread bagels, fish and potatoes - 
and a traditional Ashkenazi diet of lokshen, farfel Kreplach and chicken soup.272 
The visibility and aroma of Jewish cuisine was a distinctive element of East 
London life prior to the war; around the market at Petticoat Lane ‘peddlers went 
around with baskets of bagels - salt herrings, sauerkraut, and pickled 
cucumbers were sold from barrels’.273 An entry from the Dickens Dictionary of 
London 1888 compiled by the author’s son depicts the culinary offerings 
available on ‘the lane’ in vivid detail and is worth quoting at length:  
   ‘The London artisan often purchases the tools of his trade in Petticoat-lane on 
Sunday mornings; where also may be bought the highly spiced confectionary in 
which the children of Israel delight - the brown and sweet “butter cake”, the 
flaccid “bola” the “stuffed monkey”, and a special pudding made of eggs and 
ground almonds. The poorer Jews of London eat Spanish olives and Dutch 
cucumbers pickled in salt and water as food rather than as a relish. They love 
herrings steeped in brine, German sausage, the dried flesh of beef and mutton, 
smoked salmon, and indeed fish of all sorts, stewed with lemons and eggs, or 
fried in oil. Every Jewish luxury may be obtained in perfection in Petticoat-lane, 
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besides “cosher”[sic] meat, and matzoth or unleavened cakes, used at the 
Feast of the Passover, which falls after Eastertide… Raw and fried fish are 
staple commodities of “the lane”, and several fried fishmongers have been 
known to amass large fortunes. “cosher” rum and shrub, and liquors such as 
cloves, aniseed, noyeau, &c., of which the Jews are exceedingly fond, may be 
obtained in this quarter’.274  
   Whilst far from a meticulous authority on the Jewish East End’s culinary 
culture, Dickens Jr’s account does reveal the depth of cultural transfer within 
the Jewish migrant experience that absorbs Sephardic and Ashkenazi culinary 
influences into the traditional dishes of the later eastern European migrants.    
   It has often been argued that Orthodoxy amongst the majority of Jewish 
immigrant families remained strong long after arrival in Britain, with a strict 
adherence to the dietary laws of Kashrut, and that this was not quite so true of 
more established and anglicised Jews.275 Many Anglo-Jewish cookbooks and 
recipes in the Jewish Chronicle prior to the First World War did not adhere to 
Kashrut and those that did differed little from mainstream contemporary English 
dishes, indicating that the anglicisation of Jewish food tastes amongst the early 
to mid-19th century Jewish arrivals from Germany was mostly complete.276 
Indeed, a 1900 social study of London Jews remarked that ‘the foreigners [east 
European Jews] are commonly shocked and scandalised at the laxity in faith, 
and the shamelessly ‘non-observant’ lives of their English co-religionists’.277 It 
was not as clear cut as this however, and evidence to the contrary comes from 
a 9 March 1911 Jewish Chronicle article on restaurants in the East End that 
claimed: ‘ninety per cent of these establishments are unworthy of the name 
restaurant or indeed, of Kosher… It is a moot question whether there is really a 
need for these unwholesome eating houses, with their ill-kept tables, unkempt 
patrons and uninviting fare’.278 The article goes on to assert that the handful of 
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‘more respectable Kosher restaurants’ in the East End were unlikely to attract 
Eastern European Jews.279 Clearly not all Eastern European Jews were models 
of chaste orthodoxy when it came to following Kashrut, as were not all English 
Jews converts to secularism. The upper echelons of Anglo-Jewry in particular 
were concerned with maintaining the integrity and observance of Jewish dietary 
laws within London’s Jewish community. On several occasions before 1914 the 
Chief Rabbi and the London Shechita Board defended the practice of shechita 
from animal rights protestors and campaigned against the selling of bogus 
kosher meat.280 However, it would seem in general terms that culinary 
anglicisation within established Jewry was at a more advanced stage than their 
East European co-religionists by 1914.  
   The East End of London contained the largest collection of Jewish butchers in 
the country. One of the most successful, E.Barnett, owned a collection of 
warehouses that dominated Middlesex Street in Aldgate281 and boasted of 
having ‘the only sausages that bear the Shechita Board seal’.282 Indeed the 
Jewish food industry, whilst being a key cultural pillar of the Jewish community 
of East London, was also increasingly a source of friction with the larger non-
Jewish population. The Lancet reported as early as 1884 on the animosity 
towards Jewish tailors in Hanbury Street caused by refuse left outside the 
tailoring workshops, and in particular ‘The large quantity of refuse from the fish, 
which forms a staple of the Jewish diet, mixing with the cloth dust coming from 
the workrooms may, perhaps, contribute to create this unpleasantness’.283 In 
1903 a Royal commission set up to investigate Jewish immigration interviewed 
a member of the British Brothers’ League, a Mr J.A Kreamer, who claimed over 
200 residents had been driven out of Exmouth Street in Stepney by the 
establishment of a Jewish owned fish factory: ‘The system by which they have 
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been driven off is much the same system as I am suffering from now. Next door 
to me there has come a pickled herring yard. I do not know whether you 
gentlemen know what pickled herrings are - I have never tasted one, but the 
odour from them is something dreadful. I have even been to Thames 
magistrates to ask them to help me to do away with this nuisance, but they tell 
me I have no redress, and all day on Sunday these pickled herring barrels are 
being thrown in and out of the shed. I want to live, as I consider myself a decent 
working man, and I want to live in a respectable street, but they are turning the 
street into one of the worst streets I know of in the neighbourhood’.284 
Ominously, the man added ‘I assure you, gentlemen, If you don’t do something 
this time, it will be something more serious, for only yesterday I was talking to a 
clergyman in this neighbourhood who expressed himself very very strongly, and 
said he was an anti-Semitic man, and he would go with the people as hard as 
he could… The object of the British Brothers’ League is to stop these pauper 
aliens coming here’.285  
   The strength of the anger demonstrated here shows the importance of the 
relationship between food and identity within social group interaction.286 The 
aroma and visibility of Jewish food was associated with unpleasant emotions for 
some non-Jews particularly as they represented an inescapable reminder of the 
continuing encroachment of the Jewish community into the heart of the East 
End. Diet was of central importance to how both groups defined themselves 
and each other; Jewish food was considered bizarre, odorous, and even 
unpatriotic compared to the wholesomeness of traditional British dishes such as 
roast beef - of which the concept rather than the reality of consumption was 
more important for the majority of English families for whom beef would be a 
rare luxury.287 This sentiment was connected with the resentment created by 
economic competition between Jews and non-Jews detailed in the previous 
section, and leant significant recruitment inspiration for nascent anti-Jewish 
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groups in the East End, such as the British Brothers’ League, that provided a 
model and inspiration for Oswald Mosley’s The British Union of Fascists during 
the interwar period.288  
   The First World War greatly exacerbated these tensions. In 1914, Britain 
imported two thirds of the country’s necessary food supplies from foreign 
markets. The virtual cessation of world trade and threat of German naval action 
put this vital supply line in jeopardy, leading to dramatic increases in food 
prices, not only in London, but also across the provinces. The prospect of food 
shortages resulting from the onset of war led some who could afford it to buy up 
quantities of food in bulk, and un-scrupulous shopkeepers to raise prices in 
prediction of the forthcoming scarcity of their produce. Within the first week of 
war the rise in food prices began to be felt - the East London Advertiser on 8 
August 1914 stating: ‘Probably in no part of the country will the war affect the 
masses of the people as in the East End of London… Already there has been a 
wicked attempt to take advantage of the war scare to increase the price of food 
unduly… the action of many shop-keepers in the East End has been of a 
monstrous character and householders who have been called upon to pay as 
much as 4d, per pound increase upon their butter have every right to resent it, 
for they have undoubtedly been fleeced’.289 On the same day The Eastern Post 
and City Chronicle reported: ‘certain tradesmen in Roman-Road have made 
advances in the prices of provisions. Many of their former customers, indignant 
at this action, have gone elsewhere to “shop”’.290 The majority of local 
shopkeepers were forced legitimately to raise their prices according to the 
sharp market fluctuation. However, a series of press reports highlighting the 
actions of a few allegedly unscrupulous shop keepers led to a nationwide 
newspaper campaign of condemnation against unpatriotic retailers who were 
accused of profiteering from the war.291 The high proportion of Jewish grocers 
and bakers in the East End suffered sustained pillorying in the local press, 
particularly from the East London Observer, which called for boycotts and 
demonstrations against ‘the immoral Jewish businesses seeking to profit from 
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this evil war’.292 There is little evidence to suggest Jewish shop keepers were 
guiltier of ‘profiteering’ than non-Jewish owners, but the prevailing hostility 
towards Jews driven by economic competition was often enough to confirm 
suspicions.  
   Given the loss of many families’ ‘breadwinners’ to the army or unemployment, 
the onset of food shortages caused severe distress, which grew as prices 
everywhere increased- by an average of 16 per cent in the first week of the war 
alone. Many East London families were used to just ‘getting by’ before the war, 
and the impact of such food price rises, coupled with the loss of the 
household’s main earner, meant as Julia Bush has stated ‘instant hunger for 
many East Londoners’.293 Bernard Waites in his study A Class Society at War, 
shows the effects on such families by the increases in food prices and the strain 
this placed on the nation’s relief services: ‘In the last fortnight of August, three 
times as many children were fed in the borough under the 1906 legislation 
empowering local authorities to feed necessitous school children as had been 
in the corresponding weeks of 1913. The majority were children of those 
unemployed because of the war’.294  
   British trade gradually recovered, and a series of good harvests coupled with 
a steady supply of imports meant there were no food shortages in Britain for the 
next two years of war. However, 1916 witnessed dire wheat and potato crop 
harvests as well as an acute rise in shipping losses to submarine action, 
resulting in British cities experiencing severe food shortages and further price 
rises. In the East End, local councils already strained by war-related poverty 
amongst working class families did not have the resources to provide 
widespread food relief and depended on the help of charities and philanthropic 
organisations such as the Fabian Society to fill the holes.295 Many recollections 
of those who lived through the war fixate on the experiences of the food crisis, 
and the daily struggle to obtain enough, even for a minimal amount, to sustain a 
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typical East London family. Alice Linton who was six years old and living in 
Hoxton at the outbreak of war, reflected: ‘The shortage of food was very 
noticeable… There was a great shortage of potatoes, meat and especially coal. 
Caroline, Albert and I were sent to queue up whenever the word got round that 
a shop had got a supply in. We took an old wooden home-made cart to fetch 
the precious, half hundred weight of coal, which was all that we were allowed, 
and we didn’t know when there would be any more’.296 
   Arthur Newton of Hackney gives a similar account of the grind of obtaining 
food following the onset of war: ‘Many times in those days we would hear of 
potatoes at Smith’s shop, or coal at the depot, and I would be sent to try and 
get some. Many times we could line up for one hour or even two only to find 
them sold out when one gets near’.297 The queuing for and scarcity of food was 
not unique to East London, and paled in comparison to the acute food 
shortages that would affect Russia and Germany in the ‘turnip winter’ of 1916-
1917. However, the prevailing economic hardships and poverty of East London 
pre-war where many families were only just about able to keep their heads 
above water, meant the effects of enlistment, unemployment and rising food 
prices brought on by the war were always likely to have a particularly 
devastating effect on the fortunes of the East End.  
   The deprivation of English East Enders would be put into sharp relief by the 
perception that Jewish families were less affected by the onset of these 
shortages due to the profits accruing from the ‘Khaki Boom’.298 Whilst it is 
broadly accurate that the Jewish community suffered less from the onset of 
food shortages, this may have had more to do with the thrift associated with 
Jewish home-cooked recipes, as a reporter in The Sunday Magazine attested 
to: ‘What they obtain for their money is superior in the way of cooking to 
anything we can have… I took my stand also in the general shop of the 
neighbourhood, at a little after twelve mid-day, and if you ever have a desire to 
realise the value of a penny, and that four farthings make a penny, go there and 
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note the purchases…the farthing’s worth of tea, of milk, of flour, were to help 
make a dinner for more than one or two people’.299  
   There were however signs that tailoring profits resulting from the war were 
beginning to alter what Jewish families ate. Bill Belmont (b.1910, Old Montague 
Street), whose father worked as a tailor in Aldgate, recalled typical pre-war East 
European family cuisine: ‘Fish loomed large in our diet (a relic of the Russian 
ghetto?), with an ordinary ‘schmaltz’ herring as the best buy. Two herrings only 
cost a penny, and together with boiled potatoes formed a tasty nourishing 
meal’.300 Belmont relates that later in the war ‘when money seemed to be more 
available’ chicken replaced fish as the main ingredient in the family meals, and 
although these took the form of typical Jewish dishes like lokshen soup, English 
recipes such as roast chicken and liver-based dishes began to feature 
prevalently in the family diet.301 Belmont makes no particular mention to how 
strictly the family adhered to Kashrut. 
   The renewal of the German U-boat campaign in the spring of 1917 resulted in 
devastating shipping losses - almost three million tons lost between March and 
June alone - resulting in Britain’s supply of wheat shrinking to just six weeks’ 
worth.302 Rationing was introduced on a voluntary scale and then compulsorily 
for a series of food products from February 1918 onwards. Whilst not as 
systematic and enforced as the rationing system in the Second World War, it 
greatly reduced the variety of food types available. Rationing coupons set out 
strictly what items could be purchased and in what quantities - this included 
pork, bacon and ham ration tokens which for Jews practicing Kashrut is strictly 
forbidden. These tokens could not be formally exchanged, although some like 
Naidia Woolf’s mother swapped them with a Christian neighbour for egg and 
cheese rations.303 This was not always possible however - some families such 
as that of Aubrey Rose felt the situation of the war allowed for a temporary 
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dispensation of Kashrut and made use of the pork rations to supplement their 
otherwise meagre meat rations.304 Others sought extra kosher meat on the 
black market that had sprung up in the wake of the introduction of rationing. 
The Board of Deputies had great difficulty monitoring these unlicensed kosher 
meat sellers, and suspected that as many as 5,000 Jewish families within the 
East End may have unknowingly been sold non-kosher meat products.305 The 
Board and the Jewish Chronicle lobbied for the replacement of pork rations for 
Jews, and the Government acquiesced in May 1918, with Jewish citizens 
receiving replacement meat rations.306 This however led to accusations from 
non-Jewish observers that Jews were in fact getting extra rations on top of the 
standard allowance.307 Whilst this was quickly shown to be baseless, the 
suspicion that Jews had in some way been granted special privileges remained. 
   The return of soldiers in November 1918 brought another challenge. Near the 
beginning of the war the Chief Reverend Michael Adler issued a special 
dispensation allowing all serving Jewish soldiers to abstain from Kashrut for the 
continuation of hostilities, due to the difficulties faced in keeping kosher on the 
front line.308 Whilst many Jewish soldiers attempted to fulfil their religious 
obligations as best they could during their service in the British Army (as will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter two), many accepted this dispensation, 
even revelled in it, as a Jewish chaplain attached to a labour battalion in France 
observed: ‘[the soldiers] were getting an issue of bacon and pork in their daily 
rations. I therefore applied to the Army Headquarters for some substitute to be 
provided, and the request was immediately granted. Imagine my surprise and 
disgust upon my next visit to their camp at hearing from their Commanding 
Officer that the men had protested in large bodies and practically threatened to 
refuse work unless the bacon ration was restored for their breakfast. Now I 
have no doubt that the men had never tasted bacon before entering the Army; 
yet, in spite of a comparatively favourable Jewish environment, a short period of 
army life had so reduced their Jewish consciousness as to make them actually 
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prefer and demand swine  flesh when other food was offered them in its stead. 
The only reply I received upon remonstrating with them was: “It’s not so bad 
when you get used to it!’309 These young Jewish soldiers were typical of 2nd 
generation Jewish immigrants who often held ambivalent attitudes towards 
religious belief at odds with the deeper religiosity of their parents, removal from 
whose influence and the unique circumstances of army service rendered a 
religious life incompatible with their interests.  
   The restrictions the war placed on the ability of orthodox Jews to maintain 
strict kashrut, both on the Home Front and in the Army, contributed to the 
adoption of English culinary tastes and habits that diminished - albeit in a small 
and not often acknowledged way - cultural differences between Jews and non-
Jews in the East End. As will be discussed more fully in the main conclusion - 
as the thesis evaluates the longer ramifications of the war for London’s Jewish 
community - the anglicisation of Jewish food tastes as a result of the war would 
ultimately form part of the fuller process of Russian Jews integration into 
working class East End society. In the short term though, accusations of 
unscrupulous practices against Jewish shopkeepers profiting from food 
shortages, and a largely ephemeral perception that Jews were protected from 
scarcity by their economic prosperity and ability to exploit loopholes in the 
rationing system, only added more fuel to the smouldering tensions between 
Jews and non-Jews as the war progressed. 
 
 Zeppelin Raids: the Enduring Image of the 
Cowardly Jew 
 
   The already strained relations between Jews and their Gentile neighbours in 
the East End of London were tested further by the death and destruction 
brought by the Zeppelin air raids from May 1915 until the last raid in October 
1917. These attacks brought the realities and horror of the front line to the 
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Home Front. In total, thirty-four separate raids by Zeppelin airships and Gotha 
bomber planes were directed at London, resulting in over three hundred 
fatalities and leaving thousands injured or homeless.310 Many Jews were 
mistakenly attacked in the anti-German riots in the wake of the first raids in 
1915.311 The bombings animated British stereotypes of both Jews and non-
Jews. Jews were perceived to behave in a cowardly and selfish fashion during 
the raids in stark contrast to the stoicism, good humour and generosity shown 
by ‘true’ cockneys.312 The local press blamed Jewish cowardliness for causing 
a fatal stampede at Liverpool Street station in 1918, and labelled as ‘bomb-
dodgers’ Jewish families suspected of quitting the city for the countryside.313 
With police reports revealing that 300,000 Londoners were taking shelter in the 
Underground stations during Zeppelin raids, close proximity bred friction 
between Jews and non-Jews. However, it also encouraged cooperation in 
some cases. The indiscriminate wrath of the falling German bombs constructed 
an environment of shared struggle that partially offset the interpretation, 
bolstered by the ‘Khaki Boom’ and the conscription crisis, that Jew and non-
Jews in the East End were fighting separate wars.      
   On 31 May 1915, a fleet of five Zeppelin airships navigated up the Thames 
Estuary and dropped 3000lb of explosives on Hackney, Poplar and Shoreditch, 
killing seven and injuring sixty others.314 This was the first major raid by the 
German air force against London. Two of the victims of the raid were Jewish - 
an eight year old boy, Samuel Reuben and a sixteen-year-old girl, Lily Lehman. 
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The Times also reported the miscarriage of twins carried by a Russian Jewish 
woman brought on by fear caused by the raid.315 Despite Jews numbering 
amongst the human collateral of the raid, the Jewish community would be 
targeted in the wave of Germanophobia that followed. The Times reported on 2 
June 1915: ‘Probably as a consequence of the air raid acute anti-German 
feeling has broken out again in London. In Shoreditch yesterday morning angry 
mobs surrounded the premises of people suspected to be of German 
nationality… in the case of a shop in Hoxton-road, Shoreditch, the occupant 
fled when the premises were entered and was pursued down the road by the 
infuriated mob’.316 The raid had come hot on the heels of the nation-wide anti-
German sentiment caused by the sinking of the Lusitania earlier that month. 
The majority of the victims in the aftermath of both East End reprisal incidents 
were Jewish small shop owners; their German sounding names were enough 
for the mob to target them.317 The East London Observer questioned the 
commitment of the Jewish community to the Entente’s cause following the raid, 
remembering the pre-war hostility to Russia and sympathy for Germany of 
certain Jewish figures, leading to an angry rebuff from the Jewish Chronicle.318 
David Cesarani has argued that ‘whilst Russian Jews were amongst the aliens 
affected by the riots in 1915… this was accidental as compared to the 
sustained animosity aroused by their reluctance to serve in the allied forces’.319 
Accidental or not, the effects of the riots left a sense of unease amongst Jewish 
businessmen, and even naturalised British Jews felt compelled to display their 
naturalisation or birth certificates in the shop window ‘between the miniature 
flags of the allied nations’ and ‘as if life depended upon their preservation’.320  
   It would perhaps have been the case that the misdirected local violence that 
followed the first Zeppelin raids increased the anxiety of the Jewish populace in 
the event of future raids. London newspapers criticised the Jewish community 
for inciting and encouraging panic in the face of the raids. The Jewish Chronicle 
commented on this in October 1915: ‘We have come across some mean and 
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wicked newspaper agitations in our time, but for sheer repulsiveness the palm 
must be awarded to the attacks on “alien” residents here, to which the recent 
raids have given rise… one newspaper [Morning Post], whose brutality 
characteristically gets the better of its prudence, openly singles out for its 
opprobrium “the swarms of aliens, Jews and Gentile, but mainly Jew”’ accused 
of fleeing the raids.321 A developing theme in 1915 that would gain fuller 
attention later in the war was the accusation that Jews were quitting London 
altogether as a result of the bombing. The Chronicle again rallied to the 
defence: ‘Another newspaper, in its wild distraction, speaks of a hundred aliens 
to one native being found in Brighton, a grotesque exaggeration which would 
give the famous town a population of some thirteen millions, and which almost 
points to a mind unhinged’.322 This fits with the wider accusation from the local 
press that the Russian Jewish community were attempting to ignore the reality 
of the conflict and its consequences for the community’s position within London 
society.323 Press reports of so called ‘bomb dodging’ by alien residents, as well 
as the growing numbers of Jewish applicants to the military tribunals, 
strengthened perceptions amongst English residents of the East End that Jews 
were avoiding their wartime responsibilities whilst simultaneously profiting 
through the ‘Khaki Boom’ from the opportunities the conflict presented.  
   Familiarity and improved air defences lessened the sensational impact of the 
Zeppelin raids as the war progressed, and defying the bomb threats became 
associated with an assumed peculiarity of the British national character. Virginia 
Woolf wrote to her friend Lady Robert Cecil: ‘My dear Nelly…I rejoiced to hear 
of you following the Zeppelin in a taxi; such it is to have the blue blood of 
England in one’s veins’.324 Heimi Lipschitz, an eight year old Jewish boy living 
with his family in the Jewish district of Cannon Street Road near Aldgate, 
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recalled taking shelter from the raids at the Tilbury Docks warehouses along 
with other East Enders, and hearing the falsely reassuring sound of the gunfire 
from the nearby battery at Tower of London (despite proving largely ineffectual 
at shooting down German bombers and the added danger of anti-aircraft 
shrapnel, the guns proved a comfort to jittery Londoners - the gun placed on top 
of Tower Bridge was affectionately named ‘Barking Charlie’ by Bermondsey 
locals).325 Lipschitz too however, despite his young age, soon quickly became 
hardened to the once alien sight of the slow-moving Zeppelin ships and the 
monotony of the nightly trips to Tilbury, choosing to accompany his family only 
in the rare occurrence of an official air raid warning.326 Despite Lipschitz’ 
indifference, Jews on the whole were characterised as responding with fear and 
hysteria to the raids. The mayor of Stepney, Hugh Chidgey, suggested that it 
might be: ‘very desirable that in the western portions of the borough, official 
notices should be published by the police in Yiddish advising people to remain 
in their own houses when warning is given rather than rushing along the streets 
to certain large buildings’, implying that it was the Yiddish-speaking Jewish 
population most likely to seek public shelter in the event of a raid.327  
   A vicar of a local East London church related a similar perspective on the 
courage of the Jewish population of his parish: ‘these poor people are singularly 
liable to panic at the approach of danger. I do not profess to understand their 
psychology, but imagine this timorousness to be largely the outcome of the 
harsh treatment that has been their portion for the last 2,000 years from almost 
every nation. This fearfulness is shown particularly in air raids, and results in 
scares innumerable… I was in one of our biggest synagogues on the last Day 
of Atonement, when during the most moving part of the service, a cry was 
raised of ‘Raid’. The packed congregation was immediately afoot and crowding 
                                                          
325 White, Zeppelin Nights, P.130 (Reference to ‘Barking Charlie’ cited by White from Henry 
Fuller Morriss, Bermondsey’s ‘Bit’ in the Greatest War, (Clifton Publishing House & R. J. 
James, London 1923), p.47 
326 Heimi Lipschitz, Interview as part of Europeana project online. Official air raid warnings 
were infrequent due to the inaccuracy of pre-radar early warning systems and the desire of 
the government not to create unnecessary panic and confusion from false reports of raids. 
See White, Jerry. Zeppelin Nights, pp.130-131   
327 Minute Book No.25 of the Public Health Committee of the Stepney Borough Council July 
1917-November 1918, cited in Samantha L. Bird, Stepney: Profile of a London Borough 
from the Outbreak of the First World War to the Festival of Britain, 1914-1951 (Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne 2011). 21 
P a g e  | 103 
 
in the narrow doorway, and it took some shouting on my part, and indeed 
drastic measures, to avert what looked like a very possible disaster’.328 The 
bishop of Stepney, Henry Paget, described how: ‘One of the clergy, who has 
helped a number of Jewish mothers and children into the Underground station, 
reports that it is very difficult to soothe their distress; many of them scream 
loudly, tearing their clothes and beating their breasts, while the men will pluck 
the hair out of their beards, just as we find depicted in the Old Testament’. 
Paget concluded that ‘there is no doubt that the Eastern temperament of the 
Jews makes them far more subject to alarm than our own people’.329 Rather 
than chasing Zeppelins around town in taxis in the style of Lady Robert Cecil, 
Jews were lambasted in the local press; a considerable amount of newsprint 
was dedicated to the issue of Jews supposedly leaving the city during raids, an 
accusation first surfacing during the 1915 raids. The East London Observer 
commented bitterly on the ‘exodus of better-off aliens from the air raid danger 
zone to Maidenhead, Reading and “Brightchapel”’ and accused them of causing 
‘health problems’ in these towns.330  
   A British Army report entitled ‘General Public Opinion Concerning the War-
Aliens’ in April 1918 commented on the disgust of the local population who ‘saw 
these foreigners making continuous expeditions to the country in the already 
over filled trains for the express purpose of bomb-dodging’.331 Written by 
military officers for their senior commander, the report must be treated with 
caution. The inflammatory language used - ‘This monied and artful race’ and 
‘the grabbing propensities of the Jewish tribe’ - reveal the anti-Jewish agenda of 
the authors.332 It was however supposedly the product of a general survey of 
public opinion across the South East, and the insinuation that the anger at the 
flights was connected to Jews ‘buying businesses on the cheap where forced 
sales were made by Englishmen who had been called up’ matches the 
sentiment in the local press that Jews were buying their safety.333 There is an 
interesting alternative theory put forward by Martin Watts that the journeys of 
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Russian Jews from London to the Southern Coast were in fact the movements 
of men who had refused to enlist under the terms of the Anglo-Russian Military 
Convention and were being interned by the British Government at a camp in 
Maidstone.334  The estimated number of those interned ranges from between 
800 to several thousand and the staggered shuttling of the men across the 
south during the autumn and winter of 1917 would have been highly visible to 
locals along the route. ‘Bomb dodging’ in any case was not a uniquely Jewish 
pastime. Virginia Woolf noting dryly in her diary in 1916: ‘The moon is full and 
the evening trains are packed with people leaving London’, a reference to the 
belief that the German bombers used the light of the full moon to successfully 
locate London during night raids.335  
   The fragile infrastructure of many East London tenements encouraged 
residents to seek shelter in sturdier public buildings; the London Underground 
for obvious reasons became a popular choice for shelter, thrusting Jew and 
Gentile into close proximity. The Times reported on this subject on 27 
September 1917, noting the high number of ‘alien’ shelterers in the West End 
tube stations:  ‘Great numbers of the alien population of the East End, many 
men of military age, have taken to camping with their families three deep on the 
tube platforms as early as 5 o’clock in the afternoon… Last night they were 
camped in large numbers on all the tube stations from Charing Cross to 
Hampstead as early as 5.30 and at 7 o’clock there was scarcely room for 
passengers, to pass to and from the trains. The majority of these people come 
from the East, where it is pointed out there is safe accommodation for twenty 
times the number of people who flock to the tubes. Complaint is made of the 
filthy condition and habits of these people, and their migrations seriously 
threaten the health of the invaded districts.’336 The Jewish Chronicle took 
umbrage at this observation from The Times, conjecturing: ‘This is evidently 
written on the assumption that those observed in the Tubes are “Aliens” and 
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that they belong to the East End. But our own observations on both Tuesday 
and Wednesday evenings does not bear out these conclusions’.337 
   The Observer reported that ‘the majority seeking shelter at night were 
foreigners’; correspondents complained that ‘provision should be given to 
British people and not ‘dirty foreigners’’ and railed against the behaviour of 
‘Jews, rich Jews above all, who were drawing attention to themselves, smoking 
fat cigars, and taking other people’s places’.338 This type of report demonstrates 
the emotive nature of the issue, however conflict was rare and there is a 
general lack of evidence of antagonism between Jews and non-Jews within air 
raid shelters. Bill Belmont reveals a fairly typical experience for a Jewish family 
caught up in an air raid: ‘During the Zeppelin raids, which occurred night after 
night during 1917 and 1918, we were awakened as soon as the ‘maroons’ 
sounded (they were large firework machines - the equivalent of the air-raid 
sirens of the Second World War) and dragged across the road. The high 
brewery doors were opened and we were hauled into the straw-covered sheds 
to shelter from the bombs. Heaven knows why we thought it would be safer 
there than at home, except that the building was vast and very solid looking. 
Hundreds of people huddled together on the straw, talking in Yiddish, whilst we 
kids tried to get some sleep. The all-clear was signalled by the Boy Scouts 
travelling the streets on scooters, blowing the “All clear” on a bugle’.339 The 
inflammatory tone of local press reports on the issue bred a perception of 
incessant conflict between Jews and non-Jews during these nightly ordeals, but 
on the whole most such occasions passed without major incident. Indeed Henry 
Paget related how: ‘In one parish a part of the shelter (in the parish buildings) is 
set apart for the Jews, so that they may conduct their Hebrew devotions during 
a raid, while the parish priest leads the devotions of the Christians. Many of the 
neighbouring refuges are larger and safer in this neighbourhood, and the 
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people, Jews and Gentiles, like to come to the church buildings because there 
is prayer the whole time”’.340 
   This did not prevent the East London press blaming Jews for an unfortunate 
incident in February 1918, when a false rumour of an imminent air raid led 
thousands to rush to a locked air raid shelter at Liverpool Street station, 
resulting in seventeen fatalities. The East London Advertiser’s headline 
‘Cowardly Aliens in the Great Stampede’ left few in doubt as to who they 
believed responsible, the Advertiser citing alleged police sources that blamed 
the panic on ‘young alien men’, one of which was found with £600 in his 
pocket.341 This fed off an existing discourse developed by the local press of 
Jews being cowardly in the face of bombing whilst simultaneously ‘doing well’ 
out of the war.342 The evidence of congenial relations between Jews and non-
Jews during air raids would suggest that this was not the prevailing sentiment of 
the general East London public, despite the continued ill-feeling resulting from 
the ‘Khaki Boom’. However, during moments of crisis such as the Zeppelin 
threat, Jews remained a convenient scapegoat for the East London press to 
assuage local anger. A managing director of an East End Clothing factory, H.M. 
Selby of Schneiders & Sons, cited the cowardliness of Jewish workers as a 
contributor to the 87.5 per cent drop in output from East End factories: ‘A) 90% 
of the employees were women, easily frightened and liable to panic. B) The 
other 10% were alien Jews, who were even more liable to panic than 
women’.343 Aside from the rather shameless chauvinism of Selby, such 
opinions are indicative of the readiness of both local and national interests to 
apportion blame to the Jewish community, even in the case of an external 
factor such as air raids. This was further demonstrated after the war by the 
Government’s quick acceptance of Selby’s theory during their 1922 official 
enquiry into the wartime fall in industrial output in London.344  
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   Various wartime factors were interconnected in heightening tensions between 
Jews and non-Jews in the East End. Arnold D Harvey has argued that the 
disturbances in Bethnal Green in September 1917 ‘may be attributed more to 
the hysteria generated by the German bombing’ than to the wider issue of 
military conscription.345 The heavy raids on 7 July 1917 would certainly have 
been a factor in the events in Bethnal Green later that summer. On that 
occasion the aftermath of the raids witnessed localised rioting in Hackney, 
Dalston and Bethnal Green itself, with 30 shops (mostly of Jewish ownership) 
damaged.346 However, the anger and violence witnessed on the streets of East 
London in the summer of 1917 were the culmination of a number of specific war 
related factors - air raids, military conscription, and rationing - that heightened 
pre-existing tensions between Jews and non-Jews previously limited to the 
repercussions of economic competition in the East End.  
 
 The Bethnal Green Riot: Race Relations in the East 
End 1914-1918 
 
   The intensity of anti-alien feeling in East London was demonstrated 
unequivocally in February 1917 with the holding of an extraordinary conference 
in Bethnal Green to discuss Jewish non-enlistment. Delegates for the Bethnal 
Green conference included local MPs, councillors and tribunal members from 
every East London borough.347 The theme of ‘equal sacrifice’ was unsubtly 
expressed in crude visions of Jewish economic exploitation of the war and the 
East End.348 The Times noted the frequency of the repeated charge of ‘job 
stealing’ in discussions, with the Mayor of Bethnal Green declaring ‘Men had to 
sacrifice their little businesses or their small factories to serve at the front, and 
their neighbours of foreign parentage stepped into their laces and reaped the 
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reward.’349 The conference concluded with the unanimous passing of a 
resolution demanding the immediate military service of all friendly aliens.350  
   There is a lack of evidence suggesting the conference was marred by racial 
slurs or antisemitic abuse of the Jewish population as attested by Julia Bush, 
but the conference’s existence reveals the depth of local feeling on the issue of 
Jewish enlistment and its economic implications.351 This sentiment was partly 
driven by the perception of inactivity on behalf of the Government in enforcing 
the measures enacted to solve the conundrum of Russian Jewish military 
service. The passing of the Military Convention with Russia in July 1917 and 
the establishment of the Jewish Battalions in the same month were welcomed, 
but the perceived lack of enforcement of either - as thousands of Jewish men 
remained visible on East London streets - confirmed local suspicions that the 
Government was pandering to Jewish interests.352 The FJPC held numerous 
public meetings throughout July to protest the decision to pass the Military 
Convention with Russia, leading the Observer to comment: ‘it is quite clear our 
“guests” intend to make the administration of the new Act as difficult and 
uncertain as possible’.353 
   Just before Yom Kippur on Saturday 23 September 1917, in an otherwise 
unassuming corner of the East London Borough of Bethnal Green, a pub fight 
between a Russian Jew and an English soldier rapidly turned into a serious 
altercation between rival Jewish and English groups. Tensions escalated further 
on the Sunday as the two contingents reconvened to continue the dispute. 
According to the initial police report: ‘A crowd, numbering some 5,000 persons - 
a large proportion being women and children - quickly assembled, and took 
sides with the disputants. The Jewish element were outnumbered, and retired 
indoors to their residences in Blythe and Teesdale Streets… almost exclusively 
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occupied by Russian Jews engaged in the tailoring trades’.354 Referred to by 
Charles Booth as a ‘Jewish Island’,355 Blythe and Teesdale Streets represented 
the largest concentration of Jewish tailors and their families outside of Brick 
Lane and the Aldgate area, despite Jews making up no more than 25% and 
probably as little as 5% of the population of Bethnal Green (compared to 75-
95% in Brick Lane and the surrounding streets).356 Running battles between 
Jews and non-Jews for control of East London’s streets had been a recurrent if 
small-scale feature of the area since the beginning of the mass immigration of 
Eastern European Jews in the 1880s. 
   Attacks on the Jewish residents of Blyth and Teesdale Streets continued late 
into the night and the following day, one eyewitness reporting ‘All sorts of 
weapons were used - bars of irons, flat irons, logs of wood, and pistols’.357 The 
Jewish Chronicle reported that dozens of Jewish shops were looted and 
vandalised, and hundreds of Jews seriously assaulted.358 This does not match 
the police report that listed ’30 panes of glass broken in 8 houses on the two 
days (19 panes in one house, 11 in the other seven houses’ and only one case 
of assault ‘Abraham Cohen, age 22 years, British subject, tailor, of 32 Kerbella 
Street, Bethnal Green, who sustained two cuts on his head (not serious)’.359 As 
has been seen, tensions between Jews and non-Jews escalated in the area 
throughout the spring and summer of 1917, revolving around the issue of 
Russian Jewish non-enlistment into the British Army and the profits accrued by 
Jewish tailors in the ‘Khaki Boom’.   
   Yet when the flames burst, they were not lit by the failure of another Jewish 
recruitment drive or a demonstration by the Foreign Jews Protection 
Committee, but a pub fight between a Russian Jew and an English soldier that 
rapidly saw 5,000 protagonists occupying the narrow streets behind Old 
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Bethnal Green Road - the petrified Jewish inhabitants of Blythe and Teesdale 
preparing to face another Kishinev or Odessa. Despite the frenzied state of the 
crowd, the main victims of the violence were the friable window panes of the 
Jewish tenements spread across the two streets. The rival groups that clashed 
violently over the weekend returned to their tailoring workshops, market stalls 
and pubs on the Monday with relations normalising to the usual war strained 
levels.  
   The violence witnessed in Bethnal Green was not the first occurrence of 
wartime tensions bubbling over into sporadic violence on the streets of London. 
The rioting that followed in the wake of the Lusitania sinking in May 1915 saw 
far greater destruction of Jewish homes and businesses than the events of two 
years later, the majority of Jewish victims in this case being the mistaken 
victims of the Germanophobic mob as previously discussed.360 A heavy-handed 
police raid on the FJPC in May 1917 caused widespread anger amongst the 
Jewish East End. The Women’s Dreadnought investigated the incident and 
concluded: ‘Yes, this is the first British anti-Semitic pogrom: let us hope that we 
never see another, for such customs once started are apt to grow more cruel 
and violent.’361 Outside of London, shortly before the outbreak of war the 
Jewish community of Tregodor in Wales became the victims of violent attacks 
by their Welsh neighbours over religious and commercial differences in the 
community in 1911, and in Leeds several thousand English vigilantes 
ransacked Jewish streets over a few days in June 1917.362 
   The violence in Leeds, over the weekend of 3 & 4 June, closely matches the 
circumstances of the later trouble in East London. An initially small but heated 
argument between Jews and non-Jews escalated into widespread violence and 
destruction of Jewish businesses. The attacks were motivated predominantly by 
the resentment felt by English residents caused by the non-enlistment of 
Russian Jews of military age in the Leeds area. The majority of perpetrators 
were young - none of those arrested by Yorkshire Police were over 25 years of 
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age. Writing on the topic of the Leeds disturbances under his Jewish Chronicle 
pseudonym ‘Mentor’, Leo Greenberg condemned the violence: ‘the main fact to 
be borne in mind is that the riots were caused by the antipathetic sentiment 
harboured by non-Jews towards Jews. The importance of appreciating the root 
cause of the trouble that occurred at Leeds, and my reason for insisting upon it, 
resides in the fact that an identical condition is to be found in other centres 
inhabited by large numbers of Jews. We know it exists in the East End of 
London, and the present writer can say that he has found it to be prevalent at 
Manchester, at Glasgow, and at Cardiff, to name three places, he has within the 
last few days, visited. In each case there are various differences due to local 
nuances, but the root mischief is always present.’363 Returning to the topic of 
Leeds in his condemnation of the Bethnal Green violence, Greenberg 
commented: ‘The “raid” on Jews in the East End the other day was due au fond 
to the same cause as the one at Leeds.’364 
    The German press somehow got hold of the story and painted the Bethnal 
Green disturbances as a pogrom damaging to British interests, leading to a 
strong refutation from the Commissioner of Police: ‘The whole incident was 
nothing more than a street brawl. There was nothing in the way approaching a 
riot or pogrom, anti-Semitic or other’.365 This did not prevent the usually 
restrained Jewish Chronicle from mimicking language used in commentaries on 
Tsarist pogroms against Jews, pointedly referring to the disturbances as a 
‘“raid” on Jews in the East End’.366 Without specific proof to suppose a 
fabrication of the evidence on the part of the police (although their handling of 
the situation appears to have been less than exemplary), it must be supposed 
that the physical damage was indeed less than that reported in the Jewish and 
local press. The characterisation of the events of September 1917 as a riot - 
bordering on a pogrom - is therefore curious. The great number of people 
involved - variously reported as between 3,000 and 5,000 - and the involvement 
of women and children imply that it was a more substantial movement than the 
street brawl implied by the police, and reports equated what happened in East 
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London with the larger anti-Jewish disturbances that occurred in Leeds earlier 
in the summer.367  
   A week after the conference in February, the Mayor of Bethnal Green was 
quoted saying: ‘A mother heard of the death of her son or husband. Her tears 
began to flow, and while the bereavement was fresh in her memory she went to 
the door and found youngsters- principally from Russia - exempt from national 
duty… unless something was done the women would take the matter up in their 
district if the men did not’.368 Whilst this specific anecdote is perhaps an 
exaggeration of the situation from a known mischief maker,369 the involvement 
of women and children in the dispute, noted in the police report, reveals the 
level of community agitation regarding the issue. The Times reported that ‘The 
average age of the rioters (who included many off duty servicemen) was much 
higher than in the Leeds outrage.’370 This was not another gang fight between 
Jewish and English youths and the fact that the victims were mainly Russian 
Jewish tailors is consistent with the animosity towards the tailoring trade since 
the start of the war.  
   Local press reports of both the Leeds and Bethnal Green disturbances focus 
on the provocation of English soldiers by Jews as a precursor to violence. In the 
case of Bethnal Green, it was reported the fighting began after a Russian Jew 
accused a wounded English soldier of being a fool for enlisting.371 Local 
sentiment interpreted as unanswered the call for ‘equal sacrifice’ from the 
Jewish community vociferously delivered at the Conference in February. By 
failing to defend the interests of the state through enlistment Russian Jews had, 
when seen from this perspective, set themselves up as ‘outsiders’ within the 
nation and as dangerous competitors to British workers. This would cause 
further tensions upon the cessation of hostilities, when returning English 
                                                          
367 Yorkshire Evening News, 5 June 1917 cited in Englander, History of Jewish Immigrants, 
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368 Interview with the ELO, reprinted in The Times 3 March 1917 
369 William John Lewis, a regular and vocal censurer of the borough’s alien contingent 
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soldiers found themselves pushed out of several key East End industries. This 
has been identified as the legacy of the events of Bethnal Green in September 
1917, as the tipping point for anti-alien sentiment transforming into outright 
violence, however short-lived.372 However, in assessing the significance and 
legacy of these events, some sense must be made of the contentious and often 
contradictory reports surrounding it and the discrepancy between contemporary 
accounts and the subsequent position it has assumed within the history of 
British Jewry. 
 
   The events of September 23-24 1917 in Bethnal Green have drawn divergent 
conclusions from academics examining British Jewry in the 20th Century, 
although few have dwelt on the disturbances in depth.373 David Cesarani 
argues that the ‘press and openly anti-Semitic journals’ influenced ‘the physical 
violence against Jews that occurred in Bethnal Green’.374 More recently, 
Anthony Julius charged the event with having ‘demonstrated the marginal 
status of East End Jewry’.375 Dan Tilles equates Bethnal Green with the 
organised anti-Jewish attacks and marches witnessed in the 1930s led by 
Oswald Mosley’s fascists,376 and it has also been labelled a precursor to the 
Battle of Cable Street in 1936 by Jehuda Reinharz. 377 More improbably, it has 
been cited in a recent biography of Adolf Hitler in WW1, compared negatively to 
the benign treatment of Imperial Germany’s Jewish population during the 
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war.378 How did an incident described in the official police report as ‘no more 
than a street brawl’ and ‘nothing in any way approaching a riot or pogrom, anti-
Semitic or other’, come to occupy a significant place in the timeline of Jewish-
Gentile relations in the metropolis? 
   There was one notable example of antisemitic rhetoric used by the 
perpetrators of the event - a 16 year old youth who became the only arrest from 
the incident as detailed by the police report: ‘This youth, seeing several men of 
Jewish appearance passing, said to some companions “There’s another gang 
of f-----g Jews” and ran towards them, when he was at once taken into custody’. 
379 Both the East London Observer and the Advertiser fumed at the supposed 
provocation of Jewish youths in starting the violence -  conjecturing it was the 
long term result of immigrant Jewish failure to reciprocate their host nation’s 
hospitality through enlistment - but they also condemned the resulting violence 
forcefully. 380 The Jewish Chronicle stated the serious violence witnessed on the 
Sunday afternoon ‘seemed to have been organised’.381 However, it is hard to 
accept this assertion. Both the police reports and eyewitness statements attest 
to the sporadic nature of the unfolding events, and despite the significant unrest 
caused by the Russian conscription controversy and economic competition, the 
war did not see any emergence of organised anti-immigrant or anti-Jewish 
groups such as those witnessed in the interwar years.382  
   That the victims of the violence were Jews, and that the cause of the violence 
was economic jealousy, would imply an antisemitic event. The Jewish Chronicle 
was unequivocal in its belief that a particular and specific hatred of Jews was 
driving the violence: ‘We are wont to call this anti-Semitism... A mere dislike, 
without reason and without sense, just sheer prejudice, is the root of the trouble 
here, as it is the root of the trouble with the hooligans in Leeds, or the roughs in 
                                                          
378 See Weber, Thomas. Hitler's First War: Adolf Hitler, the Men of the List Regiment, and 
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382 The British Brothers League- the leading anti-immigration group in the East End- was 
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Bethnal Green.’383 However, the events of September 1917 can more rightly be 
identified as the results of economic xenophobia against a competing minority 
group exploiting a deregulated market. This mirrored previous local clashes 
against French Huguenot weavers migrating into the East End in the 17th 
Century, Irish immigrants in the 1840s and 1850s, and subsequently in less 
extreme form in concerns over the saturation of the East End Labour market 
following successive waves of migration from Bangladesh in the 1960s and 
1970s. In a comparative assessment of anti-Irish riots in London during the 18th 
Century, John Marriot has written ‘In East London – both then, and in 
subsequent episodes such as Jewish immigration – religious antagonisms were 
invoked at times of more fundamental work-based tensions, serving to 
complicate the picture’.384  
   Leeds and East London were the principle urban areas for Russian Jewish 
settlement between 1881 and 1905, and it has been suggested by Colin 
Holmes that wartime violence to Jews was mostly limited to these two urban 
centres due to the unresolved complications of immigration into both areas in 
the era before the outbreak of war. The violence of 1917 was partly the ‘working 
out’ process of the earlier process of immigration.385 This is mostly accurate, 
and as discussed in the first section of this chapter the wartime animosity 
between Jews and non-Jews stood on a platform of mutual mistrust and 
misunderstandings associated with the generation before 1914. Tony Kushner 
has extrapolated that the riots were an indication of a ‘cultural exclusivity 
among non-Jewish East Enders’ that was exacerbated by wartime hardships 
and shortages.386 However, the timing and socio-political context of the 1917 
violence against Jews in both Leeds and Bethnal Green indicate that the 
disturbances were war-specific reactions rather than primarily the result of long-
term friction. The violence was a sporadic flash that coincided with the worst 
shortages on the Home Front of the war and the peak of anti-alien sentiment 
surrounding the Russian conscription controversy. 
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   It is clear that the ‘riot’ had a significant psychological impact on the East End 
Jewish community. The events of September 1917 resonated so deeply 
precisely because of their spontaneous nature. By September, the Jewish 
Legion scheme and the Anglo-Russian Convention were successfully reducing 
the number of non-enlisted Jewish men on the streets, and Jewish control of 
the tailoring industry had slipped as a result. Consequently, to the Jewish 
residence of Blythe and Teesdale streets barricaded in their own homes by 
thousands of their English neighbours, there appeared little context for the 
attacks except hatred. For elder Russian Jews the violence was an 
uncomfortable echo of the persecution many of them had fled Eastern Europe 
to avoid. The timing of the violence, just before Yom Kippur, would have given 
the impression of a premeditated attempt to disrupt the Jewish community at a 
point of unpreparedness during a religious festival, a frequent tactic in Russian 
pogroms. It lacked the destruction of property and deaths associated with 
continental pogroms, but for the victims experiencing the violence fist hand, it 
bore all the trademarks of an antisemitic attack.  
   Perception of the facts can prove more powerful than their reality in 
communal and ethnic struggles. Jonathan Dekel-chen has shown that the size 
and scope of, and official involvement in a pogrom or anti-Jewish incident is 
less important than how it is reported.387 The often sensationalist and 
provocative reporting of the event in the local newspapers and the Jewish 
Chronicle, which were ‘inclined to publish anecdotal or misleading reports that 
either incited communal violence or wrongly allocated blame after the event’,388 
was an important factor in two distinct processes. It convinced a significant 
number of Russian Jews that the British government was against their 
continued residence and hastened their return to Russia in accordance with the 
terms of the military convention (evidence suggests that almost half of the 
‘Conventionists’, as they became known agreed to depart after September 
1917).389 Secondly, it accelerated the movement of Jewish interest groups 
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(inspired by the model of the FJPC) into developing ties with local East End 
Labour organisations. Economic and social security for the Jewish East End 
and the prevention of further violence such as seen in Bethnal Green could only 
be achieved by improving ties with English Labour interests and the active 




    The war exacerbated underlying economic and ethnic tensions between 
Jews and non-Jews in the East End that had been evident since large scale 
Jewish immigration into the area began in the 1880s. The ‘Khaki Boom’ 
contributed to the intensification of ill feeling, with the entrenchment of the myth 
that Jewish tailors were profiting from the war in the absence of their English 
competitors patriotically serving on the front line. Significantly, the events of 
Bethnal Green in 1917 invoked for the first time, both the reality and implication 
of violence in relations between Jews and non-Jews which defined inter-
communal tensions between the wars. Much of the wartime animosity was 
driven by the virulence of the local press - in particular the East London 
Observer - which demonised Jewish applicants for military exemption and 
missed few opportunities to accuse Jews of cowardice during air raids.  
   Yet a broader perspective of the war reveals a less destructive influence on 
Jewish/non-Jew relations in the predominantly working class East End of 
London. The sensationalism of the East End press exaggerated the impression 
of hostility between Jews and non-Jews in East London, masking the everyday 
acts of co-operation and kindness that characterised Jewish/non-Jewish 
relations as much as mutual animosity during the war years. This centred on 
the concept of shared struggle, revealed in the Jewish Battalion story and the 
indiscriminate dangers of bombing and starvation, greater Jewish involvement 
in and membership of trade unions, and the cessation of immigration after 
1914.  
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   This was the paradox of the Jewish experience of 1914-1918. The same set 
of factors - be it economic competition, enlistment, rationing or air raids - both 
heightened and eased tension between Jews and the wider London community. 
It is therefore misleading to disproportionately focus on a single event such as 
the Bethnal Green riot in 1917 when seeking to form a greater understanding of 
the evolving set of relations between Jews and non-Jews, immigrant Jews and 
integrated Jews, during the First World War and the decades immediately 
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CHAPTER TWO 







   Chapter one assessed the wartime experiences of a transitional immigrant 
community under pressure to engage in the dominant nation’s war effort. This 
chapter will use as its subject London’s more established West End Jewish 
population to assess how anglicised, emancipated and patriotic English Jews 
were affected by the forces of British nationalism during the war. This chapter 
will focus on the national scrutiny of established Jewry’s patriotism as a historic 
minority community expected to oblige the ‘privilege’ of emancipation through 
patriotic sacrifice. Sacrifice in this sense was double layered; on the Home 
Front the war presented several unpalatable scenarios where established 
Jewry sacrificed purely Jewish concerns at the expense of British interests. On 
the front line, the service and sacrifice of English Jewish soldiers represented 
the ‘shield of Patriotism’ of the community against accusations of disloyalty. The 
pressure placed on West End Jewry by the forces of British nationalism 
between 1881-1918 fostered attempts to eradicate Jewish differentness within 
the public sphere, and the attempts to control, condemn and distance 
themselves from the unpatriotic actions of immigrant Jews to a large extent 
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   Britain’s declaration of war on Germany in August 1914 effectively upgraded 
the ambiguous set of mutually beneficial geopolitical agreements reached with 
France (1904) and Russia (1907) into formal military alliances. The new 
alliance with Russia in particular would place the communal leaders of London 
Jewry in a conundrum. Since 1907 a highly publicised campaign, led primarily 
by elements within the Jewish London elite, focused on reversing the British 
commitments and political attachment to Russia implicit in the territorial and 
trade negotiations between the two countries made that year. Beginning in 
1912 the Jewish Chronicle published a supplementary paper written by Lucien 
Wolf entitled ‘Darkest Russia’ detailing the harrowing anti-Jewish atrocities of 
the Tsarist regime.390 Prominent London Jews such as Nathan Rothschild, 
Samuel Montagu and Nathan Adler lobbied for British action against Russia 
(citing the horrors of the Kishinev pogrom of 1903391) and institutions such as 
the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association established 
investigative committees to confirm and denounce Russian treatment of its 
Jewish citizens.392 The Tsarist government’s persecution of their Jewish 
population was an issue that largely united an often fractious Anglo-Jewish 
community. 
   As late as 31 July 1914, the Jewish Chronicle protested against the prospect 
of ‘spilling blood or the squandering of British resources in order that the Slavs 
may maintain their position against the Teutons and an effete and barbarous 
autocracy be sustained on a tottering throne.’393 Alliance with the historic 
enemy therefore caused much embarrassment, not least for the Editor of the 
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Jewish Chronicle Leo Greenberg, forced to perform a quick volte-face and a 
cessation of Wolf’s supplement.394 This incident characterised the difficulties 
English Jews faced during the war; that any issue requiring a definitive 
communal response regarding a Jewish matter would, dependent on the 
choice, be accompanied with the accusation of insufficient British patriotism or 
the callous abandonment of a Jewish cause. The Jewish elite’s responses to 
the poverty of immigrant Jews in the early weeks of the war, the issue of the 
Russian Jewish conscription crisis, and − as will be seen in this chapter − the 
issue of the arrest of alien Jews after the Aliens Act of August 1914 are cases 
in point. With regards to the Anglo-Russian alliance, the acceptance of an 
intolerable friendship with the hated enemy accompanied the uncomfortable 
reality that the community’s past behaviour in relation to the Russian entente 
now represented the weak link in West End Jewry’s supreme commitment to 
England’s cause.395 
   The majority of accounts detailing the experiences of London Jews during the 
First World War focus on the immigrant Jewish community, with the 
involvement of English Jews an intrinsic but unseparated element of this 
narrative. One study that attempted to explore primarily the latter perspective is 
David Cesarani’s 1989 study, An Embattled Minority: The Jews of Britain during 
the First World War. Cesarani attempts to show the upheaval of the four years 
of war and the controversy created by the Russian Jewish crisis from the 
perspective of the Jewish elite: the institutions of established Jewry desperately 
attempting to quell the flames of indignant British chauvinism fanned by the 
indifference of the Jewish East End that threatened to engulf the entire British 
Jewish community. Cesarani concluded that the War ‘engendered a serious 
deterioration in the position of the Jews in British society’, caused both by the 
antisemitism of British society and the fact ‘British Jews were under enormous 
pressure to show that they were loyal citizens’.396 This view has enjoyed a 
healthy longevity in the years since 1989. Mark Levene (1992) has argued that 
during the War ‘Wealthy Anglo-Jews from the West End with foreign-sounding 
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names, found themselves obvious targets for popular suspicion and popular 
wrath’.397 More recently, Paul Ward (2009), a historian of British patriotism, has 
stated that ‘Jewish men were under severe pressure to join the army to “prove” 
that they were Britons first and Jews second’.398 There is some truth to this 
school of thinking; the pre-war anti-alien movements, a jingoistic national press 
and the grinding social stresses of total war after 1916 led to an increased 
pressure and attention on the activity of English Jews. As discussed in chapter 
one however, there were few examples of overt anti-Jewish prejudice during 
the war − as one recent history of London in the war has stated, ‘stone throwing 
over one weekend in a tiny corner of east London [was] as bad as things got in 
terms of communal violence’.399 Mark Levene states the jingoism of August 
1914 led to English Jews ‘trumpeting one’s Britishness whilst belittling one’s 
ethnicity or religiosity’.400 Whilst certainly motivated by the very real attention of 
negative British public opinion, this chapter will argue that an element of this 
pressure that Ward, Cesarani and others have identified for British Jews to 
prove themselves in the war was the product of intense attempts on behalf of 
London Jews to anglicise their immigrant co-religionists during the period 1880-
1914. This, among other outcomes, gradually transformed the concept of 
national and religious allegiance for Jews in Britain as a whole.  
   This chapter will examine the First World War experiences of English-born 
Jews in the context of British patriotism and national identity. It will assess the 
West End Jewish response to the war in comparison to the wider national 
reaction, and will seek to answer why English Jews felt pressured to 
demonstrate a heightened level of patriotism that in statistical terms outstripped 
the national response.401 To answer this, a wider discussion of warfare and 
British society and will be included to examine the effects of intermittent warfare 
during this period on British concepts of imperialism and patriotism, in order to 
assess how an encroaching militarism within British society impacted on 
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established Jewry. Were the Jewish displays of patriotism in August 1914 
driven by the pressurised environment created by the militarisation of British 
society in the Edwardian era? Britain was at war for less than seven of the 19 
years spanning the beginning of the Boer war and the signing of the Armistice 
with Germany in November 1918. The impact and implications of the shorter, 
far-flung imperial war in South Africa and the apocalyptic conflict for national 
survival against the Central powers between 1914-1918 were however to have 
a disproportionate effect on the transformation of British society and the 
development of a national identity, defined not so much by what Britishness 
stood for, but what it didn’t. This resulted in increased pressure on groups 
defined as being on the margins of mainstream society − particularly radicals 
and members of the far left but also Britain’s minorities − to demonstrate 
unequivocally their loyalty to Britain and the empire. It will be argued here that 
English Jews were under increasing scrutiny to demonstrate their loyalty to both 
nation and empire during this period of heightened focus regarding the nature 
of British patriotism, and it was this that partially drove the elevated patriotic 
displays of established Jewry in August 1914.  
   The chapter will also assess the experience of English Jewish soldiers 
serving in the British Army in the years 1914-1918. English Jew’s motivations 
for volunteering and the frequency and severity of antisemitism suffered by 
Jewish troops in the trenches will be examined. It will be shown that whilst 
antisemitism occurred regularly on an individual level, there is insufficient 
evidence to demonstrate endemic or institutional antisemitism in the British 
Army during the First World War. However, unsavoury and highly public 
incidents, such as the refusal to enlist Jewish volunteers at a recruiting depot in 
Hackney in October 1914, transcended this reality and were enough to 
entrench a general perception of prejudice towards Jewish soldiers that 
discouraged enlistment, particularly from immigrant Jews as the war 
progressed. The war also placed serious strain on the ability of Jews serving in 
the British Army to uphold their religious commitments. Jewish chaplains were 
not assigned to individual regiments, unlike their Christian counterparts, with 
only the roaming Chief Reverend Michael Adler to organise Jewish services for 
the majority of the conflict. Achieving leave or the relinquishing of military duties 
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for religious festivals was notoriously difficult for Jewish soldiers, and where this 
was granted, inadvertently spread accusations of special treatment. Providing 
Jewish soldiers − thinly spread out amongst the various battalions of the British 
Army − with kosher food proved a logistical impossibility. The war contributed to 
a significant decline in the religiosity of young Jewish males, and the 
households they returned to after the war. 
   Finally, the chapter will consider the impact of the Balfour Declaration 
specifically, and the growth of political Zionism more broadly, on the internal 
politics of West End Jewry. The chapter will ask why the Britain government 
sought to tie British geopolitical concerns in the Middle East to the mast of 
Zionism at such a critical stage of the war in 1917. Having assessed the 
motivations of the British government for aligning with Zionism, the chapter will 
examine how the wartime growth of political Zionism transformed Anglo-Jewish 
politics and polarised opinions within the London Jewish elite. Prior to 1914 
British Zionism as a political entity was weak, divided and lacking direction. 
Only a small group of intellectuals associated with Chaim Weizmann and 
influential individuals such as Leo Greenberg (editor of the Jewish Chronicle) 
were significant representatives of Zionism within Anglo-Jewry prior to 1914. 
However, the chaos of the war years brought new opportunities for British 
Zionists. The ascension of the Zionist sympathiser Lloyd George to the 
premiership in December 1916 and the British invasion of Palestine the 
following March, made the establishment of a Jewish homeland, through the 
acquiescence of Britain, suddenly a startlingly real possibility.402 Weizmann and 
other Zionist intellectuals attempted to influence the British government as to 
their understanding of the strength and position of Zionism within the Jewish 
community. These negotiations eventually bore fruit in November 1917 with the 
public declaration of British support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. 
However, for many English Jews the cause of Jewish nationalism represented 
an unwanted accentuation of Jewish differentness at a time when the 
community craved anonymity: the Russian Jewish conscription crisis peaked in 
1917. The deliverance of Balfour’s declaration to the symbolic head of British 
Jewry, Lord Rothschild, appeared to establish the quest for a Jewish homeland 
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in Palestine as a war aim for established Jewry, therefore diminishing the 
British patriotism the community had proudly displayed since 1914. For the 
majority of the more acculturated elite of British Jewry and the patriotic 
volunteers of the rank and file of Jewish youth serving in the trenches, Zionism 
was the antithesis of what British Jews were fighting for. Ultimately, the growth 
of political Zionism in Britain during the First World War split established Jewry 
and further deteriorated the ability of the community to find consensus on non-
Zionist Jewish matters.        
 
    Overall, the war was far from the wholly negative experience for established 
Jewry as has often been portrayed. English Jewish soldiers shared in the 
collective glory of victory in 1918, and many prospered in the improved position 
of Britain’s middle class professions in the interwar period.403 Most visibly, 
Jewish Zionists such as Weizmann and Greenberg forged important political 
links within Whitehall that not only secured the Balfour Declaration of November 
1917 but ensured crucial political protection for the Jewish community in the 
interwar period. They were far from the gullible fools portrayed by Mark Levene 
in his assessment of the Balfour Declaration.404 That said, the war would test 
established Jewry’s fragile pre-war cohesion. It would expose the true 
limitations of its control of East London Jewry and the failure of the initiatives to 
integrate them into the fabric of the nation. The patriotism of the opening weeks 
of the war would be tested by the horrific sacrifice of Jewish youths in Flanders 
field, and ultimately hollowed by the continued suspicion of Jewish commitment 
to the war effort by the British public and press. For British Jews, whose 
patriotism and sacrifice for Britain’s cause matched that of the nation as a 
whole, the years 1914 to 1918 revealed the extent to which the actions of the 
community were viewed through the prism of their status as a privileged but 
distinct minority. As a result, British Jews felt pressured to display their loyalty 
as British citizens, whilst enduring consistent accusations that the community 
was putting Jewish interests before national ones. The perception of split 
loyalties was raised in particular over Anglo-Jewry’s response to the Russian 
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Jewish conscription crisis and the polarising issue of political Zionism. 
Conversely, any perceived failures to defend the rights of Russian Jews both at 
home and under Tsarist control were loudly condemned by those who felt 
Anglo-Jewry was pandering to Government and public opinion at the  expense 
of their co-religionists. This chapter will seek to show that West End Jewry 
experienced a peculiarly troublesome war − full of the collective strains and 
horrors afflicting British society as a whole and sharing the trials and tribulations 
experienced by the Jewish East End − yet isolated from both. 
 
 British Patriotism, War and West End Jewry 1899-
1914 
  
   For English Jews, the second Anglo-Boer war (1899-1902) mirrored later 
experiences of the First World War in several important respects. For the first 
time, Jews volunteered for Army life in large numbers, inadvertently broadening 
the debate amongst both Jewish and Gentile intellectuals as to the suitability 
and worth of Jews as soldiers. Press accusations of Jewish sympathy and 
financial collusion with the enemy also muddied the community’s display of a 
patriotic front. Like the situation of 1914-1918, Anglo-Jewry found itself 
peculiarly at the forefront of events at a time when immigration issues meant 
communal leaders craved reduced visibility. 
   The Boer war illuminated the Imperial cracks and provided an array of 
responses to the question of the national character of Britain and the British. 
Breaking out with a flood of patriotic fervour on 11 October, The Times reported 
the feeling of the City a few days later: ‘nothing could possibly have surpassed 
the enthusiasm of the meeting within the Guildhall “in support of the South 
African policy of Her Majesty’s Government”’.405 A spectacular series of defeats 
during ‘Black Week’ and the muddled conclusion to the war that saw 400,000 
British troops struggle to defeat a Boer force that never exceeded 90,000, 
damaged the British military reputation built up through a succession of small 
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Imperial wars during the preceding decades.406 The war had several important 
consequences. The popular enthusiasm aroused by such events as the relief of 
the siege of Mafeking, the defeat of the regular Boer forces and the volunteer 
movement for active services in the war can be seen as evidence of a 
developing militancy in British society which would to an extent characterise 
Edwardian society in the coming decade. In the realm of politics, the Unionists 
successfully employed patriotic rhetoric to identify themselves with the recent 
victories over the Boers, skilfully identifying their Liberal opponents symbolically 
with the Boer enemy (if only through their want of enthusiasm for an expensive 
Imperial entanglement) to win a resounding victory in the general election in 
1900.407  
   British discourse on the unsuitability of Jews as soldiers was often animated 
by the perceived poor performance of Jews serving in the Russian Army. The 
journalist E J Dillon informed his readers that: ‘Summoned as recruits to the 
colours [in Russia], a large proportion of [Jews] shirk their duty and abscond. 
Enlisted in the regiments they mutilate themselves or feign illness. On the 
battlefield they surrender themselves.’408 Despite the obvious context of the 
harshness of the Russian military system, such negative conjectures dominated 
turn of the century discussion of Jews as soldiers and struck at the heart of 
Anglo-Jewry’s anxiety about its own self-image and the Jewish role and place in 
the nation.409 However, such concerns can be set within the context of wider 
debates emerging from the conflict regarding the physical wellbeing of Britain, 
not simply the country’s external international standing but the physical health 
of the British populace. More than 10,000 volunteers enlisted for service during 
the bleak winter of 1899-1900. W.J. Reader cites a contemporary account to 
explain the movement: ‘the Volunteers impelled by the lust of glory and the love 
of country, stepped to the front’.410 Volunteerism and the reasons behind it will 
be discussed in greater detail with regards to the 1914-1918 conflict, but the 
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more pressing matter arising from the Boer war volunteers was that 40 to 60 
per cent of these volunteers were rejected as unfit for military service.411 The 
poor health, size and malnutrition of the volunteers, mainly from the London 
area, shocked a middle class that felt ‘national vigour was measurable in 
population growth, in immigration statistics, in averages of height and weight 
and productivity’.412  
   The denigration of the Jewish soldier by Dillon and other critics during the 
Boer war was countered robustly in the Jewish press. Lucien Wolfe wrote a 
piece for The Graphic attempting to prove the historical veracity of Jewish 
soldiering,413 and the Jewish Chronicle published positive reports on Jewish 
recruitment in Russia to show ‘the statement that Jews evade military service is 
quite unfounded’.414 The Jewish Lads Brigade sought to alter negative concepts 
of Jews as physically unfit for soldiering by feeding recruits a diet of ‘drill, 
discipline, and manly sports, such as cricket, football, and athletic exercises’.415 
According to the Jewish World such activities would prove Jews were ready to 
‘take their places as citizens, physically and mentally equipped for the battle of 
life’.416 These initiatives appeared to bear fruit as the war in South Africa 
progressed, with as many as 2,800 Jews serving in the various units of the 
British Army417, and the Jewish Chronicle proudly relating that Jews of all 
classes had ‘rallied to the Country’s call to arms’.418 The war was popularly 
supported across the entire spectrum of the Jewish metropolitan community; 
wild celebrations in Brick Lane marked the relief of Mafeking in May 1900419, 
whilst the Westminster School-educated Henry Myer recalled as a child during 
the war having ‘a large map of South Africa, on to which we affixed miniature 
flags on pins to show the position of the British forces and we wore buttons with 
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photographs of our favourite generals’.420 A poem written in 1900 by an 
anonymous Jewish woman captured this spirit of patriotism and joint sacrifice 
on behalf of Anglo-Jewry:  
‘Now we Jews, we English Jews, O mother England,  
Ask another boon of thee! 
Let us share with them the danger and the glory, 
Where thy best bravest lead, there let us follow, 
O’er the sea!’421 
    Nationally, the popularity and patriotism identified with the war managed to 
penetrate previous critics and opponents of imperial ambition, most notably 
Robert Blatchford. As Paul Ward relates, the threat to Britain posed by the war 
led to the ardent socialist, who had in June 1899 declared ‘Our Empire was built 
on blood, pillage, and chicanery’, offering sincere support for Britain’s plight in 
an Imperial war, announcing upon its outbreak ‘I am for peace and for 
international brotherhood. But when England is at war I’m English. I have no 
politics and no party. I am English’.422 Ward explains this turnaround to an 
acceptance on the Left that British national identity was tied with Imperialism, 
and despite the manner of its attainment, when the Empire was at threat so by 
definition was Britain; Blatchford’s support for the war was to him a necessary 
duty.423  
   Despite the profusions of patriotism displayed by the Jewish community 
during the conflict, Jewish loyalty and commitment to the war was questioned 
within certain circles of British society from the outset. The fact that many of the 
major mining magnates in South Africa happened to be Jews led several 
Liberal and Labour politicians and journalists to claim that the war had been 
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incited by Jewish capitalists and was being fought for Jewish interests.424 
Hilaire Belloc argued that the war had been ‘openly and undeniably provoked 
and promoted by Jewish interests in South Africa’425, and the right wing 
newspaper The Justice railed in even more violent terms in 1899 against ‘Jew 
financiers’ as ‘gold-greedy ghouls thirsting for blood’.426 British Jews, whose 
support for the war stemmed from the opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty to 
Queen and Country, now had to face the accusation that their support was 
motivated by Jewish greed, not British patriotism.427 Not helping Anglo-Jewry’s 
cause was the highly visible evidence appearing in the accounts of war 
correspondents of Jewish soldiers, as many as 300 according to some reports, 
actively fighting for the Boers.428 Such reports were damaging for the 
community and diminished the performance of Jewish troops enlisted in the 
British Army, despite the international origin of many of the ‘Boerjuds’ as they 
became known.429  
    However, the emergence of significant opposition to the war in its later 
bloody and attritional stages casts doubt on the existence of a unified patriotism 
in Britain at the turn of the century. Phillip Stanhope, who voted against the 
measure in Parliament to raise funds for the war, in October 1899 declared in a 
letter to the editor of The Times his ‘Belief that the deplorable war in which we 
are now engaged could have been, and should have been, avoided’ and that 
‘true patriotism appears to me to involve other considerations besides pride in 
our wealth and power’.430 It was this sense that patriotism was not limited to the 
domain of jingoism that animated the Pro Boers. Opposition was often framed 
in terms of the danger the war posed to values the British had long held dear: 
constitutionalism, freedom, fair play and justice. The ILP News raged against 
the threat to these values from the Government’s belligerency and urged ‘every 
self-respecting lover of his country to protest with all the power that is in him 
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against the atrocious crime which we are apparently about to commit’.431 The 
war produced varied patriotic responses − an undeniable love of country but 
expressed through opposing concerns for the physical wellbeing of Britain and 
its Empire, and the moral health of a nation apparently swapping the role of the 
‘world’s policeman’ in favour of aggressive expansionism. 
 
    Some reports did paint Jewish soldiers in a favourable light, in particular The 
Spectator ran an article under the headline ‘Jews as Soldiers’ in 1903 which 
noted ‘The deaths among the Jewish soldiers have been, it is said, in excess of 
their quota. In any event, the bulk of the native-born Jews here have come well 
to the fore in the recent struggle’.432 However, Keith Surridge has recently 
hypothesised that the origin of British antisemitism in the army stemmed not 
from poor opinion of the quality of Jewish troops but from the contempt held for 
Jewish capitalists amongst the British officer class during the Boer war, many of 
whom had reached high rank and influential positions within the army by the 
outbreak of the First World War.433  
 
 Shield of Patriotism: English Jewish Soldiers and 
the First World War 
 
   It can be ascertained that concerns over Jewish loyalty − as well as the fallout 
from Britain’s poor war performance that saw questions over the decline in 
British martial stock − directly influenced the movement towards the passing of 
the Aliens Act of 1905. Parallels can be observed between the furore over 
Jewish capitalists during the Boer war and press accusations against Anglo-
Jewry over alleged pro-German sympathies at the outbreak of war in 1914. 
Then, as in the previous conflict, London-based Jewish financiers were 
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accused of colluding with the enemy. The Times journalist Henry Wickham 
Steed warned his readers of ‘the pro-German and pan-German tendencies of 
Jewish finance’, and it was argued by Steed and others that this underpinned 
Jewish opposition to the Anglo-Russian entente − concern over the treatment of 
Russian Jewry was merely camouflage.434 Such accusations were given 
apparent weight by the late appeals for peace talks with Germany undertaken 
by Lord Rothschild, claiming to speak for the City, which became known only 
after Germany’s invasion of Belgian had swung British opinion from a non-
interventionist stance towards a pro-war sentiment.435 As has already been 
discussed at the beginning of this chapter, The Jewish Chronicle was also 
caught out by the speed of developments, a strongly worded condemnation of 
the prospect of war with Germany and alliance with Russia on 31 July having to 
be hastily replaced with a patriotic U-turn in the following edition.436 However, 
the Jewish community were not alone in being overtaken by events in late July 
and Early August 1914, and the growing clamour for war that gripped British 
society had an organic and spontaneous quality that few social commentators 
managed to predict.  
    
   Another important offshoot from the Boer War was the stimulus it provided to 
pro-conscriptionist campaigners. Victorian society held a deep aversion to the 
prospect of mass conscript armies, a legacy of the Protectorate regime of Oliver 
Cromwell. The conscript army was a potent symbol of the authoritarianism 
consuming the militarised nations of the continent. However, the poor 
performance of the regular forces during the South African war and the 
worrying state of affairs in which Britain had been left denuded of all but 17,000 
regular troops in the spring of 1900, convinced many that an overhaul of the 
military system was necessary to provide both Imperial and home defence.437 A 
concerned correspondent for The Times in January 1900 declared ‘Depend 
upon it that in time of pressing danger the present Army system cannot resist 
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the strain’, the solution, ‘A home army or militia organised, drilled, disciplined, 
and officered like an ordinary standing army, and recruited on the broad, 
patriotic principle that England expects every man to do his duty’.438 The 
National Service League with General Lord Roberts as its president, pushed for 
compulsory service for young men and provided a platform around which pro-
conscriptionist agitators could rally.439 Boasting a membership of 270,000 by 
the eve of the First World War, Roberts and the League continuously criticised 
the Conservative and later the Liberals’ proposals for a reformation of the 
Volunteer system that would become the Territorial Army. A bill for compulsory 
service based on a Swiss system of compulsion was defeated by 123 votes to 
103 in the House of Lords in May 1909.440 The failure to command significant 
support in the country and to induce conscription legislation before 1916 to an 
extent rested on the issue of conscription being one of two competing 
patriotisms: did true patriotic love of country reside in doing one’s duty by 
sacrificing personal liberty by bearing arms in defence of the nation, or by 
upholding the cherished freedoms and liberty that were the hallmarks of the 
British Liberal state?  
   An aversion to compulsion was identified by pro-conscriptionists as evidence 
of a lack of patriotism: ‘From Paris to Pretoria, and from Archangel to Auckland, 
the private citizen is under bond to shed his blood for his country; in Great 
Britain alone he sheds nothing but his money, and pays a body of professional 
troops to discharge his patriotic duties for him’.441 The campaign for increased 
naval spending led by the Navy league under the banner ‘We want eight 
[dreadnoughts], and we won’t wait!’442 combined with German aggression over 
Morocco, led many to sympathise with Army reforms as a bulwark to the threat 
of Germany; evidence of this in a cultural context being the commercial success 
of William Le Quoux’s fictionalised ‘The Invasion of 1910’, given military 
credence by advice form Lord Roberts himself.443 However, a lack of working 
class enthusiasm for compulsory service combined with the scepticism of 
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Parliament effectively blocked the movement; as Reader concludes: 
‘Compulsory Service never came within the scope of practical politics in pre-
1914 Britain. Aversion to it ran wide and deep and, with the English Channel as 
a moat commanded by the Navy, there was no very obvious reason, in spite of 
frequent invasion scares, why the voluntary principles should not be applied to 
defence’.444 
   This reliance on volunteerism was put to the ultimate test of a general 
European war in August 1914. Although Britain had no formal alliance with 
France, many in the Liberal Cabinet such as Prime Minister Asquith felt the 
Staff talks between the countries’ military forces meant Britain had a moral 
obligation to assist France following the declaration of war against her by 
Germany, and a vested interest in sustaining France’s position as a great 
power.445 This was not reason enough for many in a Liberal Government 
distasteful of expensive foreign wars, especially during the preparation for the 
implementation of Home Rule in Ireland, and to the wider nation as a whole. 
The German violation of Belgian neutrality conveniently provided a consensus 
on which the Government and the country could enter the war united.446 
Evidence of the national enthusiasm to support Britain on the outbreak of war is 
far from lacking; the 760,000 volunteers raised ostensibly under the influence of 
Lord Kitchener in the first two months of war, the suspension of the Suffragette 
campaign to focus on patriotic activities, compelling if more moderate 
enlistment in Ireland; but it would be naïve to cite these as examples of selfless 
patriotic sacrifices. It is true that many who enlisted in the Army after August 
1914 were primarily driven by patriotism. Nicolletta Gullace has stated that 
‘enlisting in the army became the supreme mark of loyalty’.447 This loyalty was 
evident in the highest number of new recruits enlisting in late August and early 
September during the British retreat from Mons and the possibility of imminent 
defeat.  
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   Once hostilities had officially commenced, established Jewry wasted little time 
in displaying a collective patriotism and oneness with Britain’s cause. As had 
happened fifteen years previously with the opening of the Boer War, visible 
support for the struggle in the form of Union Jacks and patriotic banners quickly 
adjourned Jewish shops in the West End448, whilst the Jewish Chronicle went 
into patriotic overdrive with its famous declaration: ‘England has been all she 
could be to Jews. Jews will be all they can be for England.’449 As a comparison 
this matched the patriotic enthusiasm demonstrated by the Jewish population of 
Berlin in August 1914, a minority similarly subject to pre-war suspicions of 
loyalty to the Fatherland and fallout from immigration pressures from co-
religionists arriving from the east. Yet for German Jews war provided an 
opportunity to stand firm with the German nation through sacrifice on the 
battlefield.450 Indeed, as Derek Penslar has noted, military service provided the 
most powerful manifestation of Jewish allegiance to the state and civil society: 
‘The uniform was an accoutrement of emancipation, and the battlefield and 
barracks were sites of assimilation’.451  
   The Jewish Chronicle reported near the end of August that ‘There is every 
indication that the call to the nation has not, so far as the Jewish community is 
concerned, by any means fallen on deaf ears. The information appearing in our 
news columns point to a steady flow of Jews to the colours. In London the 
recruiting officials testify warmly to Jewish loyalty’.452 The obvious pride the 
Jewish Chronicle and other Anglo-Jewish institutions took in the number of 
Jewish volunteers stemmed in part from a fear of any repeat of the accusations 
of Jewish self-interest seen during the Boer War. This led specifically to 
stringent attempts to deny any sectarian behaviour that could be interpreted as 
Jews putting Jewish interests before national ones. This was articulated openly 
by the outgoing president of the English Zionist Federation, Sir Francis 
Montefiore that ‘the thoughts of all Englishmen should be for national 
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questions’453, but most controversially in the failure of the Board of Deputies or 
any other prominent Jewish institutions to forcefully question the government’s 
enforcement of the War Measures Act of 22 August, which saw thousands of 
Jewish enemy citizens imprisoned.454 Far from condemning such actions, as 
surely it would have if it had occurred in pre-war Russia, The Jewish Chronicle 
reacted with silence, only venturing an opinion on the subject to engage in a 
spat with The Times concerning the apparently deliberate confusion of 
‘German’ with Jew − ‘Every Jew in the minds of these foolish people is of 
necessity a German Jew’.455 The bulk of established Jewry could trace their 
roots to Germany, and some maintained familial and business links to the 
country that were only severed by the opening of hostilities.456 The rise of anti-
German agitation was a potent force in shaping national identity in the years 
before 1914. Anglo-German economic rivalry, the invasion scares of the 
preceding decade and concerns over the number of German waiters and shop 
assistants strategically placed along the east coast had created a virile anti-
German sentiment in British society before the war.457  
   The course of the war was to witness widespread anti-German riots − 
particularly in August 1914, after the sinking of the Lusitania and the death of 
Lord Kitchener − and was attended by virulent newspaper attacks, particularly 
from the Daily Mail, and extensive anti-alien Government legislation.458 Panayi 
states ‘all sections of British society became gripped by a passionate hatred of 
all things German’,459 the Bishop of London exploded ‘kill Germans! Kill them!... 
not for the sake of killing, but to save the world’.460 For patriotic Britons, 
Prussianism became a distorted malevolence to which Britishness could 
receive reflected glory, the brave and virtuous Tommy Atkins fighting against 
the desecrators of Belgium.  
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   53,324 Germans lived in Britain in 1911, of whom roughly half lived in 
London, predominantly around St Pancras, Stepney and Islington.461 Despite 
the grossly exaggerated contemporary belief that there were 100,000 German 
waiting staff in London (in the imaginings of invasion novel writers such as 
Walter Wood ready to form a fifth column force in the event of war) many 
Germans were employed as waiters or waitresses, perhaps as many as 10 per 
cent of the profession, and an estimated half of master bakers in the city were 
German.462 Stanley Brown, born 1906 in Southend, recalled the fate of his local 
baker once war was declared: ‘the intense Germanophobia which built up 
during the first months of the war. this was highlighted to me by the frenzied 
destruction of a small bakery in the South Church Avenue owned by a man of 
German extraction – a third generation inhabitant of this country – who had 
been our family baker for some time’.463 Alice Linton, born in Hoxton in 1908, 
recalled a similar incidence of the prevalence of Germanophobia in the war 
years: ‘The baker was a German and a very nice person… Although the baker 
was liked by everybody, more or less, when the war broke out they began 
looting his shop. Everything was taken and the whole place ransacked. It was 
sad to see how quickly people’s attitude changed towards that man and his 
family’.464 The intense hostility towards even naturalised Britons of German 
origin saw many such victims attempt to demonstrate their loyalty by anglicising 
their Germanic sounding names (the most prominent of whom was King 
George V who changed the royal name from Saxe-Coburg-Gotha to Windsor in 
July 1917), and by public condemnations of German atrocities, the so called 
‘loyalty letters’ that began to appear in The Times in May 1915.465 An ex-mayor 
of Bermondsey, Henry Morriss, recalled after the war: ‘We were not without a 
large share of aliens in our midst, many of whom had been tradesmen and 
workpeople in the district for several years. Suddenly the fasciae of many shops 
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told of naes which passed in the night [Morris’ italics]. Schitzler, et cetera, 
became “The Albion Saloon” or “The British Barbers of Bermondsey” ’.466  
   Mark Levene has identified the failure of established Jewry to defend the 
rights of Jewish enemy aliens, whilst simultaneously exhibiting a bellicose 
patriotism, as summative of the community’s response to the pressures of war 
and the expectations of British public opinion.467 Perhaps here as well, 
memories of the Boer War − particularly the jingoist British press and the 
damage wrought by the ‘Boerjuds’ − influenced London Jewry’s positioning 
towards a national rather than communal front. The Jewish Chronicle alluded to 
this when it advised its readers: ‘We Jews should be particularly careful at a 
time like this, by our conduct and demeanour… so that we shall not arouse a 
spirit of hostility, which at a time of national anxiety and stress such as that 
upon which we are entering, is a force… ready to assert itself at the slightest 
provocation’.468  
   Established Jewry were far keener to aid the plight of another group of Jews 
stranded in Britain, the Jewish contingent of the Belgian refugees who began 
arriving in Britain in the first weeks of the war, numbering 250,000 at the peak 
of the migration.469 Receiving a warmth of welcome provided to few migrant 
groups arriving in Britain (despite perhaps the initial enthusiasm that greeted 
French Huguenots in the 17th Century), the British population energetically set 
out to help the new arrivals. 2,000 local committees were set up to administer 
provisions and accommodation for the ‘brave’ Belgians, whose plight was leant 
further sympathy in September 1914 by circulating rumours of German 
atrocities carried out against civilians in occupied Belgium.470 Among the 
Belgian refugees were a significant number of Jews, for whom the institutions of 
established Jewry began energetically raising money for. The Jewish Chronicle 
reported on 6 November: ‘Under the auspices of the Wandsworth, Battersea 
and Balham Jewish Ladies Guild, a dance, in aid of the Jewish Belgian 
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Refugees JEWISH CHRONICLE and JEWISH WORLD fund will be held in 
Battersea Town hall, Wednesday 18th’.471  
   Attempts were made to house the Belgian Jews in the Jews’ Temporary 
Shelter, however there wasn’t enough room - a former workhouse building in 
Poland Street, Soho, provided temporary accommodation for the Belgian 
Jewish families. In December 1914, the refuge accommodated 842 Belgian 
Jews.472 Geoffrey Black in his history of the Jewish West End, has written how 
the Belgian Jews ‘made a significant contribution to the orthodox community of 
Soho’, and that one of the children of these refugees, Rabbi Dr Isadore Epstein, 
‘was appointed principal of Jews’ College in 1945’.473 Overall, the response of 
established Jewry in aiding the plight of Jewish Belgian refugees far 
outmatched the support the community leant enemy Jews interned in Britain, 
and can be explained simply by the national popularity of the former’s cause 
compared to the general British hostility displayed towards the latter. 
 
   The Jewish volunteers who enlisted prior to conscription were the most 
valuable proof for Anglo-Jewry in demonstrating the selfless patriotism of the 
community. The Jewish Chronicle proudly praised the nationalist instinct of 
Jewish youth: ‘The response of English Jewry to the call of the present crisis 
has, in fact, been one of the most noteworthy incidents in the whole of its 
history. Never before has the stream of martial ardour flowed in such 
extraordinary volume through the Jewish quarters. After this war there will be 
many theories which will have to be revised or discarded. One of the earliest to 
go by the board is the idea that the Jew is lacking in courage and cannot be a 
good soldier when duty calls him to the field’.474 By most contemporary and 
current estimations, approximately 10,000 Jews had volunteered before the 
Military Service Act came into force in July 1916, with 1,140 becoming 
officers.475 These figures became the shield of patriotism that the Jewish 
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community presented against opponents who challenged the Jewish war effort 
in the post-war period. However, such statistics reveal less on their own without 
an examination of the experiences of the men behind them - in particular their 
motivations for enlisting, interaction with Gentile troops, and the peculiar 
hardships in the trenches caused by their religion.  
   Occupation was an important determinant for enlistment amongst English 
Jews. As Asher Tropp has shown, a high proportion of young Jewish males in 
turn-of-the-century London found employment in office-based professions.476 
During the last days of peace, clerks featured heavily in the vanguard of the 
pro-interventionist movement that sought to disrupt anti-war rallies such as the 
socialist demonstration at Trafalgar square on 2 August. The Daily Chronicle 
described such hecklers as ‘a negligible contingent of youths… clerks by 
appearance’ who sang ‘patriotic songs until a heavy shower of rain dampened 
their enthusiasm’.477 The sedentary and somewhat monotonous nature of 
clerkship has been identified as a push factor behind enlistment, the spur of 
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danger and adventure the war offered such men provided an escape from the 
humdrum of everyday life. Herbert Asquith, son of the Prime Minister Herbert 
Henry Asquith, caught this sentiment in his poem The Volunteer:  
‘Here lies a clerk who half his life has spent  
Toiling in ledgers in a city grey, 
Thinking that so his days would drift away 
With no lance broken in life’s tournament.’478 
Such yearnings for adventure were not restricted to the middle class 
professions, as Nicholas Mansfield’s account of the enlistment motivations for 
English farmworkers has shown.479 Unemployment was another powerful 
motivating factor for enlistment. The economic slump that followed the outbreak 
of war had a chronic impact on London’s working class, with male employment 
falling by 10% between July and August. Indeed, a disproportionate number of 
the earliest volunteers to enlist in London came from the urban unskilled 
workforce, many of them recently made unemployed.480 Patriotism was often 
less an effective reason for enlisting in the minds of young recruits than was 
peer pressure (in particular the Pals Battalions and the desire not to be left 
behind whilst friends enlisted), bullying from patriotic employers and 
spontaneous movements such as the White Feather Campaign481, adventure, 
and perhaps foolishly the prospect of better pay and food in the army.482 The 
army represented for many a chance to escape boredom and poverty: ‘When 
the farmer stopped my pay because it was raining, and we couldn’t thrash, I 
said to my seventeen-year-old mate, “bugger him. We’ll go off and join the 
army” ’.483  
   Another factor making volunteerism and a life in the army a more attractive 
option for young men was the remarkable makeover of the image of the British 
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soldier during the heady early months of the war. The cult of the General as 
national hero was still strong484 but it was accompanied by a new idolisation of 
the common soldier, ‘Tommy Atkins’, who as Gullace has characterised, shed 
his dour Victorian image to become ‘the ideal-typical British soldier… brave, 
cheerful, martial, and fair’.485 In no more vivid form was the popularity of the 
soldier demonstrated than the outbreak of ‘Khaki Fever’, an obsessive ailment 
afflicting mainly young girls aggravated by the ‘patriotic involvement and warrior 
garb’ of the newly enlisted servicemen (Richard Voeltz makes the point that the 
‘Fever’ was short lived due to the mass mobilisation of women into war 
industries and the wearing of khaki in the factories, negating the novelty).486 
The revolution in the image of the soldier was significant in signalling a 
transformation of the relationship between masculinity, the state and national 
identity. The authorities through skilful propaganda posters promoted the 
soldier as the patriotic defender of the country but in a more local spirit the 
defender of the home and family determined to prevent the atrocities inflicted 
on Belgium from reaching his community.487  
 
     Contrary to the overall metropolitan trend that saw a disproportionate 
number of volunteers from the working class professions, amongst English 
Jews an equally disproportionate number of the earliest recruits were drawn 
from the middle classes. The experiences of Norman Bentwich, a Jewish law 
clerk in Fleet Street, attest to this. Norman’s decision to enlist in August 1914 
‘released [him] from the rigours and petty annoyances of my present situation’ 
and to ‘don the proud khaki and feel a wondrous sensation of being involved in 
a just cause’.488 Norman did not feel any pressure to hide his Jewishness upon 
enlistment, as other Jewish soldiers felt the need to do, either by attesting to a 
different faith when questioned, or anglicising their name. The anti-alien 
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campaign waged in the decades prior to 1914 led many Jews with foreign 
sounding names to adopt English ones − a process made more common by the 
war due to the rise of Germanophobia and the pre-existing rumours of 
institutionalised antisemitism within the British Army.489 The reverend Michael 
Adler noted this during his visits to the battlefields: ‘In the early days of the war 
certain of our men attempted to conceal their identity by not reporting 
themselves as Jews. Some, whilst remaining Jews, changed their names, as in 
the classic example of Gunner Leib Kalmanovitch adopting the name Louis 
Bonaparte, whilst the name of Smith became a favourite’.490  
   Such practice inevitably confused and limited the public perception of the 
Jewish contribution to the war, admitted openly by the Jewish Chronicle in late 
August: ‘It is always difficult to calculate the real number of Jews serving with 
the colours. Not only are names no criterion, but for reasons which are well 
known Jewish soldiers in a large number of cases do not enlist as such’.491 The 
Board of Jewish Guardians held an emergency meeting to discuss the 
‘invisibility’ of Jewish soldiers in October, concluding that recent examples of 
antisemitic behaviour at recruiting stations across London was the dominant 
factor behind it. In particular, the Board noted the rough treatment of Jews at a 
recruitment depot in Hackney.492 The Jewish Chronicle interviewed the 
recruiting officer at the affected depot, who said: ‘What happened was that we 
found a great deal of very strongly developed prejudice among a certain section 
– not the best – against the Jewish recruits. Generally they gave the Jews a 
rough handling in every possible way. They called them names, hustled them, 
distorted their foreign names, and made things generally offensive. We 
therefore thought it best, in the interests of the Jews themselves, to refuse 
them’.493 A correspondent wrote to the Jewish Chronicle in December 
complaining that his son had been refused enlistment into the 4th City of London 
Fusiliers on the basis that he was a Jew; the regiment apparently had a policy 
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of not enlisting Jews.494 Whatever the motivation for the practice of recruits 
masking their Jewishness, the outcome was a loss of publishable recruitment 
figures for an Anglo-Jewish establishment determined to display full support for 
the war effort.495  
   In contrast to the fears of the Jewish establishment, the number of serious 
cases of antisemitism experienced by Jewish soldiers during the war were 
surprisingly few. Congenial relations between Jews and Gentiles in the 
trenches were the norm. However, cases of both direct and indirect prejudice 
against Jews did occur, undermining the victim’s sense of patriotism on which 
they enlisted and the position of enlightened tolerance that the Ministry of 
Information portrayed Britain’s cause in, especially as the war progressed.496 
Many Jewish soldiers were quick to attest to the comradery between the faiths 
in their letters home. Colonel Sergeant R. Harris with the 4th Royal Fusiliers 
wrote that ‘I feel that the way we were treated and the privileges we received go 
a long way to prove that the old prejudice against the Jew has entirely 
disappeared, and that no man need be ashamed to admit that he is a Jew.’497 
The Jewish Chronicle was quick to publish such sentiments from Jewish 
soldiers between late 1914 and throughout 1915, in part to encourage further 
Jewish enlistment.498 The reverend Michael Adler reflected after the war ‘I have 
frequently been asked whether there were any signs of anti-Semitism in the life 
of the great British Army, and I say without the slightest hesitation, that 
whatever indication of ill feeling there was towards the Jew was so small as to 
be entirely negligible. The Christian soldier was warmly attached to his Jewish 
“pal”, and the relations between the soldiers of all denominations was 
remarkably cordial.’499 
   Jacob Plotzker of the 47th Royal Fusiliers experienced the occasional anti-
Jewish jibe in his time in the forces, ‘having one or two fights over the topic’, but 
the tight military discipline of his unit ensured such incidents ceased after a 
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week or so.500 British soldiers, when questioned directly on the subject of their 
Jewish comrades, often answered in glowing terms. Charles Ward of the 20th 
Battalion Middlesex Regiment praised the high military quality of two Jewish 
recruits from Stamford Bridge.501 Bill Smedly of the 12th Battalion South Wales 
Borderers Regiment denied that there was any real antisemitic behaviour 
towards the Jewish soldiers in his unit, although did admit that other recruits put 
‘crabs in the bed of my Jewish friend “silverman”, but just for fun’.502 Whether 
such an incident would represent a crude example of Jewish victimisation within 
the British Army or simple high jinks amongst young men cannot be ascertained 
from Smedly’s account. Pre-war tensions and prejudices certainly followed 
recruits into the army. A young recruit from Lewisham did not attempt to hide 
his contempt for the Jewish East End in a letter to his father in May 1917: ‘So 
the recruiters have woke up. They are worse than a set of Jew boys. However 
better late than never I suppose. So they are rounding the gallant Hebrews 
up… I did not expect to see one in Khaki when I came here but out of our 
company − 200 strong, a dozen of them are Jews. I can see Whitechapel 
getting a V.C yet − if the war goes on long enough’.503 Charlie ‘Ginger’ Byrne, a 
private in a Machine Gun Corps, described his Jewish commanding sergeant 
as ‘a “Jew boy”. Proper “fiddler” ’.504 Byrne goes on to reveal the sergeant in 
question owned a Woolworths store in London, implying the term ‘fiddler’ was a 
derogatory antisemitic slur against the perceived economic avarice of Jewish 
businessmen.  
   That some British soldiers harboured a preconceived dislike of Jews upon 
their enlistment, and which diminished little upon contact with Jews in the army, 
is little proof of an ingrained aversion to Jews as soldiers within the British Army 
in the period 1914-1918. Little convincing evidence has been provided to show 
that in an official capacity Jews were deliberately hindered in their progress or 
barred from achieving certain ranks, despite the persuasive arguments of Tony 
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Kushner and Gavin Schaffer.505 English Jews attained officer rank in 
proportionally higher numbers than the national average, and the Australian 
Jew John Monash became one of the army’s most celebrated and respected 
generals.506 There was no equivalent in the British Army of the 1916 
Judenzählung, the census of Jewish soldiers in the German Army that sought 
to prove Jewish disloyalty.507 This is not to say opposition to Jewish military 
advancement did not exist in the army, and evidence can be found in individual 
cases. Henry Myer recalled how his cousin Ernest, having taken the Certificate 
C for promotion to Field Rank – ‘in effect to qualify for command of a Battalion 
in War’- had been told by one of the examining board that a fellow examiner 
had exclaimed “We can’t pass Myer − he’s a Jew!”508 Such reasoning may have 
been based on popular scepticism of Jews as soldiers, or individual prejudice, 
but a lack of institutional antisemitism within the army is borne out by the 
majority of the examiners who outvoted their colleague and passed Myer for 
command.  
   Antisemitism in the army occurred at an individual rather than an institutional 
level and had only limited significance in the continuation of cordial Jewish and 
Gentile relations. However, the experience of even isolated prejudice was a 
shock for many Jewish soldiers, especially the majority of British Jews who 
regarded themselves as ‘Britons of the Jewish persuasion or Faith’.509 Isolated 
in the stratified world of the Edwardian period, for many upper class Jews such 
as Henry Myer, to be treated any differently, and worse, derogatively, by their 
fellow Britons came as a shock. Myer sums up his experiences of antisemitism 
thus: ‘Whilst we were treated by the vast majority of our fellow Englishmen in 
similar fashion to our many Gentile friends, there was a substantial number of 
Gentiles, who either did not understand or did not want to associate with, or 
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even disliked British Jews, no matter how assimilated they appeared to be.’510 
Such experiences of prejudice dimmed for those British Jews who experienced 
it a previously unvanquished sense of Britishness − replaced in the case of 
Henry Myer by a lost Jewish identity nurtured by his later experiences in the 
Jewish Battalion, as will be discussed in more detail later in chapter three. 
 
 Faith Under Fire: Judaism in the Armed Forces 
1914-1918 
 
   The war placed serious strain on the ability of Jews serving in the British 
Army to uphold their religious commitments. Jewish chaplains were not 
assigned to individual regiments, unlike their Christian counterparts, with only 
the roaming Chief Reverend Michael Adler to organise Jewish services for the 
majority of the conflict. Achieving leave or the relinquishing of military duties for 
religious festivals was notoriously difficult for Jewish soldiers, and where this 
was granted, inadvertently spread accusations of special treatment. Providing 
Jewish soldiers − thinly spread out amongst the various battalions of the British 
Army − with kosher food proved a logistical impossibility. Overall, the war 
contributed to a significant decline in the religiosity of young Jewish males, and 
the households they returned to after the war. 
   Of course religiosity was highly variable amongst individual Jewish soldiers, 
and declining levels of strict observance amongst English Jews in particular 
was a pre-war phenomenon.511 There were however, a significant number 
(perhaps a majority512) of practicing Jewish soldiers fighting in the British Army 
who expected and wished for their religious needs to be accommodated during 
their time of service. Aaron Cohen delayed his enlistment due to his concerns 
that he would be unable to fulfil his religious duties, reluctantly signing on in 
September 1915 as ‘it was expected of him’.513 He suppressed news of his 
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enlistment from his close knit and highly religious family until the last moment; 
the news of his embarkation for France reached them just as they were setting 
off to the synagogue for Jewish New Year, causing consternation.514 The Board 
of Deputies sought to ease the burden of the Jewish fighting men, empowering 
the existing Shechita Committee to deduce means of providing kosher meat for 
the troops on the front, and sanctioning Michael Adler’s request to join the Army 
in France to provide services and organise burial for the Jewish dead.515  
   Adler compiled a Prayer book that was issued to every Jewish soldier516, and 
crisscrossed the various regiments of the British Army, attaching himself to 
those with the highest number of Jewish soldiers. In Baupaume in 1917 he 
managed to put on a service for 1500 Jewish soldiers.517 His hectic schedule 
often resulted in mistakenly committing to two services in different parts of 
France at the same time. Henry Myer relates one particular service held for the 
Jewish troops of his battalion where, as the senior officer present, he had to 
step in to lead a service Adler had failed to show up for.518 Adler attempted to 
intervene on behalf of Jewish soldiers to secure leave for Jewish festivals with 
only mixed success. Individual Jews were occasionally granted leave for Yom 
Kippur and the Day of Atonement, but the Army informed Adler that this would 
be impossible to grant en masse, for obvious reasons.519 Where leave did 
occur, it could create tension between Jews and non-Jews. A London-born 
soldier complained in April 1917 ‘I do not think I shall receive any leave for 
three months at least. All the “Shonks” have got 4 days leave this Easter to 
celebrate the Passover’.520 Near the beginning of the war in December 1914 
the Daily Record reported on a novel solution to the potential resentment 
caused by the issue: ‘a suggestion has been made that all the duties in the 
camps on Christmas day should be done by the Jewish recruits, and so permit 
of the Gentiles having a real holiday. This proposal has been seriously put 
forward by some Jews who maintain that this would be an excellent way of 
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showing their appreciation of the leave granted to them in September and 
October that enabled them to observe certain of their religious festivals.’521 The 
suggestion came to nothing due to the overall scarcity of Jewish soldiers across 
the various battalions of the British Army. The same Daily Record reporter 
commented, albeit on the basis of hearsay, that one training centre in London 
contained only one Jewish soldier out of 4,000.522 However, the proposal does 
suggest that some Jewish soldiers did feel uncomfortable with the special leave 
creating resentment amongst their fellow soldiers and potentially creating a 
precedent for the accusation that Jewish soldiers were provided special 
treatment. As the war progressed and the relentlessness of military action 
increased on the western front, the opportunities for Jewish soldiers to take 
leave for Jewish festivals and the Sabbath decreased. Jacob Plotzker, born in 
Leeds into an orthodox family who moved to London before the war, recorded 
that he observed Passover and had matzos and wine sent on (presumably by 
family members), but that generally in his unit no ceremony was held on the 
Sabbath and no day off was granted.523 Plotzker recalled that some Jewish 
soldiers did ask for leave for Jewish festivals, but that this would only be 
granted if they held favour with their commanding officers. In general, Plotzker 
stated that he and other Jewish soldiers in his battalion were given no special 
treatment, and were treated like any other soldiers.524 
   Despite the gradual addition of seven more chaplains by the end of 1917, 
Adler and his colleague’s efforts were insufficient to meet the needs of the 
majority of Jewish troops, as he readily admitted ‘The number of chaplains on 
the western front was never adequate, the consequence being that each was 
allotted an area far too wide an extent to be thoroughly worked by one 
Chaplain. In spite of numerous applications to the authorities none of my 
colleagues had a motor car allotted to him to enable him to journey as often as 
necessary through the length and breadth of his Army or Base’.525 Indeed, 
having considered the request for motor car assistance, the Army ruled that 
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such provision was not in the best interests of the Army as a whole, and was 
denied.526 This summed up the Army’s lack of interest in the privation of Jewish 
religious needs on the frontline, and was matched by the increasingly half-
hearted commitment to the issue from the Board of Deputies − the Shechita 
Committee switched focus to supplying kosher meat for the Home Front 
following the introduction of rationing in January 1917.527 This was a 
consequence of the larger concern the Anglo-Jewish establishment felt towards 
the increasing ‘differentiation’ of the Jewish soldier (strongly influenced by the 
campaign for a Jewish Battalion in 1917), and institutions such as the BoD and 
the JWSC gradually removed support for any initiatives deemed contributory to 
this process. This led to frustration − one Jewish soldier from the 10th Royal 
Fusiliers complaining ‘5 services in 3 years. Us Jews feel we are being 
neglected’.528 However, the issue of meeting the religious needs of its Jewish 
soldiers was far from unique to the British Army. All the main belligerent nations 
struggled to accommodate the religious requirements of their increasingly 
multicultural armies as the extended duration of the war saw the necessity to 
tap the vast resources of the various European empires. Jewish troops in the 
German Army encountered great difficulties in organising religious festivals, as 
seen by the struggle encountered by the German Jewish soldier Martin Lion, 
who took it upon himself to organise a Seder for the Jewish troops in his sector. 
Having battled against the authorities to secure even a room for the service, the 
gathering of German Jewish soldiers had a sombre and melancholy tone, 
summed up by the speech to the troops made by Lion at the end of the 
ceremony: ‘these rightly sinister men at home are seeking to deprive us. Today 
we think of our families and loved ones at home, we committed ourselves 
together to stand up for our Jewish heritage, and to continue in the never 
ceasing fight against these forces of darkness’. 529  
   Many Jewish recruits experienced a relative decline in religiosity as a result of 
their war service. Private Jake Copeland attempted to adhere to Jewish dietary 
law whilst in the trenches but found ‘four years in the army knocked it all out of 
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me’.530 A Gentile British soldier from Tottenham, Charles Ward, recalled how by 
the end of the war the Jewish soldiers in his battalion fought ‘as hard as anyone 
for the fat left over from frying bacon’.531 As was discussed in chapter one, 
Jewish chaplain Arthur Barnett faced mutiny amongst the men attached to him 
after his attempts to switch their normal bacon rations for kosher equivalents.532 
Plotzker recollected that he never received kosher food during his service in the 
army, but was of the opinion that strictness of Jewish dietary law ‘didn’t really 
matter when there was a war on’.533 Many Jewish soldiers held little or no 
religious convictions before enlistment. Those who did, however, experienced 
frustration with the Army authorities for inept and half-hearted attempts to 
accommodate Jewish religious practice, and disillusionment with the Jewish 
establishment for failing to take a stand on the issue. 
 
 British Zionism and the Road Towards the Balfour 
Declaration 1914-1917 
 
   Prior to 1914, there was little evidence pointing towards the dominant and 
divisive impact political Zionism would have on Anglo-Jewry. The British Zionist 
organisation Chovevie Zion remained the modest forerunner of an insignificant 
political undercurrent, deemed by the association of Jewish Literary Societies to 
be a subject of ‘too limited interest’ to warrant a lecture on.534 The visit of the 
World Zionist Congress president Theodore Herzl in 1895 and again in 1901 
failed to stimulate any lasting intellectual debate or impetus into the British 
Zionist movement, and even as late as 1914 ‘The prevailing attitude of the vast 
majority of the community was one of bland unconcern [towards Zionism]’.535 
And yet the issue of procuring a collective Jewish homeland would become the 
central Anglo-Jewish concern of the war by 1917, splitting the community into 
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pro- and anti-Zionist camps, and irrevocably transforming British perceptions of 
the Jews’ place within the Empire and their commitment to the war effort. This 
section will first examine the origins of organised Zionism in Britain to establish 
the weakness of the movement in 1914, but will also show that early 
enthusiasm for Zionism within established Jewry can be interpreted as the 
extension of assimilationist policies through Zionism. It will then assess the 
British motivations behind the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 to pinpoint 
the British Government’s attitude and relationship with Zionism and more 
importantly for this study, what this reveals about Government and British 
attitudes to Jews in Britain at this stage of the war. Finally, it will be shown how 
the war led inexorably to the growth of political Zionism in Britain, and how this 
had a transformational impact on the internal communal politics of established 
Jewry. 
 
   The unsteady beginnings of British Zionism reflect the ‘relatively’ benign 
political and religious conditions to which English Jews were accustomed 
compared to the patchy and often discriminatory laws their co-religionists were 
subject to on the continent in the years preceding 1914. For instance, British 
Jews had no direct parallel of the epiphanic realisation experienced by 
Theodore Herzl for the necessity of a Jewish homeland upon witnessing a 
Parisian crowd chanting ‘Death to the Jews!’ in the wake of the Dreyfus affair, 
or the necessity to form self-protection leagues by Vladimir Jabotinsky in 
Odessa following a spate of antisemitic pogroms.536 As has been discussed, 
the leading elements of established Jewry pursued policies directed towards 
continuing the process of assimilation and integration of the community within 
British society begun over two centuries previously. Late nineteenth-century 
political Zionism presented the Jews of Britain with an entirely different 
ideology. Zionists groups − such as the Chovevie Zion Association of England 
(Est.1890) − argued that British Jewry’s position was ‘inherently unnatural; the 
Jews would not gain authentic citizenship by endeavouring to separate the 
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religious from the national in their creed, or by choosing the path of 
assimilation. Political independence within defined territorial boundaries was the 
only solution’.537  
   Chovevie Zion began as an immigrant orientated movement, regularly 
meeting at the Jewish Working Men’s Club in East London. Recent arrivals 
provided the burgeoning Zionist movement with numerical muscle and the 
emotional commitment to the cause borne from their experiences of 
persecution in Russia. However, the group also attracted influential figures from 
the West End Jewish establishment. The first meeting in May 1890 attracted 
among others Sir Samuel Montagu, Lord Nathaniel Rothschild and the 
President of the Jewish Board of Guardians Sir Benjamin Louis Cohen.538 
Samuel Montagu, the philanthropic MP for Whitechapel, presented a positive 
endorsement of Zionism at a meeting the following year at the Great Assembly 
Hall in Mile End: ‘Many considered it a religious duty and privilege to cultivate 
with their own hands the soil of the Holy Lands’. He went on to state that the 
Arabs, with religion, customs and language ‘nearly akin to the Hebrews’ would 
make more tolerant overlords than the Russian: ‘better to be under Ismail rather 
than Esau, to live with Arabs rather than persecuting Russians’.539 
   Two years later Montagu outlined his public support for Zionism and Chovevie 
Zion further, stating he would ‘yield to no-one in his appreciative regard for the 
Holy Land. Nothing would delight him more than to know that a multitude of 
Jews were happy and prosperous cultivating the soil of Palestine and 
endeavouring to make that land flow again with milk and honey as in former 
times.'540 Privately, Montagu doubted the practicality of large scale Jewish 
settlement in Palestine, as he confirmed in a letter to Herzl in 1897: ‘I do not 
think that Jews can be established in Palestine excepting by the voluntary 
combination of the great powers or by some leader who would command the 
confidence of the Jewish race. I would not like to see a very large number of 
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Jews placed under Turkish rule at the present time.’541 The insincerity of 
Montagu’s public positive comments on Zionism can be attributed to two factors 
common amongst prominent West End Jews involved in the movement prior to 
1914. A need to appease the prevailing pro-Zionist sentiment of the immigrant 
Jewish communities (who Montagu, as MP for Whitechapel, was politically 
incentivised to indulge), and the pressing desire to deflect further immigration 
away from Britain.  
   On this point, it can be argued that West London Zionists shared similar 
concerns with anti-alien agitators. Indeed, there is evidence Zionist groups were 
actively supporting anti-alien candidates in the 1900 general election. One of 
the leading British Zionist of the war years, Chaim Weizmann, would later write 
supportively of the actions of the British Brothers’ League founder William 
Evans Gordon: ‘Sir William Evans Gordon had no particular anti-Jewish 
prejudices. He acted, as he thought, according to his best lights and in the most 
kindly way, in the interests of his country… he was sincerely ready to 
encourage any settlement of Jews almost anywhere in the British Empire, but 
he failed to see why the ghettos of London or Leeds or Whitechapel should be 
made into the branches of the ghettos of Warsaw and Pinsk’.542 The support or 
at least sympathy with anti-alien sentiment by West End Zionists shows that the 
politics of integration, or in this case the politics of prevention, remained the 
dominant communal policy of established Jewry when presented by the 
controversies of immigration, and formed the basis of the commitment to 
Zionism among some of its leading proponents. This can be seen in how the 
West End memberships of Chovevei Zion and the later English Zionist 
Federation (est.1899), increasingly dominated the direction of organised 
Zionism in Britain, and more energy was invested in the promotion of English 
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manners and habits amongst the immigrant members who made up the bulk of 
the movement.543  
   West End involvement in Zionism before 1914 therefore represented little 
more than the latest endeavour to sanitise and assimilate the immigrant half of 
Anglo-Jewry, in the mould of the Jewish Lads and Girls Brigades, the Jew’s 
Free School and the Jews Temporary Shelter, ‘through which to introduce to 
poor and alien Jews the values of the English middle class’.544 Zionism 
amongst the Jewish elites lacked dynamic and coherent leadership, particularly 
with regard to the practicalities of Jewish settlement in Palestine, and also 
lacked the numbers. Only eleven British Jews attended the First Zionist 
Congress and on their own admission ‘were not truly representative of the 
community’.545 The secretary of the Board of Deputies, Charles Emanuel, 
summed up the sentiments of the bulk of established Jewry regarding Zionism 
when giving evidence to the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration in 1902: 
'[The Zionists'] suggestion is that Palestine is an alternative to England as a 
place of emigration from Russia. As we have no home in Palestine at present, 
and no right to go there, I contest that.'546 Certainly British Zionism operated at 
the outer periphery of the Herzlian continental network, and overall the 
movement retained the appearance of a fringe movement even within 
Established Jewry prior to 1914.547 
    
   The coming of war significantly revived the political fortunes of the listing 
British Zionist movement. Increasingly during the war, Zionism became a 
platform from which opponents of Jewish leadership could project their criticism 
and opposition. As has been seen the war tested the ability and judgment of the 
London Jewish elite’s nominal leadership on multiple occasions. The Board of 
Deputies’ silence during the internment of alien Jews and the failure to defend 
the immigrant population in the face of local and national anger arising from the 
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conscription crisis convinced many within the Jewish West End barred from the 
levers of power that the grandees on the Board of Deputies did not speak for, or 
represent, their interests. One of the most vocal critics of Jewish leadership 
before and during the war was Leo Greenberg, the editor of the Jewish 
Chronicle. Born in Birmingham but educated at a Jewish school in Maida Vale, 
West London, Greenberg was a leading champion of unrestricted immigration 
in the 1890s and staunchly defended the rights of Jewish immigrants during the 
heights of the anti-alien agitation in the early 1900s. His attraction to Jewish 
nationalism was as Cesarani has stated, ‘driven as much by the belief that it 
was vital to fight assimilation as by the need to create a Jewish state’.548 His 
acquisition of the Jewish Chronicle in 1906 secured a national mouthpiece for 
the cause of Zionism, and the war years saw the famous paper mobilised in 
support of Jewish nationalism, in addition to fulfilling the role of the community’s 
most ardent purvey of British patriotism.  
   However Greenberg’s commitment to Zionism during the war would be driven 
less by the desire to see the practical implementation of its ideals, but rather the 
opportunity it presented to attack the assimilationist policies of Jewish 
leadership. In this endeavour he was joined by the scholar Moses Gastor, the 
writer Israel Zangwill and other less famous advocates of Zionism, who used 
the issue of Jewish nationalism - which represented the antithesis of the 
assimilationist policy of the Jewish elites – to cultivate and consolidate their 
existing opposition to their leadership. As Alderman has put it ‘Whenever the 
establishment needed to be chastised, the Zionists could be relied upon to 
administer the punishment’.549 Already by 1915, a resolution encouraging the 
establishment of a ‘publicly recognised, legally secured home for the Jewish 
people in Palestine’, was signed by 77,000 British Jews, indicating for the first 
time widespread support for Zionism within British Jewry.550 
   A clear example that the issue of Zionism was opening a serious breach 
within the Jewish establishment came in May 1917, when leading anti-Zionists 
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headed by David Lindo Alexander, the president of the Board of Deputies, and 
Claude Montefiore, the President of the Anglo-Jewish Association, submitted a 
letter to The Times furiously condemning the cause of Zionism on behalf of 
British Jewry as a whole. The background to this letter is long and complex but 
a brief outline of the arguments here will allow for a fuller understanding of the 
resulting controversy. The Conjoint Foreign Committee - established in 1878 to 
bring closer cooperation between the Board and the AJA and formed of seven 
representatives each - represented in effect the community’s ministry for foreign 
affairs and enjoyed an open dialogue with the British Government which it used 
to speak confidently on behalf of British Jewry on foreign affairs. By 1914 
however, the Conjoint was increasingly coming under attack from within 
established Jewry for the secrecy and undemocratic methods employed in 
decisions affecting the entirety of British Jewry.551 Zionists bitterly represented 
the secret dialogue the Conjoint enjoyed with the Foreign Office during the war, 
especially after the appointment of the arch anti-Zionist Lucien Wolf to secretary 
of the committee in January 1915 opened up the distinct possibility the Conjoint 
would attempt to detach the British Government from the early formulations of a 
commitment to Zionism.552  
   Removing Wolf and ultimately, the dissolution - or at least neutralisation - of 
the Conjoint, became a primary goal for leading Zionists such as Greenberg 
and Weizmann, and they were presented with a perfect opportunity by the anti-
Zionist letter to The Times on 24 May 1917. Under the headline ‘Views of 
Anglo-Jewry’, Alexander and Montefiore set out a stinging attack on Zionism for 
regarding ‘all the Jewish communities of the world as constituting one homeless 
nationality’, and outlined their main objections on the basis that: ‘Emancipated 
Jews in this country regard themselves primarily as a religious community, and 
they have always based their claims to political equality with their fellow citizens 
of other creeds on this assumption… It follows that the establishment of a 
Jewish nationality in Palestine, founded on this theory of Jewish homelessness, 
must have the effect throughout the world of stamping the Jews as strangers in 
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their native lands, and of undermining their hard-won position as citizens and 
nationals of those lands’.553 The letter received a predictable response from 
within Zionist circles; the Jewish Chronicle labelled it ‘a grave betrayal’ and 
called for the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association to ‘sweep 
away once and for ever this Conjoint Committee which has thus brought 
discredit on the community, and with which Anglo-Jewry has been encumbered 
only too long.’554  
   What was less predictable was the volume of anger registered by non-
Zionists across the spectrum of British Jewry. The following day The Times 
reported: ‘We have received more letters than we can find room for from Jewish 
correspondents taking strong exception to the statement, published yesterday, 
of the Conjoint Foreign Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and 
the Anglo-Jewish Association’.555 The paper published a resignation letter from 
a member of the Conjoint Committee, who complained the sentiment of the 
statement ‘differs so much from those which I hold that I have felt it my duty to 
resign my membership of the committee. I may add my belief that it does not 
represent the views of the vast majority of Jews and non-Jews here and 
elsewhere.’556 Mr S Gilbert, a member of the Board of Deputies and resident of 
Sutherland Avenue, West London, wrote: ‘As a member of the Jewish Board of 
Deputies I feel it is necessary to enter the most emphatic protest against the 
letter… The Board of Deputies has never been consulted on the question of 
whether such a declaration should be issued… But today it finds that, without 
warning and without any attempt to gain its sanction, a manifesto has been 
issued in its name. From these facts you will gather the precise amount of 
authority which attaches to this declaration.’557 The level of anger within British 
Jewry created by the 24 May letter was driven not so much from support for 
Zionism but at the arrogance of Alexander and Montefiore to speak on behalf of 
Anglo-Jewry on such a decisive matter for the community’s public image. 
Despite the pre-publication ignorance of the other member of the Conjoint and 
the Board of Deputies to the letter, for many underrepresented provincial Jews 
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and disillusioned London opponents it confirmed old accusations of the 
secretiveness of the Conjoint and the oligarchic practices of the Board.  
   The following weeks would see the Conjoint voted out of existence by the 
Board and Alexander resign his presidency.558 The dissolution of the Conjoint 
did not necessarily indicate the triumph of the Zionist cause. The Conjoint was 
soon replaced by the ‘Joint Foreign Committee’ with Lucien Wolf acting as its 
influential secretary, and Alexander’s replacement as President of the Board 
was the non-Zionist Sir Stuart Samuel, who incidentally had replaced his uncle 
Samuel Montagu as Liberal MP for Whitechapel in 1900.559 The controversy did 
however encapsulate the extent to which political Zionism had transformed into 
a divisive force within the internal politics of established Jewry as a direct result 
of the war.  
 
   The ability of a small and highly select group within the Jewish elite to speak 
for and set the agenda of British Jewry as a community had been broken, and 
replaced by competing forces within established Jewry revolving around 
whether the community’s public status would be defined by support or 
opposition to the fulfilment of Jewish nationalism. The war had thrust the issue 
of Jewish nationalism onto the main stage of Anglo-Jewish politics. However, its 
position there was ultimately dependent on the British Government’s growing 
interest in and final endorsement of Zionism in 1917, and therefore a discussion 
of the British motivations behind the Balfour Declaration is required here.  
   The increased geopolitical importance of the Middle East as a result of 
Britain’s Eastern offensive against the Ottoman Empire in 1917 placed 
Palestine in the forefront of British society’s perception of the war.560 Whilst the 
British public and press revelled in General Allenby’s capture of Jerusalem, the 
Government was quick to perceive the propaganda benefits of swaying world 
Jewish opinion to the Entente’s cause. An allied commitment to Zionism would 
strengthen the ‘questionable’ loyalty of Jewish support within the Entente 
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countries, flatter American Jewry, and potentially diminish the loyalty of 
Germany’s 550,000 strong Jewish population to the German war effort.561 In 
this transformed political climate, English Zionists wielded greater influence 
both within Anglo-Jewry and Whitehall. It allowed the respected chemist and 
President of the English Zionist Federation Chaim Weizmann to build a broad 
consensus of support amongst Lloyd George’s War Cabinet and to directly 
influence the direction of British policy concerning the planned offensive against 
Turkey in the summer of 1917.562 The efforts of Weizmann were greatly aided 
by a fond sentimentalism for the Holy Land that was strong amongst a number 
of influential government figures; namely the Prime Minister Lloyd George, 
Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour, Leo Amery and Alfred (1st Viscount) Milner. 
Lloyd George, reflecting after a meeting with Weizmann in 1915, stated ‘I 
realised as [Weizmann] was speaking, that the names of settlements in this far-
flung and dusty land [Palestine] were more familiar to me than any of the places 
on the western front’.563 Lloyd George linked his own sympathy for Zionism and 
interest in the Holy Land to his Victorian schooling: ‘We had been trained even 
more in Hebrew history than in the history of our own country… On five days a 
week in the day school, and on Sunday in our Sunday schools, we were 
thoroughly versed in the history of the Hebrews’.564  
   Indeed, Barbara Tuchman has proposed that ‘the English bible was the single 
most important factor’ behind the Balfour Declaration.565 This is somewhat 
exaggerated; British foreign policy was not directed by sentimentalism alone. A 
more pragmatic argument for British cabinet minister’s interest in Zionism, put 
forward by Mayir Verete, was a British desire to control Palestine.566 The 
Sykes–Picot Agreement between Britain and France in 1916 had divided up the 
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Middle East into spheres of influence between the two powers, but had left 
Palestine unattributed to either. A British-sponsored Zionist project to recover 
and resettle Palestine would leave Britain in a favourable position of leverage in 
the area. A further advantage would be a major coup in Britain’s propaganda 
war against Germany. The German government actively courted Jewish opinion 
in neutral U.S.A and enemy Russia during the war, and even considered 
assisting their Ottoman ally in the creation of a protectorate over a Jewish 
Palestine.567 The Balfour Declaration was designed to beat the Germans to it, 
and to secure regional dominance to boot.568 As Verete argued, Zionism 
legitimized the British invasion of 1917 and ‘wrested it from potential inclusion in 
la Syrie integrate, already allotted to France under the terms of the treaty 
[Sykes-Picot]’.569  
   Mark Levene has suggested a more cynical and perhaps sinister explanation 
for the British government’s conversion to the Zionist cause: that senior 
Whitehall officials believed Anglo-Jewry to be an untrustworthy entity which 
could only be ‘won over’ with the carrot of a Jewish Homeland to curb ‘powerful 
pro-German’ sympathies.570 Accusations of anti-Entente sentiment on the 
behalf of Anglo-Jewry occurred at the outbreak of the war and lingered on in 
occasional press sniping throughout the war. Certain Foreign Office records 
reveal individual Whitehall officials believed English Jews put Jewish interests 
before national ones.571 The co-signatory of the Sykes-Picot agreement Mark 
Sykes did indeed see Zionism as the way to win over such potential fifth 
columnists: ‘If the Zionists think the proposal is good enough they will want us 
to win, they will do their best which means a) calm their activities in Russia b) 
pessimism in Germany c) stimulate in France, England and Italy d) enthuse in 
the USA. This will be subconscious, unwritten and wholly atmospheric’.572 This 
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carried clear antisemitic overtones in the implication that collective Jewish 
power wielded political control over foreign governments.  
   However, a case can equally be made representing the Balfour Declaration 
as a testament to the trusting cooperation between the English Zionist 
Federation and Whitehall officials, as well as the pragmatic reality of British 
policy-making. The Balfour Declaration was in effect a combination of British 
geopolitical strategic opportunism, the culmination of a strong tradition of British 
non-Jewish Zionism since the 19th century, and a propaganda initiative to 
mollify American Jewry. Of more importance here is the effect the Declaration 
had on the established Jewish community of London, already badly fractured by 
the divisive issue of political Zionism. The endorsement of Zionism was met by 
the Jewish Chronicle with undisguised triumphalism. Under the headline ‘A 
Jewish Triumph’ the paper declared ‘With one step the Jewish cause has made 
a great bound forward. The declaration of his Majesty’s Government as to the 
future of Palestine in relation to the Jewish people marks a new epoch for our 
race’, before adding a rather unveiled warning to anti-Zionists ‘We cannot 
imagine that loyal British subjects, and those who proclaim themselves loyal 
Jews to boot, will continue their attitude of hostility towards Jewish national 
strivings in face of the Government statement’.573 However, far from being 
cowed by the British Government’s endorsement, the anti-Zionists regrouped 
and revived their determination to deflect and diminish the prominence of 
Jewish nationalism within British Jewry. A mere week after the Balfour 
Declaration a new group, the League of British Jews, was formed consisting of 
almost the entirety of Jewish anti-Zionist in Britain. Whilst the group totalled at 
its height no more than 1,300 members compared to the 25,000 members 
boasted by the EZF in 1918, the prestige and social standing of its members 
lent the group prominence in the eyes of the British public and Government, 
and the League used this influence to water down the terms of the 
Government’s commitment to Zionism in the Balfour Declaration.574  
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   Ultimately however, the underlying aims of the anti-Zionists during and after 
the war was for control of the British public’s image and perception of British 
Jewry’s war aims. For patriotic English Jews, the implication that the Jewish 
community was engaged in the war effort for the cause of Jewish nationalism 
threatened to undermine the patriotic efforts and sacrifice of the 40,000 Jews 
serving in the British Army, and gave further ammunition to those within the 
British press and public questioning Jewish loyalty to Britain’s war cause. This 
concept - that opposition to Zionism was driven primarily in protection of the 
image of Jewish-British patriotism - will form the basis of the discussions in 
chapter three on established Jewry’s reactions towards, and opposition against, 
the Jewish Battalion scheme. 
 
Conclusion 
   
   The rigours of four years of war severely challenged the small anglicised 
component of London’s Jewish community. The high proportion of Jews who 
served in the wartime British Army relative to the size of the community, and the 
award of over 1,500 military honours and decorations was a powerful source of 
Jewish pride in the interwar period. However, the patriotism displayed by West 
End Jewry during the war was elevated in its intensity by two interrelated 
motivations. Firstly, to prevent the repetition of the accusations of Jewish 
disloyalty raised during the Boer War and which the pre-First World War 
criticisms of the Anglo-Russian alliance threatened to revive. And secondly, to 
deflect attention from the disinterested reaction to the war of the Jewish East 
End, which appeared to confirm the failure of the Jewish leadership’s 
assimilationist policies before the war, and now threatened to undermine the 
patriotism and position of the Jewish community as a whole. Both of these 
factors were driven ultimately by British nationalism. War during the period 
1899-1918 had a profound impact on British society and on notions of national 
identity. The frailties of British manhood and military power exposed by the 
Boer War produced furious debate on the necessity for improved defence at the 
expense of constitutional rights that were still brewing in the summer of 1914. 
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On the one hand, the period 1914-1918 witnessed a persistent denigration of 
the Jewish war effort within certain circles of the British press and public that 
was comfortably matched, if not exceeded, by praise for the sacrifice of Jewish 
soldiers and the accomplishments and patriotism of Jewish statesman on the 
other. In this regards the war exposed the continuation of the British public’s 
perception of Jewish ‘differentness’ the bulk of West End Jewry wished to 
escape from.   
   The issue and experience of military service forced to the surface pre-existing 
tensions between Jews and non-Jews, in which concepts of identity and loyalty 
played an important role.575 For many Jewish recruits such as Paul Epstein and 
Jacob Plotzker, the act of soldiering provided an opportunity to disprove old 
stereotypes of cowardliness and physical weakness attached to Jewish 
manhood.576 On the whole the majority of interactions between Jews and non-
Jews in the Army were characterised by congeniality and cooperation. However 
incidents of prejudice against Jews in the army in the First World War, where 
they did occur, dimmed the patriotism of British Jews who experienced it. 
Patriotic Englishman Henry Myer felt a diminished enthusiasm for Britain’s war 
aims due to suffering antisemitic slurs in the ranks. Myer had eschewed his 
Jewish identity almost entirely, signing up as an Englishmen of Jewish birth. 
However, his diary and letters from 1917-1919 make clear his contentment and 
ease serving amongst ‘fellow Jews’, free from the everyday petty discrimination 
Jews occasionally suffered during their service.  
   Away from the trenches, the declaration of support for a Jewish homeland 
made by Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour in November 1917 was greeted with 
a mixture of relief and resentment within established Jewry. British motivations 
can be described as ambivalent at best: an idealised sentimentalism towards 
the Holy Land amongst many of the leading British protagonists. At worst, the 
Balfour Declaration was a cynical attempt to sway world Jewish opinion behind 
the Entente and to exert British control over a strategic region in the Middle 
East. the Balfour Declaration in isolation reveals the influence West End Jews 
had on the direction of Whitehall policy by the end of the war, but the issue of 
                                                          
575 Lloyd, Jews under Fire, p.234 
576 Letters and diary of Private Paul Epstein 1918-19, AJA MS 124. 
P a g e  | 165 
 
political Zionism dangerously polarised the Jewish establishment and for many 
West End Jews the cause of Jewish nationalism threatened to overshadow the 
British patriotism that defined their individual commitments to Britain’s war 
cause.  
   Chapter three will extend the issues raised in this chapter regarding the 
impact of Zionism on concepts of Jewish identity through an examination of the 
socio-political impact of the Jewish Battalions on London Jewry. The Jewish 
Battalions, like the Balfour Declaration, threatened to link established Jewry’s 
war effort with a Zionist project. However, the scheme would also appeal to 
many non-Zionist Jews, such as Lord Rothschild, through the potential of the 
project to solve the controversy that was threatening to engulf London Jewry as 
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CHAPTER THREE 






      
   By the summer of 1917 the controversy surrounding the non-enlistment of 
30,000 Russian Jews had become a major issue for both the established and 
immigrant Jewish communities of London. Having looked at how this issue 
impacted on both communities separately, it is the aim of this chapter to 
examine how the proposed solution to the conscription crisis - the 
establishment of the first Jewish-only battalions in the British Army - would 
intrinsically link the communal day-to-day politics of both East and West End 
Jewry. Chapters one and two have shown how both the established and 
immigrant Jewish communities of London to a large extent experienced 
separate narratives of the 1914-18 conflict. This chapter will build on the 
assessments made in the previous chapters of both ‘East End’ and ‘West End’ 
Jewry’s response to the war through an examination of both communities’ 
connection to the Jewish Battalion experiment. Whilst the Jewish Battalion 
scheme would highlight the divisions existing between established and 
immigrant Jewry in wartime London, it would also demonstrate how to a large 
extent the wartime fortunes of both were intrinsically linked. The Jewish 
Battalion saw East End Jewish privates serving under West End Jewish 
officers. The scheme was supported by Zionists from both communities, 
including such disparate groups as the Conjoint Foreign Committee and the 
Foreign Jews Protection Committee, albeit for vastly different motives. West 
and East End Jews were also linked through a mutual experience of British 
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hostility, both at a local and national level. Ultimately the Jewish Battalion 
existed only as a result of the unit’s usefulness as an instrument of British 
foreign policy, and as a convenient method to solve the Russian Jewish 
conscription crisis in 1917. How Britain dealt with Jewish soldiers in her armed 
forces during the First World War is a central theme of this thesis and will be 




   The deepening controversy over the Russian conscription crisis in the 
summer of 1917 resulted in two radical government attempts to solve the issue. 
The Anglo-Russian Military Convention of July 1917 tacitly presented Russian 
Jews of military age a stark choice between enlisting in the British Army, with 
the vague assurance of citizenship upon the cessation of hostilities, or 
deportation back to Russia to serve in the armed forces of the Provisional 
Government. Many Russian Jews eager to return to Russia to support the 
embryonic democracy had already left in the period since February. It has been 
estimated as few as 2,000 Russian men of military age departed Britain as part 
of the Convention in September 1917 out of the 30,000 Russian Jews of 
military age residing in Britain.577  
   The second Government initiative to solve the question of the Russian Jewish 
conscription crisis came in the sanctioning of a British Army unit comprising 
solely of Jewish soldiers. The units were heralded at the time as the first Jewish 
fighting force since the Maccabees 2,000 years previously, although Jewish 
units had been recruited in various conflicts between this period, whilst the 
Ottoman Empire had considered recruiting a Jewish unit in the early months of 
the war in 1914.578 Indeed, the British decision was motivated in part by the fear 
                                                          
577 For figures on the Conventionists see Lipman, A history of The Jews in Britain, p.146; 
also Kadish, Bolsheviks and British Jews, p.223 
578 This was incorrect. A Jewish unit had been recruited in Poland in 1794 to fight against 
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Battalion in 1915/1916. However the claim proved a powerful recruiting tool and was 
generally believed. 
P a g e  | 168 
 
Germany was about to recruit a Jewish unit of its own, and potentially 
monopolise world Jewish support to her cause. Named the 38th Battalion of the 
Royal Fusiliers but known colloquially as ‘The Judeans’, the unit officially came 
into existence in August 1917. This decision reversed three years of 
Government feet-dragging over the idea of a Jewish unit and must be looked at 
in parallel with the support given by Lloyd George’s cabinet later that autumn 
for the establishment of a future Jewish homeland in Palestine, as discussed 
already at the end of chapter two. As will be seen in this chapter, the British 
Government’s attitude to the Regiment went little beyond a sentimentalism for 
Judaism within the Protestant British tradition and a pragmatic grasp of the 
propaganda value of such a unit in winning over world Jewish opinion. Lloyd 
George’s war government contained several key members with sincere Zionist 
sympathies.579 The decision however, like the Balfour Declaration, conveniently 
solved a contentious wartime Jewish issue, specifically the Government’s 
dilemma of how to deal with the 30,000 Russian Jews residing in Britain who 
were not serving in either the British or Russian armed forces.580 The 
government perceived, or at least hoped, the prospect of fighting with their 
fellow co-religionists for the recovery of the Jewish homeland represented a 
more compelling fighting cause than for ‘King and Country’, a concept which for 
many non-naturalised Jews simply did not compute.  
   Whitehall also consistently failed to comprehend the impact within the British 
Jewish community of such an overt endorsement of Zionism. Politically, the 
Jewish Battalion split open the divisions within Anglo-Jewry already emerging 
from the war, further eroding the position of the Jewish elite to provide Jews in 
Britain with effective wartime leadership. Supporters such as Lord Rothschild 
argued that the Jewish Battalion was an opportunity for British Jews to gain 
collective glory and to serve without fear of experiencing antisemitism within the 
ranks.581 Opponents, including the Jewish journalist Lucien Wolf, countered that 
the whole scheme would be a disaster, tainting the contribution of Jewish 
                                                          
579 James Renton, The Zionist Masquerade: the Birth of the Anglo-Zionist Alliance 1914-
1918 (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2007) 
580 Cesarani, An Embattled Minority, p.66 
581 Mentor, JC, 16 September 1914 
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soldiers already serving in France and opening up Jews as a whole to the old 
accusations of special treatment and cowardice.582 
   The scheme was far from popular within the immigrant communities, where 
many saw it as another attempt to trick them out of their hard fought livelihoods 
based on the wartime boost to the tailoring trade.583 As this chapter will explore, 
there was violent opposition even within Zionist circles, particularly from the 
leading Zionist organisation in the East End Paole Zion, and the FJPC. The 
latter, formed to oppose forced recruitment of Jews in the East End, bitterly 
campaigned against the formation of any unit comprised of forcibly enlisted 
Russian Jews. Sharman Kadish was therefore largely correct in her assertion 
that the controversies and debates surrounding the establishment of the Jewish 
regiment cannot be interpreted in the classic ‘West End’ versus ‘East End’ 
narrative of London Jewish politics.584 In this sense, the Jewish Battalion 
blurred the differences between the two communities, with supporters and 
opponents of the scheme represented on both sides. However, in another 
sense, the Jewish Battalion brought both established and immigrant Jews in 
London into greater personal proximity to each other. This closer physical 
interaction often resulted in hostility and conflict, seen particularly in the ill-fated 
Anglo-Jewish recruitment drives of the East End to fill the Battalion’s ranks. 
However the unit also generated cooperation and improved communication 
between East and West End Jews. This can be seen in the mix of English 
Jewish officers and Russian Jewish privates within the battalion, despite the 
diametrically opposed routes taken to their eventual service in the Jewish units 
- the former as volunteers and the latter mostly reluctant conscripts. The 
successful realisation of the Jewish Battalion scheme ultimately rested on the 
collaboration of Zionists from both divides of the London Jewish spectrum.  
   An important element of the Jewish Battalion story that must be taken into 
consideration is the element of chance and uncertainty involved in its creation. 
As will be seen the Battalion faced many obstacles in its development and 
benefited from fortuitous circumstances without which it would never have got 
                                                          
582 Leo Wolf letter to Herbert Montgomery, 22 May 1916. PRO FO 371 2835/98116 
583 Eugene C. Black, Social Politics of Anglo-Jewry, p.374 
584 Sharmin Kadish, Bolsheviks and British Jews: The Anglo-Jewish Community, Britain and 
the Russian Revolution (Frank Cass, London 1992) p.223 
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off the ground. Therefore an examination of long term trends within intra-
communal Jewish and Jewish/non-Jewish relations to explain its existence are 
of limited value. The Jewish Battalion idea faced major opposition from all sides 
of the Jewish community and its passage into reality was not to be achieved by 
forging consensus on the issue amongst the opposing forces, rather than by the 
peculiar circumstances of 1917. The formation of David Lloyd George’s pro-
Zionist War cabinet; the Russian Revolution; American entry into the war on the 
side of the Entente; the crumbling position of the Turkish forces in Palestine; 
and, most pressingly, the culmination of the controversy created by the non-
enlistment of the immigrant Jewish population. 
        
   In total there were three main ‘Jewish’ battalions in the Fusiliers, the 38th 
consisting of mostly British based recruits, the 39th almost exclusively recruited 
in North America, and the 40th battalion recruited amongst the Jewish 
population of Palestine.585 The Jewish Battalions have been identified as an 
important catalyst for Jewish nationalism, particularly amongst the American 
and Canadian volunteers who joined the 39th Battalion of the Royal Fusiliers in 
1918. Whilst the East London Jewish recruits lacked the collective zeal for 
Zionism of their fellow North American combatants, the cause of Jewish 
nationalism was an important motivation for some London recruits and direct 
consequence for others of their service in the unit. Although the fact that only 
about 2,000 immigrant Jews enlisted in the various Jewish Battalions casts 
doubt on the power of Jewish patriotism to stimulate a displaced ethnic group to 
fight voluntarily, the significance of the Jewish Battalion cannot solely be 
attested by the number of its combatants.586 For Vladimir Jabotinsky, the 
Russian Jew who most energetically campaigned for the creation of a Jewish 
Battalion, the symbolic power of the Battalion took precedence over its 
                                                          
585 For an account of the American and Canadian volunteers in the 39th Battalion see 
Michael Keren & Shlomit Keren, We are Coming, Unafraid: The Jewish Legions and the 
Promised Land in the First World War (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Plymouth 2010) (for 
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586 Figures from Michael Adler, The Jews of the Empire and the Great War (Hodder and 
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substance.587 This is revealed in the unit’s ability to inspire a Jewish nationalism 
in the likes of the Whitechapel-born poet Isaac Rosenberg and Westminster 
educated Anglo-Jewish Officer William Myer, neither of whom expressed a 
previous affiliation or interest in Zionism.588 The enthusiastic response the 
Battalion received on its march through Whitechapel in February 1918 
demonstrates that popular support for its existence should not be judged only 
through active service.589      
   Ultimately, the Jewish Battalion was instrumental in transforming Jewish 
politics in the capital during and after the conflict. An all-Jewish regiment was at 
odds with the discreet policy of integration the Anglo-Jewish leadership had 
followed since emancipation in 1858, and also threatened to define Anglo-
Jewry’s response to the war, distracting attention from the above average 
enlistment of English Jews since August 1914.590 The Jewish Battalion reveals 
how far the attitudes towards the war of the immigrant and integrated groups 
had diverged by the later stages of the conflict. The brain child of a Russian 
Jewish journalist working within a burgeoning East London Zionist network and 
its ranks filled by immigrant Jews − the majority not as volunteers but as 
reluctant conscripts − the Jewish Battalion was the antithesis of the proud 
assertion made by the Jewish Chronicle at the beginning of the war: ‘We Jews 
are serving in the King’s Forces at this time of strife and strain for the Empire 
shoulder to shoulder with our British fellow-citizens without distinction of race or 
creed’.591 This chapter will examine how the Jewish Battalion experiment further 
accelerated the development of two distinct communities rather than one united 
and under the leadership of Anglo-Jewry.  
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   Considering the contemporary impact of the Jewish Battalion on the 
communal politics of Anglo-Jewry and its symbolic importance within the Zionist 
tradition as an early forerunner of the modern Israeli Army, the historiography of 
the topic is surprisingly sparse. There are only five major histories of the Jewish 
Battalion since 1922, of which three were written by former soldiers. The Irish 
Protestant commander of the 38th Battalion, John Henry Patterson, published 
his account in 1922, With the Judeans in the Palestine Campaign.592 His career 
in the British Army suffered from his involvement with and subsequent 
unyielding support for the Jewish Battalion scheme, and his account is prone to 
hyperbolic rhetoric concerning the military achievements of the unit. However 
his account of the meetings between supporters and opponents of the project in 
the summer of 1917 are highly revealing of the extent to which the Jewish 
Battalion was a critically divisive issue within Anglo-Jewish communal 
politics.593 Vladimir Jabotinsky’s The Story of the Jewish Legion − published 
posthumously in 1945 − displays the uncompromising attitude of the unit’s 
leading supporter regarding the ultimate importance of the scheme, and how 
desperately wrong anyone who dared disagree with him was. Despite the 
partisan nature of the work, Jabotinsky’s accounts of his recruitment drives 
within the East End are illuminating in the attitude of Jewish youth towards not 
only the Jewish Battalion but their apathy for both Jewish and British society 
generally.594 Summarising the attitudes of Jewish East Enders in the autumn of 
1915, Jabotinsky reflected ‘The East End neither loves nor hates: the East End 
has no attitude at all either to countries or to classes’.595 This chapter will 
assess the validity of this statement, questioning why so few Russian Jews 
enlisted for war service, and the extent to which service in the Jewish Battalion 
transformed the self-imposed exclusion from British and Jewish society of the 
East End recruits that served in it.  
   Former recruit Elias Gilner’s 1966 War and Hope: a History of the Jewish 
Legion596 builds on Paterson and Jabotinsky’s contributions but it wouldn’t be 
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until Martin Watts’ comprehensive 2004 history, The Jewish Legion and the 
First World War597, that the first non-partisan history of the unit was published. 
Watts’ account places the Jewish soldiers’ experience in the broader context of 
military recruitment policy, Zionist politics, and Anglo-Jewry as a whole, and is a 
good addition to the study of minorities in war-time. In his assessment of the 
social impact of the battalions on the East End, Martin Watts drew from the 
testimonials written by Jewish Battalion veterans held at the Jewish Legion 
Museum in Avichail, Israel. Watts broadly concludes from these testimonials 
that Zionism was neither a strong motivating factor for joining the unit amongst 
East London recruits, nor did service in the battalions encourage any particular 
interest in Jewish nationalism.598 In researching the history of the Jewish 
Battalion for the purposes of this thesis, I have visited and assessed in detail 
the testimonial records at Avichail, and the experiences and motivations of 
these recruits will be examined here in section five: ‘The Jewish Battalions in 
Action: War Experience and Jewish masculinity’. This section will question 
Watts’ assertion of the limited role Zionism played in the connection to the 
Jewish Battalion of the East End recruits. The testimonials reveal a complex 
picture: whilst coercion played a dominant role in the enlistment of most East 
London Jews, a high number of the soldiers of that unit expressed a later 
interest in and involvement with Zionism which can be directly linked to their 
experiences serving in the Jewish Battalions in Palestine. These experiences of 
active service detailed in the testimonials at Avichail will also be more broadly 
compared to those of English Jewish soldiers assessed in chapter two. 
Integrated and immigrant Jewish soldiers fighting in the British Army may have 
had contrasting routes to the front line, but their experiences of ethnic prejudice 
and religious discomfiture during military service are broadly analogous, and 
can be compared directly to the experiences of other colonial troops fighting for 
the British Empire during the conflict.599   
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   The most recent major study on the Jewish Battalions is Shlomit and Michael 
Keren’s 2010 study We are Coming, Unafraid: The Jewish Legions and the 
Promised Land. 600 Whilst focusing primarily on the American and Canadian 
Jews who served in the 39th battalion, the authors conclude that for many Jews 
serving in all three Battalions during the war, the act of serving in the British 
Army and the first-hand experience of antisemitism strengthened the recruits’ 
identity as Jews.601  
   As with the Anglo-Jewish experience of the First World War in general, the 
Jewish Battalions that served in the British Army are usually mentioned only in 
passing, if at all, in most histories of the community in the 20th Century. 
Geoffrey Alderman in his substantial 1992 history Modern British Jewry refers 
briefly to the Jewish Regiment in a footnote, describing Jewish integrationists’ 
opposition to the Regiment in line with the larger failure of the Board of 
Deputies and other Anglo-Jewish institutions of providing wartime support for 
the immigrant community: ‘preservation of image was to override that of 
religious or ethnic solidarity’. 602 Sharman Kadish alludes rather more to the 
Battalion in her work of the same year Bolsheviks and British Jews: The Anglo-
Jewish Community, Britain and the Russian Revolution, discussing the 
divergent reactions across the Jewish community to the unit and how ‘the 
generally accepted pattern of communal politics broke down’ over it.603  Kadish 
reveals the critical impact of the Russian Revolution in enticing many of the 
most vociferous and radical East End opponents of Jabotinsky back to Russia 
in the spring and summer of 1917, greatly reducing organised resistance within 
the immigrant communities to the Jewish Regiment scheme.604 Todd Endelman 
makes no mention of the Jewish Regiment in his major works encompassing 
the First World War605 and David Cesarani in his 1982 article Embattled 
Minority: The Jews in Britain during the First World War only briefly considers 
the issue despite its contemporary impact on Jewish politics and social 
relations. Cesarani concludes that ‘The unit did little to alter popular perceptions 
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of the Jews’, viewing the legacy of the Battalion as part of one narrative 
regarding the primacy of virulent British antisemitism during the War to the long 
standing detriment of the Jewish community.606  
   The limited military contribution to the fabric of the First World War and its 
marginalisation from community politics after its disbandment perhaps explains 
the often cursory treatment of the Jewish Regiment story within the larger 
narrative of the Jewish communities of Britain in the First World War. This 
chapter seeks to show that the Battalion did indeed have a lasting impact on 
social and political relations within the Jewish community that continued to be 
felt long after its official disbandment in 1922, not least by the men who served 
in it. The Jewish Battalion experience reveals the complexity of the Jewish 
reaction and involvement in the conflict. The official Jewish Book of Honour, 
written by Reverend Michael Adler in 1922 as a testament to the war record of 
Jews in Britain, praises ‘the Judeans’ as dutiful British citizens patriotically 
upholding the values of Anglo-Jewry.607 In contrast the founder of the Battalion 
Vladimir Jabotinsky saw in it the emergence of a specifically Jewish national 
identity committed to legitimizing the Zionist claim in Palestine.608 The 
controversy surrounding the Jewish Battalion scheme ultimately centred on the 
issue of identity: whether Anglo-Jewry was going to fight the war as Englishmen 
and women or as Jews, and how the British press and public perceived a split 
identity in the context of Jewish only units. The clash between opponents of the 
Battalion who saw it accentuating unwanted Jewish ‘differentness’ and its 
supporters who saw its true purpose as a tool of Jewish nationalism, was to 
decisively polarise the Jewish establishment and leave it unable to provide the 
effective leadership the Jewish community needed to weather the storm of war. 
    This chapter will also examine in greater detail the Russian Jewish 
experience of military service in the British Army. The attitudes towards and 
experience of life in the British Army for Russian Jews will be assessed and set 
against those of West End Jewish soldiers discussed in chapter two. These 
Russian Jewish perspectives on soldiering will also be compared more broadly 
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to the motivations for enlistment of English soldiers from the East End. It will be 
shown that Russian Jews held a distinctly more ambivalent attitude towards 
military service than West End Jewish soldiers and English soldiers more 
generally. This was based on an ingrained hatred of militarism associated with 
military service under the Tsars and an indifference derived from belonging to a 
transitional community on the periphery of British society. However this chapter 
will also show that some Russian Jews did enlist before the enforcement of the 
Anglo-Russian Military Convention, and for those that did serve in the Jewish 
Battalions, many returned home with a new British patriotism created by their 
part in Britain’s victory. Indeed, the first section of this chapter will discuss how 
the British Government potentially missed an opportunity of engaging and 
enlisting a spontaneous popular enthusiasm for Britain’s war cause amongst 
Russian Jewish males in the late summer and autumn of 1914.  
 
 The ‘Jewish Regiment’ of 1914 
     A few short weeks after Britain’s declaration of war on Germany, The Jewish 
Chronicle summarised a letter from one of its readers, a certain Mr. F. Simpson, 
who suggested ‘The formation of an essentially Jewish corps, as a Jewish 
expression of loyalty and appreciation of England.’ He went on to add that ‘a 
number of his acquaintances are willing to join such a corps and look to the 
lead of the more important members of the metropolitan community.’609 This 
was typical of the early sentiment surrounding the idea of a Jewish unit: that 
such a unit would demonstrate unconditionally the community’s British 
patriotism; that there was popular support for the idea; and that its success 
depended on the enthusiasm and leadership of the Anglo-Jewish elite. This 
focus on an expression of loyalty and commitment to Britain was not however 
universally accepted amongst the demographic intended to fill its ranks: 
Russian Jewish males. As has previously been discussed in chapter one, many 
of the immigrant Jews residing in London and other urban centres felt little 
affiliation with Britain or sense of Britishness. They were in the most part, as 
Paul Ward has stated, ‘refugees looking for temporary asylum, not… 
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immigrants seeking to establish new lives’.610 Many regarded London as a stop-
off on route to America, taking work to pay for the second part of their journey 
and ‘spoke little or no English, dressed visibly differently from other people in 
Britain, and sought to ease the trauma of their migration through living in areas 
already inhabited by previous Jewish migrants’.611 In addition, they harboured a 
deep hatred of militarism and the Tsarist state they had fled persecution from 
and to whom Britain was now allied to.  
     All of this did not necessarily bar the community from embracing and being 
swept up in patriotic enthusiasm for a British military cause, as can be seen in 
the revelry described by the Jewish Chronicle in Brick Lane at the relief of 
Mafeking in May 1900: ‘The greatest display of flags were in the [Brick] “Lane”. 
Every stall, every barrow had its flag. One could get ‘Mafeking fish’, ‘Mafeking 
oranges’ and ‘Mafeking lemons’, cakes l’kovod Mafeking and what not. 
Everything was being sold in honour of Mafeking and, every minute or so, one 
could hear patriotic airs being sung and played; the Yiddish bands….being 
greatly in demand, and reaping a ‘coppery’ harvest for their selection of patriotic 
music. All were happy. The sentence ‘Mafeking is relieved’ was like an 
abracadabra, opening the way to joy, levelling rich and poor, ending the terrible 
anxiety. ‘Mafeking relieved. Mazzeltov, Mazzeltov.’612  
    The Jewish population of East London displayed an enthusiastic support for 
Britain’s imperial position in similar fashion to the Gentile population and equal 
to -if not in excess of - the response of established British Jewry.613 Given the 
prevailing evidence of little or no particular attachment to national life in the 
context of day-to-day existence, the Mafeking celebrations demonstrate the 
paradox and ambiguity involved in defining how transitional communities react 
to national events and spontaneous demonstrations of patriotism. Such 
‘patriotic’ displays must be interpreted cautiously. An element of self-interest no 
doubt lay behind the celebrations, seen most notably in the commercialisation 
of the event through the selling of ‘Mafeking’ products, although this was a 
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widely typical response across the stall markets of Britain and the Empire in 
1900.614 There are clear parallels with the Mafeking celebrations in Brick Lane 
to other Imperial events in which popular enthusiasm was mobilised in the 
interests of patriotism and pageantry, most notably the Jubilees for Queen 
Victoria in 1887 and 1897, and of course the ‘Bank Holiday spirit’ of the first few 
days of the Great War.615  
   It could be drawn from this that native and immigrant communities alike 
engage in apparent patriotic revelry that is hard to separate from genuine 
national enthusiasm and an expression of local or communal patriotism, as well 
as the more obvious excuse for a celebration.616 This is important in a 
discussion of the response to the outbreak of war within the Jewish East End, 
where there was evidence of relatively strong support for Britain’s cause during 
the first months of the war, and in particular amongst young Jewish men 
working in the tailoring and textile industries greatly affected by the dislocation 
of international trade brought by the war. The social and economic implications 
of this trade slump have already been examined in chapter one. However, 
unemployment within the East End during the early months of the war had 
important ramifications for how Russian Jews perceived the prospect of military 
service. As has been seen with Nicholas Mansfield’s research into the 
motivations of English farmworkers for enlisting during the war, boredom and 
lack of prospects created by unemployment were powerful motivating factors 
for young men to enlist in the army.617  
   In early autumn 1914 an energetic Jewish army captain active in enlistment 
campaigns, Captain Webber, attempted to mobilise the interest of East 
London’s Russian Jews by campaigning to recruit 2,000 of them for service in a 
Jewish unit.618 At a crowded gathering at the Pavilion Theatre in Whitechapel at 
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the end of August, Webber addressed his audience by playing on their sense of 
obligation to the country that had sheltered them from persecution, specifically 
for some in the audience in the aftermath of the Tsarist pogroms in Bialystok, 
Kishinev and Odessa between 1903-1908.619 Webber argued that the most 
effective way to demonstrate this gratitude and disarm any accusations of Jews 
‘shirking’ their duty was to enlist in a British Army battalion specifically made up 
of their fellow co-religionists, a shining symbol of the immigrant Jewish 
community’s commitment to Britain’s cause.620 The Jewish Chronicle proudly 
noted that hundreds of Jews could be found crowding outside the recruitment 
depot in Whitechapel, ‘More English than the English in their expression of 
loyalty and desire for service’.621 
   Webber’s campaign sought to emphasise the ‘Jewishness’ of the proposed 
brigade, and printed recruitment posters in Yiddish in favourable publications.622 
John Rodker, a member of the eclectic mix of Jewish writers and artists known 
as the ‘Whitechapel Boys’623, relates an experience typical of the early success 
of this appeal: ‘A Foreign Legion was being enlisted and I liked the name which 
somehow kept it distinct from the British Army (it seemed exactly right for the 
foreigner I was) and I put my name down for it in a back room in Soho 
somewhere, surprised to see it all so very casual’.624 Webber’s initiative had 
support from within the Jewish establishment in the form of the editor of the 
Jewish Chronicle, Leo Greenberg.625 As has been seen in chapter two, 
Greenberg was a leading English Zionist and was an early proponent of the 
Jewish Battalion, extolling the virtues of a Jewish unit through his weekly 
column in the Jewish Chronicle and printing unofficial recruitment posters for 
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the Battalion as well as advertising the times and places of Webber’s 
meetings.626 
   For all his energy and organisation, Captain Webber’s attempts to enlist 2,000 
Russian Jews into a Jewish unit were doomed when the War Office curtly 
pointed out at the beginning of September that the men could not enlist in the 
British Army as they were not naturalised citizens.627 Indeed, already previous 
to this many Russian Jews eager to enlist in the British Army had been refused 
on the grounds of their nationality. The Jewish Chronicle reported on 28 August 
1914 that many Russian Jews were being turned away from a recruitment 
station in Tower Hill: ‘A large proportion of the Jewish population of this country 
are of foreign birth, and as such, are not eligible for enlistment. The recruiting 
sergeant at Tower Hill mentioned in fact, that an ‘enormous lot’, of foreign born 
Jews had come forward but had to be refused on that account’.628 The 
recruiting sergeant added: ‘I had a Russian in this morning…and when I 
rejected him, he said “why can’t you take me? The English troops are going to 
fight alongside the Russians”’.629  
   The Government’s recruitment infrastructure headed by Lord Kitchener was 
ill-prepared for the volume of recruits coming in nationally at the beginning of 
September, and lingering questions over the state of Jewish manhood and the 
reliability of the men’s allegiance to Britain, discussed previously in chapter one, 
were enough to turn the Government off recruiting foreign Jews at this stage.630 
The great confusion that surrounded the issue of Russian Jews’ eligibility for 
service led to disillusionment for many eager recruits turned away, including 
John Rodker: ‘But Kitchener did not want a Foreign Legion, so I was given a 
letter to the Fusiliers and they were full, and I didn’t seem what they wanted, 
they had the pick in those days, and I was ashamed to have been turned down, 
or else I wanted the Foreign Legion and nothing else would do, and anyhow the 
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fortnight or so of waiting had given me time to think, and I knew about war, and 
how inconclusive it had always been.’631 
   In the later stages of the war and particularly after the introduction of 
conscription in 1916 failed to provide the British Government with the required 
number of recruits to meet its commitments in all theatres, legislation barring 
Russian Jews from service in the British Armed Forces would be relaxed. 
However this untapped early enthusiasm to enlist amongst a sizeable number 
of East London Jews would haunt the subsequent recruitment drives of those 
who were to take up Webber’s efforts to enlist Russian Jews into an all-Jewish 
unit. Supporters of the Jewish regiment idea such as Greenberg continued to 
devote their efforts towards eliciting a Government endorsement for eligible 
Jews serving together, but were caught off guard by a committed and 
vociferous backlash against the scheme from within established Jewry. The 
Reverend Michael Adler attacked in an open letter to the War Office the 
proposed regiment as ‘Totally irresponsible’ and having ‘Received no 
countenance whatever from any influential member of the Jewish community. 
The matter has been carefully considered both by the military and civilian 
representatives of our community, and they are practically unanimous in 
deciding that no such Battalion is desirable or necessary’.632 
   Numbering among those Adler would have consulted were Edmund Sebag-
Montefiore (the War Office liaison officer with the Jewish community) and 
Denzil Myers (London Jewry’s chief recruiting agent), and therefore his views 
were guaranteed weight within the War Office.633 The Jewish Regiment 
proposal split established Jewry, revealing the community no longer spoke as a 
cohesive and centralised body on Jewish issues as it had in the Victorian era. 
The issue further demonstrated the extent to which political Zionism had 
infiltrated the upper echelons of established Jewry since the early initiatives of 
Chovevei Zion in the 1890s, discussed in chapter two.634 For opponents of the 
scheme, to serve separately from their fellow Englishmen in an exclusively 
Jewish Battalion would increase the visibility and difference of the community, 
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open up accusations of special treatment, and effectively put the visible sum of 
Jewish war effort into one basket.635 
   Predictably, Greenberg was furious with Adler’s ‘meddling’, particularly his 
temerity in speaking for the community as a whole, and stepped up his own 
campaign for a Jewish Battalion, arguing it was more necessary than ever 
following a spate of antisemitic cases at recruitment centres, most notably in 
Hackney in October.636 The Hackney incident has already been touched on in 
chapter two in a discussion of the prevalence of antisemitism in the British 
Army, but it is worth returning briefly to the thoughts of the recruiting officer at 
Hackney in the aftermath of the violence: ‘Since then however, a good many 
thoroughly patriotic Jews were so anxious to enlist that, without any declaration 
of religion, they were recruited. When their religion became known, they were 
allowed to remain because they were  numerous enough to protect 
themselves… what we intend to do is to form them into a special platoon of 
their own’.637 It is interesting to note here that the local military authorities were 
quick to propose the suggestion of the segregation of Jewish troops, primarily 
for their own protection. For Greenberg, the battalion would be a unit of Jewish 
strength and a tool to combat antisemitism within the British Army, and, almost 
as importantly, would demonstrate Jewish martial abilities in a collective and 
visible way. As a letter addressed to Greenberg and printed in the Jewish 
Chronicle in November 1914 put it ‘Personally, I believe the greatest 
opportunity occurs since the diaspora, of proving Jewish patriotism and at the 
same time the virility of the race’.638 The contending parties eventually met face 
to face at a London hotel on 6 December 1914. The pro-Battalion party led by 
Greenberg and joined by Dr David Eder and Joseph Cowen, both noted Jewish 
nationalists, and the anti-Battalion group drawn mainly from the Jewish elite.639 
The resulting deadlock convinced the War Office - who had been looking for 
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strong Jewish leadership to take on the project of making the proposal a reality 
- that Anglo-Jewish leadership was disunited and that a Jewish battalion was 
for now an unworkable project.640 
   The cheers, toasts and impressive renditions of the national anthem that 
followed Captain Webber’s speeches at his meetings in the weeks after the 
declaration of war would appear to demonstrate a tangible, if short-lived, wave 
of patriotism and identification with Britain’s cause amongst the East End 
Russian Jewish population.641 It is probable that this was no more than an 
ephemeral display of enthusiasm that did not outlast the onset of winter and 
was in line with the passing of the national ‘war fever’.642 The Russian Jewish 
population was never again as positive in fighting for Britain and specifically on 
the prospect of fighting in a Jewish Regiment as it was in the first six weeks of 
the war. As we saw in chapter one, the profits associated with the ‘Khaki Boom’ 
deterred many Russian Jews from enlisting voluntarily after the initial economic 
slump of the early weeks of the war. In retrospect this period offered an 
opportunity for the Government and Anglo-Jewish leadership to solve the 
problem of Russian recruitment at the very beginning of the war. For the 
Russian Jews whose attempts to enlist were ultimately disappointed by the 
British Army’s stringent naturalisation requirements, it was further confirmation 
of their position outside of British society, and helped to entrench the wider 
perception within the Jewish East End that this was not their war to fight.        
 
   At this juncture it would be useful to discuss the frequency of and motivations 
for volunteerism in East London amongst the non-Jewish population, in order to 
place the attempts by Russian Jews to volunteer into a local context. Voluntary 
enlistment figures, in East London as in the rest of the country, remains a 
strong barometer for which to judge popular enthusiasm for the war. The 
Eastern Post and City Chronicle reported on 8 August the swiftness with which 
East End reservists had re-joined their units, noting also that ‘large numbers of 
men and youths have offered their services to the military authorities, but 
                                                          
640 Ibid. 
641 JC, 28 August 1914 
642 Gregory, The Last Great War, p.9 
P a g e  | 184 
 
unfortunately in most cases their lack of training has been against them’.643 In 
the last week of July the local newspapers and journals had been consumed 
predominantly with preparations for the forthcoming bank holiday, as already 
discussed in the beginning of chapter one. With the declaration of war, 
domestic concerns were now pushed aside to prioritise war related interest. 
The East End newspapers in particular focused on the just nature of Britain’s 
cause and the activities of the local Battalions, extolling the new recruits and 
urging more to step forward.644 One particular Battalion which drew significant 
numbers of men to its ranks, whilst also capturing the imagination of the local 
population, was the 17th Stepney and Poplar Battalion. The East End News and 
London Shipping Chronicle reported on 7 August that ‘the number of recruits 
presenting themselves at headquarters [Stepney Battalion] has been very 
large’.645 The paper returned to the topic again on 11 August, glowingly referring 
to the large numbers of men presenting themselves to the recruitment office in 
Stepney, the correspondent relating that ‘one man, I hear, was so anxious to 
join that he rang the housekeeper up at twelve o’clock midnight. The staff are 
kept very busy during the day’.646  
   It is hard to accurately extrapolate the recruitment figures for East London, 
but it would appear that the area, and London as a whole, compared favourably 
to the rest of the country.647 298,923 men enlisted into the regular army or the 
territorial force in Britain during the month of August 1914.648 55% of the male 
population of London of military age enlisted, comparing favourably to Britain as 
a whole (53%) and to the belligerent capital of Berlin (59%) whose nation did 
not rely on an ad-hoc voluntary recruitment basis for armed service but on a 
well cultivated and permanent conscription system.649 For London, no doubt 
assisted by the nine new divisional recruitment offices opened across the city, 
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recruitment averaged 1205 men per day.650 It is clear that London benefitted 
from a better defined, broader and officially sanctioned recruiting system than 
other areas, particularly rural, resulting in greater enlistment figures. Hew 
Strachan suggests it was the difference in approach to recruitment in London, 
compared to for instance Sussex, that led to disparity: ‘The methods of 
recruiting employed in rural areas were traditional and paternalist, relying on a 
sense of deference and obligation rather than on regional links and bonds of 
friendship’.651 
   It is important to factor in the time of year in such urban-countryside 
comparisons. For many farmers and landowners, getting in the harvest was a 
priority in the late summer and early autumn of 1914, resulting in a reluctance 
to allow or encourage farm labourers to enlist in the freer manner of workers in 
the cities, and the work the harvest provided was an incentive for the farm 
hands to resist enlisting until it had been brought in.652 As a comparison, this 
would later be mirrored by the reluctance of Russian Jewish tailors to enlist at 
the expense of the profits to be made during the ‘Khaki Boom’. However, as 
discussed in the context of wartime unemployment in the docklands industry in 
chapter one, for English workers in East London work prospects were less of a 
restriction to enlistment. Julia Bush identifies the local economy as a factor 
behind the recruitment drive: ‘In an area like East London, war caused almost 
immediate economic distress. This fact, combined with the poverty before the 
war, undoubtedly assisted recruiting. The same newspaper which reported the 
rush to enlist also reported that food prices were rising steeply’.653 
   It must be remembered that although London compared well to the 
countryside and Britain as a whole for enlistment, it was on a par with some 
urban areas and performed less well than places such as Edinburgh.654 It also 
of interest to note that 260,672 men had volunteered to join up for military 
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service in Germany by 11 August 1914, an impressive testament to German 
patriotism considering the conscription programme already in place.655 The 
recruitment activity in East London, however, and in particular the activity of the 
Stepney and 17th Poplar Battalion, aroused great popular interest within the 
local populous and acted as a focal point for East End attitudes towards the 
war. The tangible form of the soldier an acceptable image between which the 
fevered agitation, anxiety, wild jingoism and ardent anti-war sentiment from 
varied interests of the opening days of the war could patriotically compromise.  
   The East London Observer noted the effects of the Battalion’s route marches 
through the district: ‘Their appearance on these occasions had made a great 
impression on the people in the neighbourhood. Native patriotism has been 
thrilled by the example of these men who have offered themselves to the 
service of their King and Country’.656 Such public drills, albeit necessary scratch 
exercises for the troops, instilled confidence in the local population whilst 
encouraging by example non-enlisted men in the area to join up. They also 
proved particularly uplifting and inspiring to East End children attempting to 
comprehend the sudden loss to the services of elder brothers and fathers. One 
resident of the East End, Marsland Gander who was twelve upon the outbreak 
of the war, recalled later the effect upon his school class of a drill march in full 
uniform by the West Ham Battalion of the Essex Regiment past his school: 
‘Forty boys left their desks in a wild scramble for the windows. The form-master, 
a Mr. Dadlers, smiled indulgently and tugged at his moustache. We glowed with 
pride and quivered with excitement’.657 
   The imitation of their new soldier ‘heroes’ by local children reveals a deep 
inclination or fixation with militarism in Edwardian youth instilled by programmes 
such as Baden Powell’s boy scouts movement and the creation of Boy’s 
Battalions, as already examined in chapter two. The influence of this sentiment 
and the presence of soldiers in the streets in August 1914 was strong enough 
to captivate even new arrivals to Britain. Maurice Levinson born in the Russian 
province of Bessarabia and whose family fled the Tsarist pogroms for East 
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London only in 1914, recalled as a child: ‘Playing in an East London street with 
my two brothers. We were walking in single file with a mob of other children, 
and yelling ourselves hoarse with childish investives against the German 
Imperial Army’.658 This imitation or hero worship of the common soldier 
represents a strong break with the traditional image and reaction to the 
profession of soldiery in recent British culture, as has already been related in 
chapter two. 
   High enlistment figures however are not necessarily the most reliable source 
for detailing a locality’s patriotism, for while they do reveal a physical 
commitment to the national cause, they unfortunately do not list the motives 
upon which the enlisted men have made that commitment. The lack of 
widespread diary and written record keeping amongst the Edwardian working 
class has given us very few of these motives, and those that do exist must be 
carefully scrutinised for the influence of post war attitudes towards the horrors 
and ‘futility’ of the war to end all wars.659 Albert Conn’s account of why he 
enlisted is strikingly simple and consistent with the attitude of many young men 
presented with unprecedented times. Conn, from Barking Road Green Gate 
and under age in 1914, did not hesitate to enlist: ‘Joined up myself I did. I went 
up to the depot of the Poplar and Stepney Rifles, the old 17th CO of London 
Mob... I don’t know what made me do such a thing. I wasn’t brave, nothing like 
that. It’s just that I wanted a bit of excitement’.660  
   This kind of sentiment - of excitement and the thrill of adventure over 
patriotism and defence of king and country - was typical of young men from an 
area experiencing economic dislocation. However as Nicholas Mansfield has 
pointed out, this was true in rural regions too.661 In this regards the yearning for 
excitement and adventure as a motivator for enlistment matches the sentiments 
of many West End Jews employed in sedentary and monotonous professions 
for whom enlistment represented a chance of escapism as much as the 
opportunity to display patriotic loyalty to Britain. The number of those who 
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enlisted under age is significant, such as Jack Jones of Brick Lane who was 
ejected from the forces for being underage only to re-enlist in 1917, and William 
Cotton who managed to enlist in 1914 at only fifteen by lying about his age, 
again hints at a prevalent militarism within early 20th Century British society.662 
The lack of employment prospects in an already impoverished East End 
economy struggling to adjust to the new conditions of wartime was a powerful 
pull factor into the forces for many men, as was the danger of having too much 
time on their hands, as Shadwell local Joe Bloomberg’s father found out: ‘My 
own father and his friend who lived in the house next door joined up. I believe 
they were both drunk at the time because they both joined the Royal Scots 
Fusiliers!’663  
   Many did also fight for patriotic motives. The aforementioned William Cotton, 
born in Westminster but a resident of Lime house East London in 1914 and 
aged only fifteen, relates how a patriotic sermon from a local blacksmith on the 
heroics of the Boer war, including the bellicose statement ‘when Kitchener gets 
hold of this Kaiser he’ll make him wish he had never been born’, convinced him 
and his friends to decide at once to join the forces.664 Nevertheless, the 
widespread exhortations spilling from the local press that the large numbers of 
volunteers represented a great display of patriotic intent must be treated with 
caution, and set against a growing suspicion in some quarters of the press that 
the recruitment figures for East London were in fact not sufficient. The East 
London Observer sceptically stated: ‘in view of the nation’s need of men, it 
would be interesting to know how many really able-bodied young men remain in 
the work houses and infirmaries of the country. You can see a great deal of 
fraud in this respect as your train passes through East London’.665 In fact, this 
perhaps represents an early example of the East London Observer’s suspicion 
of the wartime conduct of the immigrant Jewish community rather than any 
slight on the patriotism of the East End in general.   
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   Overall, English East Enders were motivated to volunteer by broadly similar 
factors as their Russian Jewish neighbours were in the autumn of 1914, and the 
impetus to enlist of both groups are largely analogous with those of West End 
Jews described in chapter two. Men chose to fight for a variety of reasons - for 
love of country to love of adventure - but perhaps a greater pull, particularly in 
regions such as East London boasting strong community ties, was the local 
factor drawing men to the colours.666 As Winter relates ‘some men fought for 
nation and empire, for King and Country, others fought for their part of London 
in a way they never fought for England; and when they saluted England in song 
and verse, their ‘England’ was envisioned as a very local and particular place, 
bounded in many cases by the streets they knew, and the daily lives they 
led’.667 An important attraction of the Jewish Battalion scheme in 1914 for 
Russian Jews was the prospect of enlisting with their friends and neighbours to 
participate in a momentous collective endeavour. Indeed, the Jewish Chronicle 
emphasised this sentiment in its support for the concept of a Jewish Battalion, 
which it argued ‘represents only the same sentiment that induces men to enlist 
in a “Pals’ Brigade”. Surely it is not too much to ask that Jews, too, should 
sometimes line up together as – “Pals”’.668 
 
 First Experiments: the Zion Mule Corps 
    
   It will now be explored how the Jewish Battalion idea moved on from its 
unsuccessful beginnings in 1914 to the creation of the first all Jewish unit in the 
British Army, the Zion Mules Corps. This will necessarily move the focus briefly 
away from London to the recruiting centre of Alexandria and the fighting 
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grounds of Gallipoli. However the formation of the Zion Mules Corps was to 
prove of great importance to London Jewry. It would prove that the formation of 
a Jewish unit in the British Army consisting of Jewish immigrants with no 
particular fondness for Britain’s war cause could pass from rhetoric to reality. 
The feasibility and success of the unit would inspire more substantial attempts 
by Zionist leaders in London to recruit immigrant Jews into a Jewish Battalion, 
and would go a long way to convincing the British government later in the war 
that the concept of a Jewish battalion had legs. The existence of the Zion Mules 
Corps would however, harden the attitudes of opponents of the Jewish 
Battalion scheme as the possibility of its future implementation appeared less 
fanciful and more threatening. Most importantly perhaps, a discussion of the 
motivations for enlistment and the experience of active service for recruits in the 
Zion Mule Corps will illuminate later discussions on the recruits of the Jewish 
Battalions of 1917/1918.   
    
   The concept of a Jewish Battalion may have been defeated in 1914 by 
internal resentment of the idea from within established Jewry, but it also failed 
through a lack of belief in the project on the behalf of the government, and 
doubt amongst its supporters as to whether its ultimate aim was a British or 
Jewish ideal. No such deficiency in belief or confusion of aim clouded the 
judgement of the ardent Zionist Vladimir Jabotinsky, a Russian Jewish journalist 
whose energy and political machinations led directly to the endorsement of the 
Jewish Battalion scheme by the British Government in 1917. For Jabotinsky a 
Jewish fighting unit was a means to an end, specifically as a tool to forge a 
Jewish homeland. The Battalion idea was an extenuation of Zionist policy and a 
weapon the movement could arm itself with in an increasingly militarised world. 
Born 1880 in Odessa, Tsarist Russia, Jabotinsky developed a fierce Jewish 
nationalism after witnessing the Kishinev pogrom in 1903. He would later be 
active in establishing Jewish self-defence organisations across Russia, 
although he confessed to no particular cultural affinity with Judaism in his 
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youth.669 Elected as a delegate at the sixth Zionist Congress, Jabotinsky quickly 
aligned himself politically and spiritually with Theodor Herzl (although he would 
reject Herzl’s Uganda plan for a Jewish homeland) and Max Nordau, who 
became a confidant and mentor.670  
   The period 1880-1914 witnessed a broad sociological discussion within many 
leading European nations regarding the fitness and continuing veracity of their 
most potent weapon, the male of military age. This was particularly the case in 
Britain, where the poor performances of British troops during the Boer War 
were equated with the debilitating effects of industrialisation on the health of the 
working classes, and cited as evidence for the decline in industrial output vis-à-
vis Germany and the USA in the decade before 1914. Likewise, in the years 
before the First World War the physical fitness of Jews became for the likes of 
Nordau and Jabotinsky a mandatory prerequisite for the future success of 
Zionism. It had also become a fixation for non-Zionist interests. The formation 
of the Jewish Lads’ Brigade in London in 1895 by the vice chairman of the 
influential Anglo-Jewish Gentleman’s club The Maccabeans aimed to: ‘Cultivate 
the sound spirit in the sound body which marked the well trained soldier… and 
to spread amongst Jewish working lads the habits of smartness and obedience, 
while augmenting their growth and general vigour’.671 Members of the JLB 
would account for 27% of Jewish deaths in the British Army during the war (525 
of 1,949).672 The Brigade went some way to altering the negative image of the 
Jew as soldier in both Jewish and non-Jewish perceptions, but its popularity 
amongst East London Immigrants remained low in the years before the war due 
to the legacy of the brutal treatment of Jews under military conscription in the 
Tsarist Empire. Girls were only belatedly inducted into the Brigade in the late 
1950s and 1960s to form The Jewish Lads’ and Girls’ Brigade; however a 
                                                          
669See Shmuel Katz, Lone Wolf: a Biography of Vladimir Jabotinsky  (Barricade Books, New 
York 1996) 
670 Ronald Sanders, The High Walls of Jerusalem: A History of the Balfour Declaration and 
the Birth of the British Mandate for Palestine (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York 1984) 
p.145 
671 Colonel Goldsmith quoted in the JC, 22nd February 1895, cited from: Kadish, A Good 
Jew and Good Englishman, p.12; “But What about the Boys?’ JC, April 1891.  
672 ibid p.2 
P a g e  | 192 
 
similar youth club, The Jewish Girls’ Club, preceded the JLB, forming in 1886 
and providing the inspiration for the formation of a male equivalent.673 
   Nordau’s concept of ‘Muscular Judaism’ would no doubt have appealed to 
Jabotinsky and underpinned his philosophy of the potential of the Jewish 
Battalion.674 The future recruits, ‘the brave and good soldiers, efficient and 
healthy’675 would, Jabotinsky hoped, sweep away the stereotype of ‘the 
cowardly and un-soldierly Jew’.676 His close associate and fellow Zionist Chaim 
Weizmann, who would prove influential in working with the British Government 
towards the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 as seen in chapter two, 
described him thus: ‘Jabotinsky, the passionate Zionist, was utterly un-Jewish 
in manner, approach and deportment. He came from Odessa….but the inner 
life of Jewry had no trace on him…. [He had] A certain touch of the rather 
theatrically chivalresque, a certain queer and irrelevant knightliness, which was 
not at all Jewish’. 677 Jabotinsky’s passion and perseverance in the cause of 
Zionism was at odds with his decidedly indifferent attitude and understanding of 
cultural Judaism and would cause him difficulties in his dealings with the Jewish 
community of East London, whose priorities were reversed. 
   By the time of the outbreak of war in August 1914, Jabotinsky was a 
successful journalist working for the Russian Monitor, a Russian paper 
apparently oblivious to his criticism of the Tsarist authorities and active 
participation in Zionist circles. Upon hearing that Turkey had declared war on 
the Allies in November 1914, Jabotinsky’s vision of a Jewish fighting force 
contributing to the reclamation of Palestine was born: ‘[before] I had been a 
mere observer, without any particular reasons for wishing full triumph to one 
side and crushing disaster to the other…Turkey’s move transformed me in one 
short morning into a fanatical believer in war until victory; Turkey’s move made 
this war “my war”.’678 For Jabotinsky the goal of Zionism was the establishment 
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of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, not in Uganda or other proposed far flung 
territories of acquiescing European empires.679 This, he believed, would never 
come to pass whilst the Ottomans controlled the Holy Land and therefore ‘the 
only hope for the Jewish restoration of Palestine lay in the dismemberment of 
the Ottoman Empire’.680 
   A witness to Turkish decline during his time working in Istanbul between 
1906-1910, Jabotinsky was convinced that war with Britain guaranteed Turkey’s 
defeat, and was clear in the role and opportunities this presented Jews: ‘If ever 
a war should occur between England and Turkey, the right thing for the Jews 
would be to form a regiment of their own and participate in the conquest of 
Palestine’. 681 The trail he followed was already worn. Russian Jewish exiles 
living in Palestine and Turkey (amongst whom numbered David Ben-Gurion 
and Isaac Ben-Zvi, future Israeli Presidents who would serve in the Jewish 
Battalions in the British Army) 682 held talks with the Ottomans on the possibility 
of a Jewish unit helping the Turks defend Palestine against a British invasion. 
The scheme was rejected and the misjudgement of its architects quickly 
demonstrated by the arrest of Jews in Ottoman lands by the Turkish authorities 
in December 1914.683 In Britain, the actions of Captain Webber and his 
supporters such as Leopold Greenberg have already been discussed, but talks 
regarding the potential of a Jewish Legion as a powerful weapon for Zionism 
had more discreetly taken place in the autumn of 1914 amongst intellectual 
Russian Jews active in the Zionist movement and residing in Britain, included 
Chaim Weizmann. One of Weizmann’s contacts, an Italian-based Russian Jew 
called Pinhas Rutenberg, claimed the credit for originating the idea of the future 
Jewish Battalions, a claim confirmed in Weizmann’s memoirs.684  
   Jabotinsky however, if not the originator behind the concept of a Jewish 
Battalion fighting in the First World War, was certainly the driving force behind 
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the idea’s transfer from idea to reality. Arriving in Alexandria in December 1914 
on the pretext of reporting on the local response to the Sultan’s Jihad against 
the British Empire, Jabotinsky was to find, almost accidentally, a willing and 
politically uncontroversial source of Jewish men to serve in what would become 
the Zion Mule Corps. Learning from a British customs official upon arrival in 
Alexandria that: ‘A few days ago a boatful of Zionists, almost a thousand of 
them, arrived from Jaffa − the Turks kicked them out of Palestine’, Jabotinsky 
immediately dropped his journalistic mission and became a recruiter. The 
British formed the refugees into camps and here Jabotinsky, along with Joseph 
Trumpledor attempted to persuade the Jewish refugees to pledge to join the 
legion. Trumpledor, born also in 1880 in Pyatigorsk near Rostov-on-Don, had 
been conscripted into the Russian Army like his father before him. Wounded 
severely enough at the siege of Port Arthur in 1905 to warrant amputation of his 
left arm, Trumpledor impressed his senior officers by requesting a return to the 
front, only to end up in a Japanese prisoner of war camp after the surrender of 
the port. In his time in the camp Trumpledor formed a Zionist circle amongst 
fellow Jews who felt institutionally victimised within the Russian Army. 685  
   His reward of military honours and promotion to officer’s rank (almost unheard 
of for a Jewish soldier in the Tsarist Army) did not dim his commitment to 
Zionism. He eventually left the army for Palestine, settling in a Jewish collective 
farm at Degania east of the Jordan River that required constant episodes of 
organised defence against marauders and antisemitic bands. He displayed, 
quite literally, a single handed determination to disprove slurs of cowardliness 
against Jewish manhood. In one memorable incident remembered years later 
by a comrade at Degania, ‘We ran after them, exchanged a few shots and 
drove them out. One-armed Trumpledor handled his rifle better than I did and 
had a surer aim’.686  
   Disgusted with the Ottomanisation of the Jewish population of Palestine, 
Trumpledor escaped to Alexandria, arriving shortly before the influx of refugees 
from Jaffa in early 1915.687 Trumpledor did not hesitate to join Jabotinsky’s 
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project. Often accompanying Jabotinsky to meetings with high ranking British 
military and government officials, his reputation as a courageous and decorated 
soldier leant the project an important air of gravitas that helped overcome 
prejudice for the scheme based on old notions of the poor quality of Jewish 
troops. This same reputation proved a burden on recruitment drives in the East 
End of London later in the war. Ironically given his first-hand experience of 
prejudice during his service in the Russian Army, Trumpledor was seen as a 
symbol of the hated Tsarist Military Conscription laws that many East London 
Jewish residents had fled from, and an inability to communicate in Yiddish 
compounded the impression that Trumpledor did not speak for the interests of 
London’s immigrant Jews. 
   At a meeting organised by Jabotinsky and Trumpledor on 2 March 1915 with 
local Jewish businessmen and enthusiasts for the project, the decision was 
made to ‘Recruit from the young men in the camps a Jewish unit to fight on the 
side of the British Army on the Palestinian front’.688 According to Elias Gilner 
there were approximately 1,200 Jewish refugees from Palestine in the British 
camps at Alexandria, of whom three quarters were Russian, the remainder of 
Palestinian or local origin.689 A week after the 2 March meeting 200 men had 
pledged to join the Jewish Legion.  
   Very little information regarding service records of the men exist outside of 
the Avichail testimonials, with the ad hoc nature of their recruitment meaning no 
official unit records, such as war diaries and intelligence logs, were kept.690 
Adler in the British Jewry book of Honour lists the volunteers as mainly 
‘students and workmen’. 691 Some, such as Isaic Mouchkatine − a native of 
Vitebsk − had been forced to leave Russia ‘due to revolutionary activity’692, 
others due to persecution, such as Jack Knopp whose family survived the first 
and second pogroms in Kishinev before emigrating. 693 The majority had 
escaped persecution to begin new lives in Palestine: the indiscriminate brutality 
by which it was wrested away from them in December 1914 by the Turkish 
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authorities perhaps attests to their eagerness to volunteer. This was 
demonstrated by one of the youngest recruits Irving Warchawsky who was told 
that he was too young to be enlisted in the British Army: ‘As I passed 
Trumpledor I wept bitterly… That evening when I came to see him, he asked 
me to show him my passport. He said to me, “Tear it up!” I destroyed it and 
asked him, “And now what?” He answered, “Get in line tomorrow at Camp 
Sinima, and when they ask you for your passport, tell them you lost it. And 
when they ask you how old you are you’ll tell them that you’re 19.” And happily 
and overjoyed, I entered what was to become the well-known Zion Mule 
Corps’.694  
   A release from the boredom of the refugee camp would have been a 
motivating factor for many of the young recruits, but a desire to take up arms 
against their Ottoman oppressors seems to be the primary motivator for 
volunteering. In this, their hopes were to be frustrated. The British military 
authorities in Egypt would only agree to the use of the men as a supply corps 
as their experience best matched handling and equipping mules for 
transport.695 The British official’s motives may have been sincere, but for 
Jabotinsky it was another slur on Jewish manhood, that Jewish men were not 
up to the task of performing fighting duties alongside British troops.  
   Initially titled the Assyrian Refugee Mule Corps and established on the 23rd of 
March 1915, the task of leading the Corps fell to Lt. Colonel Patterson, a forty 
seven year old Irish Protestant who happened to be in Alexandria at the right 
time. A renowned big game hunter in Africa and author of the hugely popular 
Man Eaters of Tsavo and a decorated soldier of the Boer War to boot, 
Patterson was the definition of the Edwardian ‘Soldier Gentleman’ in the mould 
of his contemporary Winston Churchill and of the type so greatly featured in 
popular adventure novels of pre-war imperial British society.696 He also held a 
deep personal interest in Jewish history and the Holy Land, not untypical of a 
product of Victorian religious education as Eitan Bar-Yosef’s penetrating 
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analysis in The Holy Land in English Culture 1799-1917 shows.697 Patterson felt 
bound up with the fate of Zionism and the Jewish unit he now commanded: 
‘When as a boy I eagerly devoured the records of the glorious deeds of the 
Jewish military captains such as Joshua, Joab, Gideon, Judas Maccabee, I 
never dreamed that I in a small way would become a captain of a host of the 
Children of Israel’. 698  
     Patterson’s involvement with the Zion Mule Corps and later with the Jewish 
Battalions of the Royal Fusiliers sits within a strong tradition of British Non-
Jewish Zionism. In the 19th century, Lord Palmerston and the Anglican Minister 
William Shecter were keen advocates of Jewish colonisation of Palestine within 
the structure and ideological vision of British imperialism, whilst amongst 
Patterson’s contemporaries prominent non-Jewish Zionists included Joseph 
Chamberlain and of course Arthur Balfour and Lloyd George, as was discussed 
in more detail in chapter two.699 Indeed, the activities of Zionists such as 
Jabotinsky and Trumpledor, with the assistance of non-Jewish Zionists such as 
Patterson, would parallel the endeavours of Weizmann, Lloyd George and 
Balfour. The Zion Mule Corps and later the Jewish Battalions, would represent 
a form of practical or ‘muscular Zionism’ to compliment the diplomatic 
successes of Zionists in Whitehall. As Jabotinsky reflected after the war ‘How 
could the Zionist movement express itself in those war years? It was broken 
and paralysed, and was, by its nature, completely outside the narrow horizons 
of a warring world with its war governments. Only one manifestation of the 
Zionist will was able to break through on to this horizon, to show that Zionism 
was alive and prepared for sacrifice; to compel ministers, ambassadors and − 
most important of all − journalists, to treat the striving of the Jewish people for 
its country as a matter of urgent reality, as something which could not be 
postponed, which had to be given an immediate yes or no − and that was the 
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[Jewish] Legion Movement.’700 To return to the new commander of the Zion 
Mule Corps, a characteristic that Patterson shared with Balfour and other non-
Jewish Zionists was, despite a deep admiration for the Jewish race, an inability 
to comprehend Jewish assimilation and a tendency to place ‘all emphasis on 
the distinctiveness of the Jews’ and ‘almost to imply that emancipation had 
done them a wrong by blurring their identity as a nation’.701 This attitude would 
later cause Patterson significant problems in his dealings with the Anglo-Jewish 
community in 1917 during his attempts to broker consensus on the issue of the 
Jewish Battalion. 
   Following the confirmation of the unit as a support corps, Jabotinsky 
abandoned the Alexandrian project to seek backers in Europe in order to 
realise his vision of a proud successor to the ancient Jewish military heritage of 
the Maccabees. The potential of the Zion Mule Corps to prove the nucleus for 
something greater was, however, clear to Patterson and Trumpledor. The corps 
consisted of 375 officers and men; the official size was given as 500, and the 
official roll in the British Jewry book of Honour puts it at 727 members.702 This 
figure has been challenged by Harold Pollins whose analysis of Adler’s figures 
reveals numerous cases of duplication and corruption and Patterson’s figure of 
500 is perhaps the safer one.703 They were differentiated from the Jewish youth 
of Whitechapel and Bow in two important respects. Firstly, unlike immigrant 
Jews in London they were directly affected by the war, and the cause of the 
reclamation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine inspired them personally as it 
was, in fact, their adopted home and the Turks their direct enemy who had 
expelled them. Secondly, they could be enlisted into a Jewish unit far less 
controversially and less visibly in Alexandria on the periphery of British society 
than could Russian Jews in London.  
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   The force was not to be sent directly to fight in Palestine but instead to take 
part in the amphibious assault against the Turkish and German defenders at 
Gallipoli. Despite this set-back, the policy of ‘Any front leads to Zion’704 was 
adopted by the leaders of the retitled Zion Mule Corps. The corps received a 
number of medals and mentions in despatches and was praised for its courage 
under the heaviest fire on the Helles sector.705 The Corps was evacuated from 
Gallipoli at the end of 1915 as part of the larger strategic withdrawal of the 
British forces on the Gallipoli peninsula and shipped back to Alexandria. With 
little prospect of a new campaign in Palestine or elsewhere, the Corps was 
disbanded on the 26th May 1916.706  
 
   The importance of the Zion Mule Corps to the future prospects of recruiting a 
regiment of British Jews was subtle but significant. Only the Jewish Chronicle 
and no other Jewish or national newspaper reported on the establishment of 
the regiment in April 1915.707 However, the raw facts of a British Army unit 
formed from an exiled and nationless group of refugee Jews would provide 
powerful evidence of the possibilities of success for Jabotinsky, and the bravery 
of the corps under fire a clear collective disavowal of the old slur of Jewish 
cowardliness. 
 
 Building Support: 1915-1917 
 
   In the years 1915-1917 London’s Jewish population increasingly experienced 
the full effects of war strain. The War Office announced in December 1915 that 
British-born Jews of friendly alien parentage were now eligible for service, 
accounting for the majority of East End Jews of military age.708 However there 
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was increased exasperation from Whitehall with the vacillation of the Board of 
Deputies and the Jewish elders on the issue of Russian Jewish recruitment.709 
The indecisive meetings on the subject of recruitment drives and stonewalling 
on the issue of a Jewish Battalion led to the repetition of pre-war accusations 
from concerned interests in British society that established Jewry wasn’t doing 
enough to take control of and responsibility for the immigrant population, and 
that this weakness was now having a negative impact on Britain’s war effort.710 
The Jewish Chronicle anxiously reported on isolated but increasingly frequent 
cases of violence towards Jews or vandalism of Jewish shops, with editorials 
linking the violence to grievances caused by poor Russian Jewish enlistment.711 
The relative prosperity of the Jewish trades in supplying boots and uniforms for 
the army increased animosity directed towards them from non-Jewish residents 
of the East End, as discussed previously in chapter one.712  
    The 1914 taunt ‘what are the Jews Doing?’713 increasingly morphed into a 
more sinister antisemitic discourse that blended with mistaken accusations of 
Germanic sympathies and anti-Entente bias on the part of the Jewish 
population.714 As already discussed in chapter one, occasionally this animosity 
towards Jews flared up into large-scale violence, seen in the anti-Jewish riots in 
the aftermath of the sinking of the Lusitania in May 1915 and again later in a 
period of particular shortage on the Home Front in Bethnal Green in September 
1917.715 Eugene C. Black has argued in his work The Social Politics of Anglo-
Jewry that it was one thing to expect British Jews to volunteer, another thing to 
expect alien Jews to volunteer before conscription had even been introduced 
for British citizens.716 However the rising death tolls on the western front, 
resulting from the Neuve Chapelle offensive in 1915, had left the British Army 
close to its limits of available manpower that it could sustain from a voluntary 
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recruitment system.717 The introduction of conscription in 1916 would lead to a 
growing clamour for a solution to be found for what to do with the 30,000 
Russian Jewish males of fighting age residing in Britain who were exempt from 
the law on naturalisation grounds.718      
 
    After leaving Trumpledor and the Zion Mule Corps in April 1915, Jabotinsky, 
following  unsuccessful flirtations with the Italian and French governments on 
the issue of a Jewish Battalion and support for Zionism,719 settled in London to 
continue his campaign.720 London in the summer of 1915 did not however 
represent promising conditions for Jabotinsky and his aspirations for a Jewish 
fighting force. The British Government was indifferent to the concept of ‘fancy’ 
units and was conscious to avoid any ties to Zionist causes. The prospect of a 
Jewish Legion formed from Russian Jews faced the opposition of the majority 
of the Jewish establishment, as well as the indifference and occasional hostility 
of the men proposed to fill its ranks.721 It was clear to Anglo-Jewish leaders, 
however, that something had to be done concerning the Russian Jewish 
community’s failure to meet enlistment expectations, and there was increasing 
concern that the issue would have a detrimental effect on Anglo-Jewry as a 
whole. 
   Established Jewry’s communal policy in 1915, as directed by the Board of 
Deputies, was characterised by an accelerated campaign for the assimilation of 
the Jewish immigrant population under the strained atmosphere of the war that 
was driven by a renewed insecurity that Jewish emancipation may yet be ‘on 
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trial’.722 As we saw in chapter two, the immigrant community was identified as 
‘the potential weak link in the solid front of Anglo-Jewish patriotism’.723 
Encouragement and cajoling of the immigrant community to enlist and display 
an interest in the war increased, with a sustained propaganda campaign 
conducted by the Jewish Recruitment Committee taking the call for enlistment 
to the streets of Stepney, Whitechapel and Bow.724 Simultaneously, 
longstanding philanthropic aid extended to their East End co-religionists was 
threatened to be withdrawn unless enlistment picked up.  
   This was demonstrated in a highly visible and controversial manner when the 
BoD voted to enforce the policy in their East End soup kitchens that no male of 
fighting age would be provided soup unless they were in military uniform, the 
‘No Khaki No Soup’ campaign.725 The initiative drew stinging criticism towards 
the BoD from concerned interests within established Jewry, as well as from 
socialist and Radical groups in the East End − most notably the FJPC. It also 
raised wider concerns that the BoD and other sections of the Jewish 
establishment were failing in their duty towards the immigrant community in 
their haste to appease Gentile anger over Russian Jewish enlistment.726 As 
was discussed in chapter two, the BoD and leading Jewish figures such as Lord 
Rothschild and Leo Wolf remained quiet in the face of Government internment 
of Jewish enemy aliens in the first months of the war, and continued to placidly 
oppose a Jewish Battalion as a tool of segregation and separation in their roles 
as intelligence gatherers for the Government on Jewish affairs.  
    The static nature of the frontline in France and Belgium in the summer of 
1915 fuelled a key debate within the War Cabinet and military planners − the so 
called Easterners vs. Westerners debate − which held direct implications for the 
prospect of a Jewish Legion serving in Palestine. The ‘Westerners’ led by War 
Minister Lord Kitchener believed the quickest road to victory was to defeat the 
main protagonist, Germany, head on with a series of major offensives in the 
West. ‘Easterners’ such as Munitions Minister Lloyd George and the Lord of the 
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Admiralty Winston Churchill attacked the huge casualty rates sustained in the 
campaigns in Flanders and north-west France. They argued for a periphery 
strategy to weaken the Central Powers by knocking out Turkey in the eastern 
Mediterranean and threatening Austro-Hungary’s position by advancing into the 
Balkans.727  
    The subsequent failure of the Gallipoli front in 1915 led to the commitment in 
December that year − in joint allied staff talks with the French and Russians − 
to retain troops and equipment primarily for operations in the west. The validity 
of this approach was seemingly confirmed by the necessity to relieve the 
chronic pressure on the French at Verdun in the spring of 1916 with a summer 
offensive in the Somme valley.728 This, coupled with Kitchener’s apathy for 
‘fancy units’, meant the chances of Jabotinsky gaining official support for the 
creation of a Jewish Battalion to take part in a British offensive in Palestine in 
1915/1916 appeared remote.729  
   However, the esteem the public held for Lord Kitchener as the figurehead of 
the war effort was increasingly out of kilter with his diminishing influence within 
the War Cabinet.730 By 1915 his star was darkened by the ‘Shell Crisis’ and the 
part-responsibility he played in the strategic failures at Neuve-Chappelle and 
Gallipoli. Kitchener saw his position as War Minister further eroded by the press 
agitation against him led by Lord Northcliffe at The Times and the grumblings 
within the Cabinet where his grasp of strategic military planning was being 
openly questioned.731 The diminishing influence of Kitchener was a 
conversation topic in the first meeting between Jabotinsky and Colonel 
Patterson in December 1915 when the latter arrived in London on convalescent 
leave from leading the Zion Mule Corps in Gallipoli: 
‘Patterson: “How are the chances for the Jewish Regiment looking?” 
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Jabotinsky: “Not good. Kitchener does not like us.” 
Patterson: “No matter, Kitchener is but one man and can no longer sway the 
Cabinet.”’732 
   The eclipse of Kitchener (he was to disappear in mysterious circumstances at 
sea whilst en route to Russia in June 1916) removed one obstacle, but the 
Government and in particular the War Office remained sceptical of Jabotinsky’s 
proposed Jewish Regiment and its connections with Zionism. This is revealed 
in a WO minute from 17 January 1916 entitled ‘Military objections and 
administrative difficulties of the scheme [Jewish Regiment]’ which was in 
response to Jabotinsky’s request for a formal meeting to discuss the project (he 
received no official reply): ‘Is it not likely that this corps may in some way be 
brought in connection with the Zionist movement? As a matter of fact Mr 
Jabotinsky was told some ten months ago that we could not entertain a scheme 
of his to raise a corps of Jews for service in Palestine. On the whole therefore 
we are not in favour of this project’. 733 
    As with the rebuff of his attempts in Alexandria ten months previously to gain 
official British support for his plans, Jabotinsky was not especially perturbed by 
this latest setback, and through Patterson and Chaim Weizmann he began to 
build a network of sympathisers within and around Whitehall. Through 
Patterson, Jabotinsky was introduced to Leo Amery, a Unionist MP with whom 
Patterson had an acquaintance with from the Boer war. Amery − an outspoken 
proponent of the Eastern strategy, having recently returned from an 
appointment as a liaison officer with the WO in Gallipoli and the Balkans734 − 
was pro-Zionist and eager to promote British interests in the Middle East.735 
Research by William Rubinstein has revealed Amery’s mother was Jewish (her 
family before leaving their native Hungary converted to Protestantism), a fact 
Amery made great efforts to keep hidden, but which might explain his 
attachment to Zionism during the war.736 Amery helped set up meetings 
                                                          
732 Jabotinsky, Jewish Legion, p.98 
733 PRO, FO 371 2835/18995 
734 Watts, Jewish Legion, p.55 
735 ibid p.58 
736 William Rubinstein, ‘The Secret of Leopold Amery’, History Today, 49, 2, February 1999, 
pp.17-26 
P a g e  | 205 
 
between Jabotinsky and Patterson with Lord Robert Cecil at the Foreign Office 
who stated that unlike the WO they had ‘no objection on political grounds to the 
raising of a Jewish Corps in England’ and ‘We are not at all irrevocably 
opposed to Zionism’.737 Whilst the WO objected to the scheme on the grounds 
that they did not want to become committed to or entangled in Zionist activities, 
the FO saw in the scheme the potential propaganda benefits of securing world 
Jewish support. This was partly in regards to the U.S.A and its substantial 
Jewish minority but also in pre-empting any similar attempt by Germany, whose 
Jewish population at some 615,000 was substantially bigger than the Jewish 
community of Britain, which numbered approximately 240,000.738 Cecil put 
Jabotinsky in contact with the minister for propaganda at the FO, Lord Newton, 
to whom Jabotinsky stated his belief that ‘Jews loved Palestine more than they 
hated Russia’, and that a British commitment to Zionism through raising a 
Jewish Legion and capturing Palestine, would win over not only Russian Jews 
in England who despised the Tsar but also Jews in America who the FO was 
concerned could prove susceptible to German propaganda.739 Newton 
cautiously gave his support and continued to further the venture within the 
department.740  
   The government as a whole, and in particular the Home Secretary Herbert 
Samuel, were increasingly concerned by the growing public resentment against 
the Russian Jews that had accelerated following the introduction of conscription 
for all unmarried British males aged between 18 and 41 years old in January 
1916. In the spring and summer of 1916 Samuel laid the groundwork for a 
military convention with Russia which would present friendly aliens in Britain 
(mainly Russian Jews) the choice between conscription into the British Army or 
deportation home for enlistment in their own army.741 As a British Jew but with 
certain sympathies with Zionism, Samuel was, in the words of David Cesarani, 
‘in an exquisitely agonising position’.742 Having acted as he saw it as an 
Englishman and public servant in a manner serving Britain’s national self-
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interest, he was openly attacked for betraying his Jewish roots and acting 
illiberally by threatening the immigrants with deportation back to the country 
they had fled from persecution.743 The need to consult with the Russian 
Government and to test the legislative viability of the proposal delayed the 
implementation of the Anglo-Russian military Convention until July 1917.744 The 
ominous threat of future deportation back to Russia was expected to boost the 
voluntary enlistment of Russian Jews into the British forces in the meantime.  
   However, the proposed Convention met open hostility from both the 
immigrant community − with the formation of the FJPC − as well as criticism 
from within established Jewry such as the Jewish Chronicle which complained 
that the Convention ‘would be an exchange of freedom for oppression’ and 
arguing in its stead that ‘the formation of a Jewish Battalion on the lines of the 
Zion Mule Corps would adequately meet the case of the Russian Jews’.745 
Herbert Samuel still held out hope that compulsion or deportation of Russian 
Jews in line with the Convention would not be needed and that the threat of it 
would help kick-start voluntary solutions.746  
   The resentment of Russian Jews in the East End towards the prospect of 
deportation back to Russia was further demonstrated in late July 1916 with 
angry demonstrations in Whitechapel. The Times reported ‘A mass meeting of 
the English Zionist Federation, held in the Pavilion Theatre, Whitechapel, 
yesterday, had to be abandoned owing to the violent demonstration against the 
president of the federation, Mr Joseph Cowen, who is in favour of the proposal 
that those Russian Jews of military age who would not join the British Army 
should be sent to Russia, and not to neutral countries. As soon as Mr Cowen 
rose to speak nearly all the audience began to shout him down, shaking their 
fists and abusing him in Yiddish. There were fist fights in the gallery and in the 
body of the hall, and one man who was opposed to the chairman mounted the 
platform, but was ejected. The police were called in and comparative order was 
restored, but as soon as Mr. Cowen again attempted to begin his speech the 
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uproar was renewed, and some of the audience sang the Jewish Anthem’.747 
The Times went on to state ‘Many of those who took part in the demonstration, 
it is believed, profess to be quite prepared to join the British Army provided they 
are given their naturalisation papers, but they object to being sent back to 
Russia’.748 
   Certain observations can be drawn from this incident. Firstly, the unpopularity 
of the proposed Convention with Russia had succeeded in mobilising Russian 
Jews into active and organised protest - possibly co-ordinated by the FJPC - 
that also underlined the intractability of many Russian Jews over the prospect 
of a return to Tsarist Russia. Secondly, if The Times’ final assertion can be 
taken at face value, Russian Jews were not actively opposed to serving in the 
British Army in principle at least, and the desirability of obtaining British 
naturalisation as part of their service hints at a greater identification with Britain 
and the nation’s war cause than was the contemporary perception. And thirdly, 
the holding of a prominent public Zionist meeting in the heart of the East End 
shows that the English Zionist Federation was confident of recruiting support 
from within immigrant Jewry. However, the overshadowing of the Zionist cause 
at the meeting by the issue of Russian Jewish deportation reveals that, in the 
summer of 1916, East End Jews were quite understandably more concerned at 
British government legislation that impacted on them personally rather than 
helping secure distant British support for an eventual Jewish homeland. 
   This event encouraged Jabotinsky to launch a concerted recruitment drive in 
the East End in the autumn of 1916. Samuel, in a series of letters to Jabotinsky, 
offered any help he could provide but this fell short of the official Government 
support for the scheme he craved, dejectedly replying ‘without an official 
statement from you I cannot guarantee success’.749  
      Jabotinsky set out the slogan for his campaign to a Liberal MP, Joseph 
King, at a meeting at the National Liberal Club in early 1916 following King’s 
assertion that Russian Jews should join the British Army in large numbers as 
British Jews and Gentiles had done: ‘It is an unjust demand… because there is 
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a vast difference between your boys and those East End boys. Your boys are 
British; if Britain wins their people are saved. Ours are Jews; if Britain wins, 
millions of their brothers will still remain in purgatory… in order to be just you 
can demand only two things from the foreign Jew: First “Home defence”, to 
protect Britain itself, because he lives here; second to fight for the liberation of 
Palestine, for that is the heim of his people. “Home and Heim” − that is my war 
motto’.750 
  Unfortunately for Jabotinsky, the ‘Home and Heim’ campaign proved to be a 
dismal failure. In a series of public meetings and rallies during October 1916 the 
recruitment drive for a Jewish Regiment received only three hundred firm 
pledges to join.751 There were prior movements within the community to prevent 
enlistment, with the Jewish Chronicle reporting in August the arrest of three 
men circulating the Yiddish language newspaper The Worker’s Friend which 
urged Jews not to enlist.752 Jabotinsky himself suspected that assimilationist 
and anti-Legion elements within established Jewry such as the arch anti-Zionist 
Claude Montefiore − the president of the Anglo-Jewish Association − were 
using their network of informers and agitators to disrupt meetings and misinform 
the Russian Jewish community about the feasibility of the Jewish Legion.753 
This again reveals the complexity of the Jewish Battalion’s impact on Jewish 
politics in London during the war. The Worker’s Friend and Claude Montefiore 
agreed on little beyond a mutual desire to render the Jewish Battalion scheme 
unworkable, so both sought to stir up anti-military sentiment within the Jewish 
East End against the project. 
    Jabotinsky bitterly blamed the failure of the campaign on the lack of official 
backing from the Government to persuade sceptics in the community who did 
not believe in the feasibility of a Jewish Regiment serving in the British Army for 
the liberation of Palestine.754 Despite some truth in these assertions, a damning 
reason for the ‘Home and Heim’ campaign’s failure was that it was deeply 
unpopular with Russian Jews. Special Branch agent Sergeant Albers was sent 
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to monitor the meetings held on 16 and 17 of October, and reported ‘The 
audience at both these places consisted of the Jewish element, chiefly 
Russians of military age. From the commencement of the proceedings in each 
case, they were antagonistic towards the speakers and a considerable amount 
of booing and hissing greeted them… At both the meetings it was found 
necessary to have the hall cleared by police. In my opinion it appears useless 
to hold these gatherings as the Jewish folk seem to greatly resent the 
arguments put forward, and in view of the hostile attitude of the crowd, no good 
purpose could be served by continuing to advocate Mr. Jabotinsky’s 
propaganda’.755 
    A sizeable number of Russian Jews had been enthusiastic to enlist in the 
excitement of the first weeks of the war in 1914, but rejection by the Army of 
those who attempted to sign up on naturalisation and fitness grounds led to 
resentment and disinterest towards the idea of serving, coupled with the 
increasingly visible grim reality of a soldier’s lot on the Western Front.756 The 
lack of a push factor of friends’ enlistment, sense of patriotic duty, conscription 
and family pressure to join all prevented enlistment but the relative success of 
the Jewish trades in wartime represented the major incentive not to 
volunteer.757 The Board of Guardians reported in December 1915: ‘The 
Working Classes have had a more prosperous time than for many years 
past’.758 As Eugene Black has stated, Russian Jews ‘regarded recruitment as a 
thinly disguised scheme to take away their hard-won East End homes, jobs and 
sanctuary’.759 
   After one particularly hostile public meeting in Whitechapel that October, 
Jabotinsky was told by a Jewish anarchist: ‘How much longer do you intend to 
knock your head against the wall? You do not understand a thing about our 
boys. You explain to them they should do this thing “as Jews” that thing “as 
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Englishmen” and that other “as men”. Nonsense. We are not Jews. We are not 
Englishmen. We are not men. What are we? We are tailors.’760 This would tend 
to cast doubt on the assertion that the peculiar conditions of war had bred an 
increased interest and participation in Zionist circles within the bulk of the 
immigrant Jewish communities of Britain during the First World War. Geoffrey 
Alderman argued in a piece for the Anglo-Jewish History conference in 1980 
that: ‘During the First World War Zionism became more popular, in the East 
End and elsewhere in the major areas of Jewish settlement, perhaps as a 
reaction to the excessive, almost hysterical patriotism of the Anglo-Jewish 
grandees, whose attempts to enforce conscription upon immigrant Jews from 
Russia and Poland were bitterly resented’.761 
   Whilst there was increasing Zionist sympathy in radical and intellectual 
Jewish circles,762 Zionism had not penetrated sufficiently amongst the majority 
of male Jewish youths to encourage them to give up their hard won jobs. That 
East End Jewish youth rejected a national identity for a professional one is in 
line with the evolution process of a displaced ethnic minority and the 
importance of securing financial sustainability over integration. Jabotinsky 
would be forced from his experiences in the East End in the autumn of 1916 to 
admit the majority of the recruits to the Jewish Battalion would be compelled to 
join rather than volunteer for it.763  
   Between the end of 1916 and the first months of 1917 several fortuitous 
events were to transform the moribund fortunes of the Jewish Legion scheme 
and set it on the path towards realisation. The first occurred in December 1916 
with the forced resignation of Asquith as prime minister and his replacement 
with known Zionist sympathiser Lloyd George, as well as the new role of Leo 
Amery as an advisor in the so called ‘kitchen Cabinet’ that counselled the prime 
minister on the conduct of the war.764 Lloyd George was an acquaintance of 
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Chaim Weizmann and a key ‘Easterner’, with one of his first acts as Prime 
Minister being to encourage the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian 
Expeditionary Force, General Murray, to launch a major offensive against the 
Turks through Sinai.765 
   As we saw in chapter two, Lloyd George linked his own sympathy for Zionism 
and interest in the Holy Land to his Victorian schooling: ‘We had been trained 
even more in Hebrew history than in the history of our own country’.766 This was 
encouragement to Jabotinsky, who along with Trumpledor sent a formal petition 
to the new Premier proposing the formation of a Jewish Legion for service in 
Palestine, delivered personally by Leo Amery.767 His cause was further 
enhanced by the toppling of the Tsarist regime in the Russian Revolution of 
February/March 1917. Not only did it swing neutral Jewish sentiment firmly 
behind the Entente and opened up the door to potential American and 
Canadian recruits but it was hoped that the removal of anti-tsarist sentiment 
would encourage Russian Jews to now enlist with the British Army. Sharman 
Kadish has shown that a sizeable proportion of Russian Jews who decided to 
return to Russia following the revolution and the ratification of the Military 
Convention were associated with the intellectual Left or other radical groups 
within the Jewish East End that had provided tenacious opposition to 
recruitment programmes and the Jewish Legion scheme in particular.768  
   Voluntary recruitment in the East End continued to be poor however, despite 
the renewed efforts of Jabotinsky who now had the full support of the 
Recruitment Department. The FJPC although weakened by the loss of the 
Conventionists, vigorously maintained its opposition to the scheme. More 
seriously for Jabotinsky was the opposition of Labour Zionist organisations 
within the East End, particularly the London branch of Poale Zion (Workers of 
Zion), who condemned the ‘collective enlistment of Jews on one side in the 
‘Imperialist’ war in which Jews, as Jews, had no real interest’.769 Jabotinsky’s 
version of Zionism was at odds with anti-Zionist ideologies circulating in the 
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East End of London in 1917, and was not sufficiently influential to persuade 
Russian Jews to freely sacrifice their hard won livelihoods. 
    Following a series of Pogroms against the Jewish populations in Jaffa and 
Tel Aviv by the Turkish authorities in May 1917, Lloyd George, sensing the 
propaganda value and impact of defending the Jewish Holy Land would have 
on world opinion,770 gave his consent to the recruitment of a Jewish Legion by 
briefing the WO to reconsider their objections to the scheme.771 Jabotinsky now 
had the official backing he needed to legitimise the Jewish Legion project, and 
the terms of the Military Convention were also changed to offer Russian Jews 
the chance to join the battalion over serving in the main British Army or 
deportation back to Russia. 
 
 Backlash: the Battalion as a Divisive Factor in 
Jewish Politics 
     
   On 27 July 1917 the WO issued a press-release announcing: ‘Arrangements 
are now nearing completion for the formation of a Jewish Regiment of Infantry. 
Experienced British Officers are being selected to fill the higher appointments in 
the unit, and instructions have already been issued with a view to the transfer to 
this unit of Jewish soldiers, with knowledge of Yiddish or Russian languages, 
who are now serving in British Regiments. It is proposed that the badges of the 
Regiment shall consist of a representation of King David’s Shield’.772 This 
declaration fell like a bombshell upon the anti-battalion camp, who felt 
particularly aggrieved that no prior consultation between the WO and the 
leadership of the established Jewish community had taken place concerning 
the matter.773 On this point, the WO had decided to circumvent the official 
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organs of Anglo-Jewry due partly to the recent discrediting of the BoD. As was 
seen in chapter two, Its President, David Alexander, and Claude Montefiore 
wrote an open letter to The Times on 24 May entitled ‘Palestine and Zionism- 
Views of Anglo-Jewry’ which attempted to portray a general anti-Zionism on 
behalf of the community, but instead provoked a widespread backlash from 
many disparate Jewish voices and led to the serious questioning of the board’s 
claim to represent the interests of the Jewish community.774 Despite this 
incident, the creation of the Legion re-doubled previous concerns held by 
prominent British Jews that the poor quality and performance of the Russian 
conscripts would discredit the whole of British Jewry, and touched on old fears 
that any form of segregation would discredit the position and rights of the 
community painstakingly built up since 1858. Edwin Montefiore, a cousin of 
Herbert Samuel, made this clear in a letter to the FO: ‘Could anything be more 
disastrous than for Jewish Englishmen…to be bracketed with the Jewish 
Russians, sharing the same verdict for their part in the war?!’775 
    Surprisingly, amongst the most vocal opponents of the scheme was Leo 
Greenberg, the editor of the Jewish Chronicle and one of the earliest supporters 
of the concept of a Jewish unit. Greenberg attacked the title ‘The Jewish 
Regiment’ and the use of the Star of David for its insignia as particularly 
insensitive to the identity of Anglo-Jewry, stating ‘When a Jewish soldier dons 
the British or the French, or a Russian uniform, he does so as a British, French, 
or a Russian soldier, and not a Jewish soldier. There is therefore, neither point 
nor relevancy − there will, we fear, be grounds for actual offence − in imposing 
the symbol of Jews or Judaism upon his accoutrements’.776 Greenberg 
attempted to convey to the Government the divisions within the community 
already caused by the Legion. Cesarani summarised his views thus: ‘all 
sections of the Jewish population were split on this issue, with nationalists, anti-
Zionists, orthodox and Liberal, immigrant and British Jews ranged on all 
sides’.777 Greenberg’s initial support for the concept of a Jewish Regiment had 
been based on its use as a tool to protect Jewish recruits from the antisemitism 
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perceived to be rife within the British Army, but by 1917 these concerns had 
been superseded by the greater fear of differentiation.  
   Greenberg’s volte-face reveals the fluidity of Jewish politics, seen also in the 
pragmatic support for the Jewish Legion by Lord Rothschild (the symbolic and 
spiritual leader of Anglo-Jewry and not to be confused with the zealously anti-
Jewish Legion Major Rothschild) whose scepticism for Zionism and distrust in 
the Jewish Regiment scheme was overcome by the practical benefits it 
provided to the solution of the Russian Jewish enlistment crisis.778 Lord 
Rothschild’s remaining discomfort with the project is revealed in a letter to M J 
Landa on 23 June 1918 criticising the proposed name of ‘Jewish Regiment’ for 
the unit: ‘As regards the name of the regiment I cannot say I approve at all of 
“the Jewish Regiment” and I never have as the regiment is not representative of 
all the Jews of the world not even of the British Empire. Moreover it will only 
arouse active opposition to the force which is to be avoided. The Judeans or 
Judean Regiment is the proper title.’779  
   Certainly the furore over the name of the regiment and its insignia was far 
from a triviality. At the heart of the deputations throughout August 1917 led by 
Montefiore, Major Rothschild and others to induce the Home Secretary Lord 
Derby to drop the Jewish title, was a deep-seated fear that the sum of the 
regiment’s contribution to the war would upon the cessation of hostilities be 
regarded as representative of the contribution of the Jewish community as a 
whole. The WO’s attempts at a compromise, that the regiment would be 
renamed in military tradition as the 38th Battalion of the Royal Fusiliers, pleased 
neither camp. Greenberg was correct that the Legion was far from universally 
popular amongst the various groups and factions that made up the Jewish 
community, and it proved divisive even within the British Zionist movement 
which, apart from Chaim Weizmann, supported the official World Zionist policy 
of neutrality. Some, such as the Zionist intellectual Ahad Ha’am, dismissed the 
notion that the Legion was necessary to prove Jewish fighting ability, writing to 
Trumpledor that: ‘Your main argument is that the Legion will prove to whoever 
is in need of proof, that we are able to fight, and that, therefore we shall be able 
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to defend our Country. But I believe, that even without the Legion the Jews 
have sufficiently demonstrated their fighting capacity in all the armies that are at 
present engaged in the war’.780 As Kadish relates: ‘On the issue of the 
Regiment, the generally accepted pattern of communal politics broke down’.781 
Matters were brought to a head when Patterson called a meeting of senior 
figures representing a broad cross-section of the various Jewish communities 
and factions, as well as individuals with an attachment or interest in the legion, 
at the WO on 8 August. This included the new president of the BoD Sir Stuart 
Samuel (Alexander having resigned after the debacle with The Times in May), 
Lord Rothschild, Chaim Weizmann, Leo Greenberg, Claude Montefiore, and 
many other leading Zionists and assimilationists.782  
      Patterson recalled in his memoirs that after fierce debate between 
Jabotinsky and Weizmann on one side and the present assimilationists on the 
other: ‘I again addressed the meeting and said I thought it was a good thing the 
Government had not left it to the community to form a Jewish Regiment, as I 
saw that they would never agree; but as the Government had already made up 
its mind, and was determined to have a Jewish Legion of some kind, I begged 
them to lay aside all differences and help me to make a success of a movement 
which was bound to affect all Jews, one way or another, throughout the world. 
In conclusion, I said I would rather know who were my friends, and asked all 
those who did not intend to further this scheme, which after all was a scheme 
propounded and adopted by the British Government, to retire. Not a man 
moved.’783  
   In this manner, Patterson secured an uneasy acceptance of the reality of the 
Jewish Battalion on the part of the Jewish establishment, although many of 
those present perhaps felt they had been confronted by a fait accompli by 
Patterson, and to display an open hostility for the movement would be to court 
accusations of disloyalty to the nation and the community.784 Alyson Pendlebury 
interprets Patterson’s position as that of the British Government’s ‘Zionist 
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Missionary’, attempting to persuade a sceptical Anglo-Jewry that their interests 
were foremost in the government’s plans for the Battalion.785 Service in his 
regiment, he argued, would instil dual national interests within Eastern 
European migrants through participation in a Zionist project that also saw them 
furthering the cause of the British Empire. The East London Jews would be 
‘normalised’ through entry into nationhood.786  
   This did not, however, dispel fears amongst opponents of the scheme that the 
Jewish Regiment would ultimately disgrace the British Jewish community, and 
that Government support for the scheme was a pretext to the resettlement of 
British Jews in the Holy Land once it was firmly under British control. Patterson 
recounts a conversation prior to this meeting with an un-named prominent 
English Jew who opposed the Jewish Battalion and the ideology of Zionism 
chiefly because he ‘had no desire to be chased out of my comfortable dwellings 
in Kensington to live in some wooden hut in the desert defending it from Arabs 
and the like’.787 The fear within certain sections of Anglo-Jewry that the reality of 
a Jewish homeland would lead to growing press and popular agitation for Jews 
in Britain to move there was a serious obstacle to the Battalion scheme. 
Resentments remained (evident not less than half an hour after the meeting, 
when Montefiore and Major Rothschild reported Patterson to his commanding 
Officer General Geddes for holding a Zionist meeting in the WO) and the 
Jewish Battalion would continue to be dogged by opposition originating within 
the leadership of established Jewry right up until its disbandment in 1922.788  
 
     The government’s dramatic U-turn in 1917 from the previous 
administration’s policy of making no official commitment to the cause of Zionism 
− and the Legion idea in particular − was based in part on the pro-Zionist 
sympathies of the Prime Minister Lloyd George and certain members of his 
Cabinet. This was consolidated by a series of positive meetings with Jabotinsky 
and Trumpledor in which the structure of the Legion was drawn up, and the 
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favourable conditions for an offensive in Palestine in which the Legion’s 
participation both symbolically and militarily was desirable for both parties. 
Added to this was the increased attractiveness of the Allies in the eyes of World 
Jewry with the fall of the Tsarist government in Russia and the entry of the USA 
on the Allies side with its large and influential Jewish population. The potential 
propaganda benefits to the Allies of exploiting Jewish world opinion through a 
clear display of sympathy with Zionism was increasingly evident to strategists in 
the WO as well as Cabinet members.789   
    It was not, however, primarily sentimentalism for the Holy Land within the 
Cabinet or a desire to court world Jewish opinion that motivated the official 
sanctioning of the Jewish Legion.790 It was a pragmatic realisation that it posed 
the best opportunity for the Government to solve the drawn out affair of the non-
enlistment of Russian Jews. The Times reported on 17 July that in Stepney 
alone there were 4,000 Jewish absentees ‘Avoiding service by every 
conceivable means’ and just over a week later the paper ran a report on the 
local unrest caused by this amongst the Gentile population: ‘Eight thousand 
Jewish aliens of military age are still living as civilians in Stepney and Hackney 
alone… ”The ferment down here,” a well-known Hackney resident said 
yesterday, “is rapidly becoming serious, and if the Government deals with the 
situation with a strong hand they will have the full support of the British 
population… [On the Russian Jews] They do not want to go to Russia. They do 
not want to fight for anybody… Conscience has not prevented them from 
making money out of war contracts and war work”’.791  
   Following the agreement of the Military Service Convention between Britain 
and Russia on 16 July 1917, the Government was under greater pressure than 
ever to be seen to be enforcing this policy.792 The closure of the FJPC and the 
arrest of its leader Abraham Bezalel in July 1917 is evidence of a tougher 
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approach,793 although Russian Jewish men continued to resist deportation and 
enlistment. In a private meeting a few months previously, the Home Secretary 
Lord Derby questioned Joseph Trumpledor on the possibilities of persuading 
Russian immigrants to serve in the Jewish Legion. Trumpledor replied ‘If it is to 
be just a regiment of Jews − perhaps. If it will be a regiment for the Palestine 
front − certainly. If, together with its formation, there will appear a government 
pronouncement in favour of Zionism − overwhelmingly’.794 The WO would draw 
the same conclusion: if the men would not fight for Britain or for Russia perhaps 
they could be persuaded to fight for a Jewish homeland. It was felt also that the 
difficulties of incorporating the men within the British Army due to religious and 
language barriers rendered the Jewish Battalion more attractive to the WO as 
the solution to the conundrum. In effect the Russian Jews were presented with 
a third option: if deportation back to Russia and serving in the main British Army 
proved undesirable they had a final choice of serving in an all-Jewish Regiment. 
This was as close to volunteerism as Jabotinsky could hope for but the fact 
remained that the Russian Jews faced compulsion to choose one of these three 
options.   
    That some men chose none of these three options can be seen in the 
experiences of a Jewish resident of Whitechapel, Arnold Harris. Harris’s family 
had fled Kovno Province in Poland to join other family members in London in 
1900 when he was 6 years old. The family as a whole, and Arnold in particular, 
were heavily involved in Zionist organisations in the East End. The young Harris 
regularly attending Zionist meetings to hear the likes of Israel Zangwill and 
Moses Myer speak from street corners.795 This did not however equate to any 
interest on the part of Harris in Jabotinsky’s Jewish Battalion. Mark Levene has 
extensively examined Harris’ memoirs and speculates that he was interested in 
a brand of Zionism associated with Labour politics in the East End (possibly 
Paole Zion) which differed markedly from Jabotinsky’s Zionist vision and was in 
principle anti-war. However, in Harris’ own words ‘I had made up my mind that I 
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would not surrender to the call-up, not for ideological reasons but from plain 
fear’.796  
    Harris paid £5 to a local doctor for a fraudulent note diagnosing myopia and 
when this was rejected by the Enlistment Office as unsuitable grounds for 
medical discharge, he visited a local boxer who had done well out of the war 
charging a fee for his ‘expertise’ − a precise punch to the side of the head 
inducing a perforated ear-drum. Harris decided against this extreme measure 
when the man couldn’t guarantee the ‘procedure’ would not result in permanent 
deafness, and after seeking refuge in Ireland, Harris returned to London only at 
the end of the war. In his own words he had endured impoverishment and 
loneliness, and recognised he would have been better off enlisting, but resisted 
not for ideological reasons but simply from fear.797 The similar experiences on 
the run of John Rodker and the ready network of supporters to shelter them 
hints that many more continued to resist enlistment after the Convention came 
into force.798 This however reflects a wider war disillusionment in British society 
and the raft of military tribunals and press agitation against ‘shirkers’ and 
conscientious objectors reveals deeper national concerns that British men were 
not fulfilling their conscription duties, as was noted in chapter one.799 Fear was 
as significant a factor in resisting enlistment as the loss of livelihood. 1917 was 
the high water mark of the public’s appreciation of the horrors of the Western 
Front, and the reality and actualities of death were much stronger in the 
potential recruits of 1917 than they were for the men of 1914.  
    
   Patterson’s meeting at the WO in August had resulted in the acceptance of a 
Jewish Battalion by the Jewish establishment, but the role and significance that 
it would play within the history of the Jewish community of Britain was yet to be 
decided. The anti- and pro-Battalion camps vigorously sought to shape this 
role. Would the new unit constitute a means to engage idle Russian Jewish 
manhood through participation in a unit with a non-descript name in a 
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peripheral sector; or, as Jabotinsky and Patterson hoped, would it represent 
symbolically and actually the fusion of British and Russian Jewry through the 
transfer of Jewish soldiers already serving in the forces and the ardour of the 
youth of Whitechapel mobilised in the cause of Zion?  
The superficial shell of the Regiment, its name and insignia, was attached great 
significance by both parties, for the title ‘Jewish Regiment’ was deemed by both 
to encompass the war efforts of the Jewish community, for contemporaries and 
for posterity. Opponents of the Battalion scheme described this in negative 
terms, revealed in a WO minute detailing a deputation led by Lord Swaythling800 
to General Hutchinson, the Director of Organisation at the WO, who recorded 
that:  
‘The above named (Lord Swaythling, Major Rothschild and Mr. Montefiore) 
strongly object to this name [Jewish Regiment] − whether they represent any 
large section of Jews I cannot say − they think the Jews we are going to 
enlist will disgrace the name of the Jew. I do not care what the unit is called 
but we have already called it the Jewish Reg. in a Communique. The names 
suggested are:                                                                                                                                                     
Russian Jewish Reg.                                                                                                                       
Zion Regiment (Taken from the Zion Mule Corps in Egypt).                                                                                                 
Macobean [sic] Reg.’801 
   Apart from revealing the general bafflement on behalf of the British authorities 
regarding the furore caused by the naming of the Regiment, the alternative 
names suggested by the deputation show how as far as possible the opponents 
of the Jewish Battalion wanted the unit to be disassociated from the main body 
of Anglo-Jewry. The controversy over the name threatened to destabilise the 
whole project, with Lloyd George becoming increasingly frustrated at the slow 
progress in the formation of the Battalion802, and eventually the Secretary of 
State for War, Lord Derby, dropped the name in preference for a number: the 
                                                          
800 Son of Samuel Montagu - Liberal MP for Whitechapel 1885-1900. As we saw in chapter 
2, Swaythling would go on to found the anti-Zionist League of British Jews a week after the 
Balfour Declaration in November 1917. 
801 PRO WO 32 11353. WO minutes 15-23 August 1917. 
802 See Watts Jewish Legion, p.110 
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38th Battalion of the Royal Fusiliers.803 In a reply to a pro-Regiment deputation, 
Derby defended his decision by arguing the title ‘Jewish Regiment’ was too 
encompassing: ‘They must remember that there were many thousands of Jews 
serving in all branches of the British Army at the present moment who, in many 
cases, had earned themselves the respect of their comrades for their fighting 
capabilities’.804 He left open the possibility for the re-naming of the unit following 
distinguished service in the field and in time the Battalions would become 
known colloquially as ‘The Judeans’. Once again however, Jabotinsky and 
other supporters of the Jewish unit project had been forced by latent hostility 
within the community and the specific needs of the government to compromise 
on an integral aspect of the project: the Jewish title that the world and posterity 
would acknowledge it by had been substituted for an anglicised one. 
 
 The Jewish Battalions in Action: War Experience 
and Jewish Masculinity 
 
     At the end of August 1917, the WO sanctioned the creation of a depot at 
Crown Hill in Plymouth to which the Jewish conscripts would be sent to create 
the first unit: the 38th Battalion of the Royal Fusiliers (the 39th and 40th Battalion 
would be recruited in North America and Palestine respectively). Despite 
initially sluggish numbers of recruits and transfers805 the Battalion reached its 
required target of 1,200 members by November, and after intense training was 
ready for overseas duty by the beginning of February.806      
   It is important at this juncture to attempt to discover what lay behind the 
motivations of the men who chose to join the 38th battalion in 1917 rather than 
returning to Russia or choosing resistance like Arnold Harris and John Rodker. 
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Michael Adler advising Jewish soldiers not to transfer to the Jewish Legion. Jabotinsky, 
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The testimonials of the veterans of the Jewish Legion stored at the Beit 
Hagudim Museum in Avichail, Israel, provide invaluable clues as to the men’s 
motivations for enlistment. Only a fifth of the 7,000 soldiers recorded as serving 
in the various Battalions of the Jewish Legion are represented at Hagudim. The 
Museum houses just over 1672 testimonials of which 425 account for soldiers 
of the 38th battalion that was formed in September 1917 at the Crown Hill depot 
in Plymouth and to which the majority of the London-based recruits were sent. 
As an overview, the testimonials of the London recruits reveal several expected 
and some surprising pieces of information. Martin Watts’ account of the 
testimonials affirms that over two thirds of the men recruited in Britain (an 
important proviso as over half of the 38th Testimonials concerned American and 
Canadian volunteers, reflecting the methodology of the museum’s first curator 
in favouring these nationalities for a perceived commitment on their behalf to 
Israel over their British comrades) were in fact born in Britain. Watts also gives 
the average age of the recruits as 20 years old. This appears in line with the 
evidence that the vast majority of Jewish immigration from Russia took place in 
the late Victorian period and certainly before the Aliens Act of 1905. He also 
states that the vast majority of the recruits from Britain demonstrated little or no 
allegiance to Zionism.807  
     However, when only the troops recruited directly from London are examined, 
this picture changes. From a random selection of 54 veterans living in London 
in 1917 and who served in the 38th Battalion, 24 were born in England, 21 were 
listed as born within the Russian Empire and a further 9 did not list their country 
of birth. Less than half therefore were born in Britain and the majority of these 
had served in the British Army previous to transferring into the Jewish Legion 
(16 from 24, who actively listed prior service with other British Army regiments). 
These figures reveal that Russian Jews from the East End of London were 
actively prominent in the first drafts of the Jewish Battalion and casts doubt on 
the suggestion made by David Cesarani that the majority of males of military 
age had returned with the other Conventionists to Russia in August, or were 
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interned in enemy alien camps on the south coast.808 Strengthening the 
impression that the Battalion contained many non-naturalised foreign Jews is 
the evidence of a post war report from The Jewish Regiment Committee 
(formed in August 1917 to raise donations to alleviate the needs of the new 
recruits) stating that it was necessary to send out text books to the camp in 
Plymouth and later to Palestine ‘For the teaching of English to foreign-born 
members of the Regiment’, and that many of the literary materials sent to the 
Battalion had to be translated into Yiddish, Russian, and other Eastern 
European dialects.809 
     What is also revealing is that contrary to Watts’ assertion of a lack of Zionist 
affiliation on behalf of the recruits, 17 of the 54 London recruits from the same 
survey make at least some reference to Zionist activity in their testimonials.810 
These range from relocation to Palestine after demobilisation such as in the 
case of Frederick Phillips (whose testimonial lists him as ‘a member of an old 
Anglo-Jewish family and the only member sympathising with the Zionist 
cause’811), to Mark Kerstein, a ‘bespoke gentleman’s tailor’ from Whitechapel 
listed as ‘A staunch Zionist at heart − He had a deep love of his Jewish religion 
and its traditions’.812 Others list more direct involvement in Zionist politics, for 
example Captain Samuel Barnet who found employment as a military judge in 
the British protectorate of Palestine after the war but resigned after accusing 
the administration of holding an anti-Zionist policy.813 Whilst this does not reveal 
a collective Jewish nationalism on the part of the London recruits to rival that of 
the American and Canadian recruits of the 39th Battalion, it would suggest that 
the modern perception in Israel that the coerced nature of the English recruit’s 
conscription limited their commitment to a Jewish homeland is unfair: the 
Jewish Legion attracted and nurtured pro-active Zionist supporters from the 
                                                          
808 Cesarani, Embattled Minority, p.68. Watts has shown that the Jewish Chronicle report of 
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p.126 
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East End of London, but for the most part only after the threat of compulsion 
had been used.814     
   In addition, there were high levels of transfers of Jewish soldiers serving in 
other units into the new battalion (about half of the men who joined the regiment 
in 1917 were transferees), the majority of who were British Jews.815 The circular 
letter to representatives of the Jewish community sent by Myer Landa, the 
official secretary of the Jewish Regiment, stated: ‘The large number of 
applicants from officers, non-coms, and men for transfer to the regiment 
indicates a strong sentiment in favour of the scheme on the part of those 
affected - those in the army or due to join. It proves also, that English-born 
Jews of all classes, are anxious to be associated with their Russian brothers.’816  
   This was in itself a fairly self-serving appraisal of English Jewry’s contribution 
to the Jewish Regiment, designed to soften hard attitudes amongst the elder 
statesmen of Anglo-Jewry of whom the letters were the intended target. There 
was however a clear desire on the part of the transferees to serve with their 
fellow co-religionists and on the whole an easy co-existence between Russian 
and English Jews within the camp at Crown Hill and later on campaign.817 
Russian Jews already serving in the British Army expressed interest in the 
Jewish Battalion project, such as Private J. Lancle who wrote to Landa in 
September 1917: ‘Being of Jewish birth, Polish born in Wilna, Poland, Russia, 
of Russian parentage and descent, I would very much like to transfer to the 
Jewish regiment amongst my co-religionists as I am at present the only Jewish 
private in our battalion’.818 Others such as 2nd Lieutenant H V Oleef sought 
permission from their commanding officer to transfer to the Jewish units, Jack 
Davidson writing to Landa on his behalf that he was ‘desirous of joining the 
Jewish Regiment. He is a splendid fellow full of sympathetic interest in the 
Jewish cause and widely experienced in East End Jewish club life’.819 Whilst 
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most Jewish transferees were British born, these examples are a reminder that 
some Russian Jewish men did enlist in the British Army before the issue of 
Russian Jewish conscription reached crisis point in 1917. The experiences of 
isolation and loneliness hinted at in the reasoning of private Lancle’s desire to 
join the regiment as ‘I am at present the only Jewish private in our battalion’, is 
comparable to the difficulties and occasional experiences of antisemitism 
suffered by Jewish soldiers serving in the British Army that were explored in 
chapter two. Of course the response to Landa’s letter calling for Jewish soldiers 
to join the Jewish Battalion from regular British Army units was not universally 
popular. One man wrote to him in November 1917 stating ‘I am not in sympathy 
with the movement which created a Jewish Regiment. I have two sons serving 
as officers in the army and as they and other Jews are on an equal footing with 
every other denomination I fail to see why the army should be divided into 
religious sections.’820 
   Despite this, those Jewish soldiers who did transfer are important in revealing 
the symbolic and actual appeal of the Jewish Legion. For these Jewish soldiers 
already serving in the British Army, the motivation for service in the Jewish 
Battalions ranged from the desire of some to be part of a momentous Jewish 
movement that inspired the imagination of Isaac Rosenberg, or more simply, in 
the case of David Dobrin from Hackney who had served in the Duke of 
Cornwallis Light Infantry, to serve with fellow Jews: ‘This was the happiest time 
of my army service amongst my own people’.821 
 
   Along with the controversies surrounding the naming of the Battalion, a 
further issue centring on the ‘differentness’ of the Jewish unit was the question 
of whether the specific religious requirements of the troops would be catered for 
by the authorities. As was discussed in chapter two, the British authorities faced 
mounting difficulties in meeting the needs of its Jewish recruits, particularly in 
the supply of kosher food, the recognition of Jewish holidays and the provision 
of Jewish chaplains to perform prayer services as well as burial rites for fallen 
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Jewish soldiers. The Reverend Michael Adler attempted to meet these 
requirements, however the reluctance of the British Army to provide specific 
rations for its Jewish soldiers and the opposition within Anglo-Jewry by those 
who felt such measures would accentuate the differentness of Jewish soldiers, 
resulted in inadequate procurement for the needs of strictly orthodox Jewish 
soldiers on the front line.  
    The issue gained greater prominence with the formation of the Jewish 
Battalion in August 1917. Much of the positive propaganda Jabotinsky and 
others used to ‘sell’ the scheme to reluctant Russian Jews was based on how a 
Jewish-only unit would provide Jewish troops the ability to worship freely in the 
British Armed forces. Indeed, Patterson recalled the critical nature of the issue 
for the Battalion’s success in his memoirs: ‘Now I felt very strongly that unless 
the Jewish Battalion was treated as such, and all its wants, both physical and 
spiritual, catered for in a truly Jewish way, this new unit would be an absolute 
failure, for I could only hope to appeal to them as Jews, and it could hardly  be 
expected that there would be any response to this appeal if I countenanced 
such an outrage on their religious susceptibilities as forcing them to eat 
unlawful food.’822 
    After the Army failed to make special provisions for Kosher food for the 
Jewish Battalion at the outset of its formation in August 1917, Patterson in his 
own words ‘made such a point of this that I was at length summoned to the War 
Office by the Adjutant General, Sir Nevil Macready, who informed me that I was 
to carry on as if I had an ordinary British Battalion, and that there was to be no 
humbug about Kosher food, or Saturday Sabbaths, or any other such 
nonsense.’823 After Patterson threatened to resign over the issue, the WO 
softened its hard-line approach. Patterson received a WO communique on the 
subject on 14 September which stated that: ‘as far as the Military exigencies 
permit, Saturday should be allowed for their day of rest instead of Sunday. 
Arrangements will be made for the provision of kosher food when possible.’824 
Patterson referred to this as his ‘Kosher Charter’, which helped navigate around 
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the issue during the duration of the Battalion’s training in Plymouth and whilst 
on active campaign in Palestine. 
   However, even with this endorsement from the WO, the exigencies for kosher 
procurement were often trumped by the realities of wartime shortages, and the 
supporters of the battalion were required to fund the shortfalls of the authorities 
in adequately providing for the troops’ religious needs. The Jewish Regiment 
Committee used public donations mainly drawn from wealthy sympathisers 
within Anglo-Jewry (such as Leopold Frank who donated £1,000 to the 
Battalion825), to set up a canteen in Chenies Street that catered for the Jewish 
troops before their journey to join up with the Battalion in Plymouth. The 
Committee reported that ‘the food and drink served to the men were specially 
prepared in accordance with the tastes prevailing among Russian Jews. The 
staple food was fish and sausages, and other palatable articles of diet such as 
chopped liver, herring, cucumber, etc, with brown bread and Russian tea, 
provided meals that were much appreciated.’826 On campaign, a combination of 
the use of Patterson’s ‘kosher charter’ and the donations of the JRC muddled 
through to meet the men’s needs. The first report of the Committee published 
after the war noted that the Sabbath and Jewish festivals were duly recognised 
by the military authorities, and the Passover Festival was in particular: 
‘celebrated with due regard to tradition, the committee contributing the extra 
cost of motzas, wine and haggadahs’.827 
    In this way, the Jewish troops wishing to maintain Kashrut and Shabbat 
whilst serving in the Jewish Battalions were on the whole able to, in contrast to 
the majority of Jewish troops serving individually across the British Army.  It 
would appear that the WO was able and willing to demonstrate flexibility over 
the issue of Jewish soldier’s religious requirements for three small and 
undersized battalions, but was less willing and perhaps logistically incapable of 
extending this practice to meet the needs of the thousands of Jewish troops 
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scattered across the hundreds of battalions of the British Army in the later 
stages of the war. 
    
   To relieve the boredom of camp life and to supplement their fitness training, 
the officers arranged boxing tournaments at the depot for the recruits. Boxing 
had a particular affinity with the immigrant Jewish population, honed in part by 
the struggle and conflict that characterised the tough living conditions of turn of 
the century East London. Jews were to a degree culturally segregated from the 
‘gentlemanly’ sports of football and rugby that represented the backbone of 
English sporting culture and the instilling of principles of ‘fair play’, team ethic 
and technical ability expected of an English gentleman.828 That the Jewish 
immigrants were deemed lacking in these principles was a widely held Gentile 
prejudice extended to the Jewish community as a whole.  
   Bare-knuckle boxing, especially its seedier sub-culture in the back dens of 
East End drinking holes and gambling shops, was not deemed to be an activity 
fit for aspiring English gentleman, but the necessary fighting and physical 
abilities the sport demanded and the string of Jewish champions it produced in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries are contrary to contemporary perceptions 
of the physical weakness of Jewish manhood. An East London resident, Bill 
Belmont, recalled in his memoirs following the exploits of the famous Jewish 
fighter Ted ‘Kid’ Lewis − born in Aldgate and winner of the World Welterweight 
title in August 1915 − ‘Here was someone who could show that Jews did not 
have to take everything lying down, but could hit back − and hard.’829 Fighting in 
the ring was equated to and often a substitute for fighting on the battlefield − the 
Jewish boxer Mick Shulman in the 1931 novel Magnolia Street embodied the 
aggressive instincts of Jewish youth needed in the hard environment of Britain’s 
inner cities: ‘He yearned to be a soldier. His nostrils sniffed for the blood of 
Germans. He was a member of the Jewish Lad’s Brigade, and because its 
members included no Germans, he was not permitted to attack them with 
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swords or bayonets. So he boxed them instead… In 1916, a lad of 10, he is the 
most grim jawed patriot in Magnolia Street. Woe upon Kaiser Wilhelm should 
he and Mick Shulman meet one dark night in the back-entry’.830  
    Jewish recruits at Crown Hill relished the chance to display their fighting 
prowess in the boxing tournaments held in the autumn and winter of 1917. The 
testimonial of one recruit, Alexander Berger, mentions little about his activities 
with the Jewish Legion apart from that ‘I won the boxing championship in the 
army. I still have the cup that I won.’831 Jabotinsky relates that the London 
recruits ‘Proved to be the best boxers in the whole British Army in Palestine, 
defeating, one after another, the champions of all other regiments, so that in the 
final match in Cairo between “England” and “Australia”, it was our soldier Burak 
who represented England’.832 Jabotinsky does not state whether Burak won or 
not. After success in the early rounds of the competition that included 
representatives from every unit of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, Pattison 
remarked dryly: ‘The first round of this essentially British form of sport had been 
fought and won by the despised Jewish Battalion!’833 The displays impressed 
Patterson, and went some way to allaying the fears raised in him by the initial 
experiences of military training for the new recruits, as he makes clear in his 
memoirs: ‘the men came from sedentary occupations. They had never been 
accustomed to an outdoor, open-air life, and naturally dreaded, and really felt, 
the strain of the hard military training which they had to undergo in those cold 
winter days at Plymouth’.834 
    One Officer in particular who shared Patterson’s concerns was one of the 
transferees, Henry D Myer. Born in 1892 to a wealthy Jewish family in 
Bayswater London, Myer rejected his father’s offer to send him to the Jewish 
House at Clifton College opting instead for the traditions of Westminster 
School.835 He was, as he readily confessed, little interested in his Jewish 
heritage and considered himself a fervently patriotic Englishmen, with a 
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particular penchant for the English military tradition fostered by childhood 
memories of Kitchener’s march on Sudan and the wild excitement of the relief 
of Mafeking.836 Myer joined the Territorial Army in 1908 and served with them 
initially in France upon the outbreak of the First World War before he joined the 
City of London Rifles 1st Battalion and was injured at the Battle of Loos in 
September 1915 and later witnessed the full horror of the war in the 
Passchendaele offensive during the summer and autumn of 1917. Whilst 
convalescing after another injury, Myer received a telegraph from the WO 
requesting his transfer into the Jewish Battalion.837 Despite accepting the 
commission, Myer had his doubts: ‘I felt that every anglicised, or even partly 
anglicised Jew would have long ago joined the Armed services, for this had 
been my experience and that of my older cousins and friends doing social 
among these communities. I reckoned that in London, Leeds, Manchester, 
Glasgow, Cardiff and the like, the men who would be of poor material in a 
military sense’.838      
    Myer joined too late to sail with the 38th Battalion in March 1918 but was 
assigned an Officer of the 39th Battalion. Whilst praising his fellow Jewish 
Officers, he was scathing of the regular Jewish recruits (which in March 1918 
consisted of 400 men left over from the 38th): ‘The Tailors, the boot-makers, 
cabinet-makers and other typical East Enders’ and ‘these men were types to 
whom soldiers and soldiering were anathema and were to be evaded at almost 
any cost. The daily sick parade consisted on average, of 100 men… It would 
have reflected badly on the Anglo-Jewish community had it been ventilated in 
the National Press, because few people would have understood how men, who 
and whose relatives owed so much to the hospitality they had enjoyed in the 
United Kingdom, could have refrained from showing gratitude in the form of 
sharing burdens, which fell upon all Britishers’.839 Myer was merely repeating 
the concerns expressed by Anglo-Jewish leaders that the Russian Jewish 
recruits and their poor performance in action would taint the Jewish community 
as a whole, but his repeated assertion that the recruits were ‘poor material’ 
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reflects that some British Jews shared Gentile stereotypes of the weak nature 
of immigrant Jewish manhood and were concerned that this would feed wider 
caricatures of Jewish physical weakness on the part of the community at large. 
   Whilst Myer was a reluctant transferee, another Jewish man from a polar 
opposite background was desperate to transfer into the battalion: the 
Whitechapel poet Isaac Rosenberg. A 28 year old Russian Jewish poet raised 
in the poverty-stricken district of Whitechapel, Rosenberg encapsulated to a 
fascinating degree the complexities of the East London Jewish community’s 
response to the First World War. Disconnected and diffident, Rosenberg 
shunned wider Gentile and Jewish society alike. His biographer Deborah 
Maccoby described him as having ‘Little interest in Hebrew studies, synagogue 
worship and religious rituals’.840 He found solace in the company of a select 
group of East London poets and artists such as John Rodker, Joseph Leftwich 
and David Bomberg − the so called ‘Whitechapel Boys’ − whose isolation in 
their trade mirrored the detachment of the bulk of Jewish masculinity in the East 
End.841   
    Despite this, Rosenberg volunteered for service in the British Army in 
October 1915 seven months before the introduction of conscription. Yet his 
poems and letters from the trenches reveal a continuing sense of isolation and 
detachment from the war and from British and Jewish concerns. The formation 
of a British Army regiment manned specifically by Jewish soldiers in the 
summer of 1917 filled for Rosenberg this void in national identity, re-orientating 
his own sense of belonging with the cause of a Jewish Homeland. It inspired a 
series of vehemently Zionist poems culminating in ‘These Cold Pale Days’, 
written about the Jewish Regiment two days before his death and equating its 
existence and cause with the spiritual and actual re-awakening of Jewish 
Nationalism. The line ‘They see with living eyes how long they have been dead’ 
expresses the full three millennia of the Diaspora witnessed by the soldiers of 
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the Regiment as they draw it to a close, the modern re-embodiment of the 
soldiers of the Kingdom of Judah.842 
   For Rosenberg and the men who would serve in it, the Jewish Battalion 
provided meaning for their involvement in the war, and instilled in many a 
layered set of identities − a community-based identity centred on their 
professions, but also a Jewish identity built on pride in participation with a 
Jewish cause and concurrently a British identity shaped by service − however 
reluctantly for many − in the British Army. Rosenberg’s father had left Russia to 
avoid military conscription and brought his family to London, living seven to a 
room in a tenement in Cable Street, Stepney. Poverty was a constant theme of 
Rosenberg’s youth and early adulthood, and his experiences of struggle, 
neglect and victimisation in the streets of East London fed and shaped a theme 
of alienation within his poetry shared by his friendship group of East End Jewish 
artists and poets.843 
   His formative years living in a Jewish community in a slum district of an 
English city instilled no particular sense of Jewishness or conversely any 
particular attachment to Britain in the young Rosenberg, and he differed 
outwardly and emotionally little from the majority of disaffected Jewish youth 
that frustrated Jabotinsky in 1916. His mother attempted to persuade him not to 
enlist, a not untypical occurrence as Deborah Maccoby relates: ‘The greatest 
dread of immigrant Jewish mothers from the Russian Empire was that their 
sons would be conscripted into the army; it brought back all their memories of 
the army in Russia, in which the Jewish soldiers had been so ill-treated that 
many of them had died before even reaching the front, and those who did reach 
it were treated as cannon fodder.’844 
   Like Rodker, Rosenberg deplored war, writing to his friend and benefactor 
Sydney Schiff: ‘I have changed my mind again about joining the army. I feel 
about it that more men means more war − besides the immorality of joining with 
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no patriotic convictions’.845 However, unlike Rodker, he did not actively resist 
enlistment,846 and with his poverty reaching absolute levels and hearing that his 
mother would receive a signing on bonus, Rosenberg joined the army in 
October 1915: ‘I could not get the work I thought I might so I have joined this 
Bantam Battalion (as I was too short for any other) which seems to be the most 
rascally affair in the world… Besides me being a Jew makes it bad amongst 
these wretches. I am looking forward to having a bad time altogether’.847 In this 
respect his motives were similar to many English recruits who saw service as 
an escape from poverty made more inescapable by the economic dislocation of 
the war.848 Rosenberg had not previously been known to harbour any interest in 
Zionism − his friend Joseph Ascher recalled ‘I cannot remember that Isaac was 
especially Jewish or Zionistic in his outlook…’849 Rosenberg however would 
almost certainly have heard from friends and relatives of Jabotinsky’s East End 
recruitment drive for a Jewish Legion in 1916 and 1917, and it is this that 
seemingly jolts him from an empty sense of national identity to an attachment to 
the cause of Jewish nationalism.850 Rosenberg was deeply moved by reports 
he received of the march of the Battalion through Whitechapel in February 
1918, and declared in a letter to his patron Edward Marsh: ‘I wanted to write a 
battle song for the Judeans but can think of nothing strong and wonderful 
enough yet.’851 
    Where before in his poems there had been a lack of Jewish subject to the 
extent that he has largely been identified within the Anglo-Christian tradition of 
poetry, he now produced a series of powerfully Zionist poems such as ‘The 
Burning of the Temple’ and ‘The Destruction of Jerusalem by the Babylonian 
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Hordes’, linking himself spiritually with the contemporary movement to avenge 
the diaspora and reclaim the Holy Land as a Jewish home that the Legion 
represented.852 He actively attempted to transfer into the new battalion, writing 
to his friend Gordon Bottomley in March 1918: ‘I am trying to get transferred to 
the ‘Judeans’. I think they are now in Mesopotamia. Jacob Epstein whom I 
know is with the Judeans, and several other friends of mine’.853 His final poem, 
‘These Pale Cold Days’, sees the Jewish future looking with ‘dark faces’ and 
‘wild eyes’ beyond the ravaged and war-torn landscape of Europe towards ‘the 
pools of Hebron again’; the hope and promise represented by the reclamation 
of Palestine sought by the Jewish Legion was for Rosenberg his war aim.854 
Having signed up to alleviate the financial pressures on himself and his mother 
and like many Russian Jews professing a hatred for militarism and disinterest in 
nationalism, the Jewish Battalion and the reclamation of the Holy Land became 
for Rosenberg and many of the soldiers who served in the Jewish Battalions a 
cause justifying their service in the British Army. 
 
   Before embarkation to Palestine, the regiment was granted the honour of a 
march through the East End of London, from Tower Hill through Aldgate and 
Whitechapel and ending in Stepney. The Jewish Chronicle (its editor Leo 
Greenberg having reconciled himself to the Jewish Battalion, but not sufficiently 
to refer to it as such, preferring the less inclusive term ‘Judeans’) celebrated the 
upcoming parade with unbridled enthusiasm and hyperbole: ‘It will be the first 
time that a Regiment consisting entirely of Jews will have tramped the streets of 
England, and the march of the Judeans will be a picturesque reminder of how 
history is being made in these days, here and in Palestine’.855  
   On Monday 4 February the Battalion paraded through the heart of the Jewish 
East End, and in contrast to the hostile reception that greeted Jabotinsky in the 
dark days of failed recruitment meetings, the Russian Jewish community 
greeted the Battalion with overwhelming support: ‘There were tens of 
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thousands of Jews in the streets…women crying with joy, old Jews with 
fluttering beards murmuring, ‘shehechianu’ [the thanksgiving prayer for 
‘reaching this day’]…the boys…shoulder to shoulder, their bayonets dead 
level…proud, drunk with the national anthem, with the noise of the crowds, and 
with their sense of a holy mission’.856 This is not the response we might expect 
from a community that had vainly resisted a war eventually thrust upon it, and 
reveals, at least after the event, community patriotism for the Regiment and its 
cause. The enthusiastic public response to the march-by mirrored the positive 
reception enjoyed by the 17th Stepney and Poplar Battalion during the unit’s 
marches through the East End in August 1914, discussed in section one of this 
chapter. The remarkable nature of the comparison lies in the context behind the 
local support. The crowds cheering the 38th battalion in February 1918 were not 
the optimistic and excitable masses of August 1914 that steadfastly supported 
Britain’s cause, but members of a nationally maligned immigrant community 
that had shown indifference to Britain’s war aims and were by 1918 fully aware 
of the horror of modern industrial warfare. Despite this, Patterson recalled: ‘As 
we approached the Mile End Road the scenes of enthusiasm redoubled, and 
London’s Ghetto fairly rocked with military fervour and roared its welcome to its 
own. Jewish banners were hung out everywhere, and it certainly was a scene 
unparalleled in the history of any previous battalion.857 Anglo-Jewry − and 
former opponents of the Regiment − were determined to maximise the 
propaganda potential the march presented in demonstrating Jewish 
commitment to the war effort and its oneness with Britain. The Chief Rabbi 
proclaimed at the blessing of the Regiment at Camper Down House: ‘In the 
great struggle in which they were to take their part, British ideals were 
consistent with Jewish ideals’.858 To commemorate the event the Anglo-Jewish 
poet and active Zionist Nina Salaman (whose husband Radcliffe Salaman 
became the Battalion’s medical officer in Palestine) wrote the ‘Marching Song’ 
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of the Judeans in February 1918, which later would become a popular ballad 
sung by the Judeans on campaign.859   
   After the march, the 38th Battalion embarked from Portsmouth and sailed via 
Italy to Egypt, to be joined subsequently by the 39th Battalion, formed 
predominantly of American and Canadian volunteers, and the 40th Battalion, 
consisting of the remainder of the recruits from the 38th (that Henry Myer had 
been so critical of) and locally recruited Jewish volunteers from Egypt and 
Palestine. The experience of the Battalions was mixed and certainly did not live 
up to the expectations of Patterson, Jabotinsky and the project’s supporters at 
home.860 The men performed well, particularly during the Jordan Valley 
offensive in June 1918, but were repeatedly side-lined and given 
inconsequential and laborious tasks, something Patterson attributed to an 
element of prejudice towards the Battalion within the Egyptian Expeditionary 
Force and influenced by certain forces within established Jewry hostile to the 
                                                          
859 Nina Salaman, Songs of Many Days (London 1923). P.33. See also Keren, We are 
Coming, Unafraid, p.78.  
Full poem: 
 
 “Zion, our Mother, calling to thy sons, 
     We are coming, we are coming to thine 
         aid. 
Spread among the nations, we thy loving ones, 
   We are ready, we are coming, unafraid. 
 
All along the ages thou wert lying waste, 
   We were waiting, we were looking to the goal.  
Thou wert always calling, calling us to haste; 
   We were hoping and we heard thee in our  
          soul. 
 
Other men have found thee but a stony height; 
  It is we can bring the blessing to thy soil— 
Only we, thy children, precious in thy sight— 
   We shall prove thee, we shall save thee by our 
          toil. 
 
Zion, our Mother, now thy sons depart; 
    We are coming while thou watchest there  
           alone. 
Heart amid the nations, beating with our heart, 
    We are ready, we are coming—we, thine own.” 
860 Watts, Jewish Legion, pp.198-200 
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Battalion − revealing that the deep divisions opened up by the Jewish Battalion 
scheme within the community had never fully healed.861  
   The Commander in Chief of the EEF, General Allenby, was particularly 
sensitive to winning the hearts and minds of the Arab communities in the region 
and did not want to jeopardise the chances of this by being seen to favour a 
regiment of Jews, who he privately complained had been thrust upon him and 
served no military value.862 The Battalions had missed sharing in the glory and 
publicity of the fall of Jerusalem the previous November, and the whole theatre 
was to a large extent overshadowed in the British public’s perception of the war 
by the dramatic and decisive developments on the Western Front in 1918. 
Following the Armistice with Turkey in November 1918, the three Battalions 
acted as a peacekeeping force in the newly titled British Protectorate of 
Palestine before becoming surplus to requirements and disbanding in 1922. 
 
Conclusion: Legacy of the Jewish Battalions 
     
   The majority of the recruits raised in Britain returned there after disbandment, 
never to return to Palestine. This has been contrasted with the high proportion 
of American and Canadian troops who remained in Palestine, and has been 
used to argue, by Watts and by Shlomit & Michael Keren, that the Jewish 
recruits from Britain were not interested in Palestine or Jewish nationalism and 
had been compelled into service.863 The reality was more complex: whilst the 
majority avoided enlistment until the Convention forced their hand, they chose 
to serve in the Jewish Legion over returning to revolutionary Russia or serving 
elsewhere in the British Army. It has been shown previously how serving in the 
Jewish Legion awakened in many a Jewish nationalism, revealed in examples 
of involvement in Zionist organisations and activities upon returning to England 
and declarations of solidarity with the Jewish settlers in Palestine and 
lamentations that circumstances had not allowed them to return that litter the 
testimonials at Avichail. However, the testimonials also hint that service in the 
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British Army and pride in the victory won bred a certain degree of British 
patriotism amongst a number of the recruits, with involvement in wider society 
outside of the traditional spheres of the immigrant community listed in post war 
activities, and specifically the pride many recruits experienced from performing 
air warden and firefighting services in the Second World War.       
    One of the more surprising transformations affected by service in the Jewish 
Legion was experienced by Henry Myer. Myer had reluctantly transferred to the 
Battalion out of a sense of duty, but was impressed by the commitment of the 
Palestinian recruits he came in contact with in the 40th Battalion describing 
them as ‘well developed mentally, and physically they are men’ and ‘worthy 
representatives of the race’864, and was impressed with their commitment to 
Zionism. Writing to his fiancée Louie Solomons in January 1919, he wrote ‘I am 
only a sympathizer with their views and not an active Zionist’865, but sympathy 
with Zionism represented quite a turnaround for the ultra-patriotic Englishman 
who had previously shown only muted acknowledgement of his Jewish 
ancestry. This to an extent might also be explained by his earlier experience 
within the British Army in France discussed in chapter two and worth repeating 
here briefly: ‘there was a substantial number of Gentiles who either did not 
understand or did not want to associate with, or even disliked British Jews, no 
matter how assimilated they were, or appeared to be’.866  
   Antisemitism, if not as rife on the British Home Front as David Cesarani has 
suggested during the war years, had been a persistent reality within the British 
Army since the Boer War, and dimmed for those British Jews who experienced 
it a previously unvanquished sense of Britishness, replaced in the case of 
Henry Myer by a lost Jewish identity nurtured by his experiences with the 
Judeans in the Holy Land. The issue of the Jewish Battalion further widened the 
already deep divisions opened by the war between the established community 
and the immigrant population of London, and brought into the open the conflict 
between the pro- and anti-Zionist camps that would dominate Jewish politics in 
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the interwar years.867 The legacy of the Jewish Battalion proved to be neither 
the disastrous humiliation of the whole community opponents of the project 
feared nor the crowning glory of the Jewish war effort hoped for by Jabotinsky. 
The unit was largely lost in the euphoria and upheavals of the end of the war 
and the small occasion that it did register with the British public was to reinforce 
Jewish stereotypes. During the march through Whitechapel in February 1918 
The Times reported (falsely) that after the parade of the 38th Battalion had 
finished, the majority of the troops deserted.868 
    The Jewish Battalions did however represent a tangible watershed for the 
Russian Jewish community and contributed to the painful process of integration 
into British society through its belated sacrifice in the war, attested by the many 
recruits who did not return home.869 Its existence proved a powerful source of 
civic pride for the Jewish community, and a sense of shared struggle alongside 
the wider Gentile society that proved the baptism of fire for a community 
previously in transition. For the soldiers that served in it, many returned home 
imbued with a degree of Jewish nationalism and pride in Britain’s victory that 
helped to fill a previous lack of self-identity individually and on behalf of the 
community. Ironically this transformation was perhaps most completely 
encapsulated in one soldier who did not even serve in the Battalion. Isaac 
Rosenberg requested transfer into the Jewish Legion but did not get a reply: 
‘I’ve heard nothing further about the J.B and of course feel annoyed − more 
because no reasons have been given me - but when we leave the trenches, I’ll 
enquire further’.870  
   Two days after writing this letter he was killed by a sniper whilst on sentry 
duty. These Pale Cold Days was a dedication to the Jewish Legion, and 
remains a powerful testament to the symbolic power of the unit to instil a 
national identity where it was previously lacking. 
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Through these pale cold days 
What dark faces burn 
Out of three thousand years, 
And their wild eyes yearn, 
 
While underneath their brows 
Like Waifs their spirits grope 
For the pools of Hebron again − 
For Lebanon’s summer slope. 
 
They leave these blond still days 
In dust behind their tread 
They see with living eyes 
How long they have been dead.871 
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Conclusion: Legacy and Significance of 
London Jewry’s Great War 
 
 
   The high proportion of English Jews who served in the British Army relative to 
the size of the community was a powerful source of Jewish pride during and 
after the war, and was championed as irrefutable evidence of the patriotic 
fulfilment of the community’s national duty. Approximately 10,000 Jewish men 
volunteered for service in the British Army prior to the introduction of 
conscription in January 1916. Jewish men were motivated to enlist for a 
multitude of reasons: need for adventure or to escape the boredom of civilian 
life; ‘peer pressure’; or local patriotism i.e. protection of kith and kin. These 
largely matched national motivations for enlistment, as Nicholas Mansfield’s 
and Adrian Gregory’s works in this area have shown.872 However many Jewish 
men enlisted to demonstrate their patriotism and dispel accusations of 
‘shirking’. Jews faced accusations of shirking their wartime responsibilities as 
early as the first weeks of August 1914, before any enlistment figures could be 
widely disseminated. The image of Jewish men as keen to avoid military 
service was fuelled by pre-war stereotypes of Jews as unmanly and cowardly, 
and therefore more prone to avoid service than the ‘brave and patriotic British 
tommies’ of the pals battalions. Such characterisations were largely disproved 
as the war progressed by the significant numbers of Jewish volunteers 
reprinted in the Jewish Chronicle, and the widespread evidence assessed in 
chapter two demonstrates the relatively conventional experiences of Jewish 
soldiers regarding bravery, physical exertion and co-existence with non-Jewish 
troops on the frontline.  
   English Jews that enlisted voluntarily as soldiers represented a ‘shield of 
patriotism’ to defend the community from accusation of disloyalty, and their 
service provided a powerful source of pride for the integrated community in the 
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interwar period. The patriotism of established Jewry was driven partly by the 
need to combat press agitation against the alleged anti-Entente sentiment of 
the community, but also by a perceived pressure to fulfil an ‘Emancipation 
obligation’ (the contemporary notion of a ‘blood tax’ owed by emancipated 
minorities to the dominant power in times of war − most notably felt by Jews 
living in France and Germany in 1914-1918).873 The First World War witnessed 
sporadic anti-German rioting in the British Isles and the denunciation of 
Prussianism, fundamentally rooted in a general acceptance that it was the 
antithesis of what the British represented. It has been argued in this thesis that 
Jews were under increasing scrutiny to demonstrate their national loyalty 
towards Britain during this period of heightened discussion regarding the nature 
of British patriotism, and it was this that partially drove the elevated patriotic 
displays of established Jewry in August 1914. 
   However, the desire of the established Jewish leadership to be seen by the 
government and the British public as united and fully integrated into the nation’s 
war effort was foiled by the non-enlistment of 30,000 Russian Jews, a 
controversy that brought unwanted attention and scrutiny. Russian Jewish non-
enlistment was a sensitive issue for the Jewish community, and one that 
provided a contentious and highly visible point of difference in the eyes of the 
British public. It is important though not to exaggerate the extent to which the 
Jews were an exception in resenting and even avoiding military service in 
Britain, and even other belligerent nations. As Derek Penslar has pointed out, 
the vast majority of men who fought in the First World War did so not as 
volunteers but because they were compelled to, and even amongst the most 
ardently nationalist sector of the British population, the urban idle classes of the 
British bourgeoisie, war enthusiasm had dwindled significantly by 1916.874 
When the British Government did introduce conscription in July 1916, 93,000 
British citizens failed to report for army duty, and three quarters of a million 
more initially claimed one form of exemption or another.875 For every Jewish 
applicant to the military tribunals in 1916 that met the ire and contempt of the 
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East London Observer, there were proportionately as many non-Jewish citizens 
seeking exemptions on largely similar grounds.  
   Intra-communal relations between the established and immigrant contingents 
of London’s Jewish community, already tense before the war, were greatly 
exacerbated by the conflict. In 1881 the Jewish population of London was 
46,000. By 1900 it stood at 135,000; by the eve of the First World War it had 
risen to perhaps as a high as 180,000.876 In the words of Geoffrey Alderman 
‘Merely from a demographic viewpoint this amounted to a revolution’, and 
placed serious strain on the institutional and social framework of established 
Jewry, and the impoverished condition of many of the arrivals threatened to 
embarrass the community.877 The Jewish authorities subsequently initiated an 
aggressive acculturation policy towards the recent immigrants in an attempt to 
forcibly incorporate them into the fabric of British society. This policy, driven by 
the internal and external pressures to eradicate Jewish differentness in the 
eyes of the nation, contributed to the frenzied patriotism of the early war years. 
The heavy handed attempts of Jewish recruiting committees to force the issue 
of Russian Jewish non-enlistment led to the disillusionment with, and 
separation from, West End leadership by the immigrant community. This 
attempt to force the internal integration of immigrant Jews, as much as external 
British pressure to display national rather than communal loyalty, transformed 
the concept of national and religious allegiances for Jews in Britain.  
   The issue of Zionism as a war aim of the struggles of 1914-18 critically 
divided established Jewry. Many argued the fruits of Jewish exertion in the war 
could and should be a Jewish homeland, but a significant element of the 
London Jewish elite saw only an unwanted deportation to Palestine and 
resisted it vigorously. This factionalism within Anglo-Jewry was most notably 
seen in the press battle between Leo Greenberg’s Jewish Chronicle and Leo 
Wolf’s anti-Zionist paper the Jewish Guardian that polarised Jewish opinion 
throughout the inter-war period.878 The growth of political Zionism in Britain 
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during the First World War split established Jewry and further deteriorated the 
ability of the community to find consensus on non-Zionist Jewish matters. 
   The 1914-1918 conflict further strained the already hostile relations between 
Jews and non-Jews in the East End. The rejection of Jewish appeals to relief 
committees in several East London districts in the economic crisis of the first 
weeks of war in August 1914 hint at this underlying tension and reveal the 
hollowness of patriotic sentiments calling for collective endeavour that was not 
extended to the area’s minority residents. Economic competition between Jews 
and non-Jews in the East End, bubbling under the surface in 1914, flared up 
again as the result of the profits accrued by Jewish tailors during the war. The 
‘Khaki Boom’ enjoyed by Jewish tailors after 1915 revived pre-existing 
economic concerns amongst the English working class following decades of 
Jewish encroachment into their perceived historic industries. These sentiments 
were inflamed further by the perception that these profits were accrued at a 
time when a significant number of English workers were enlisted in the British 
Army. This economic rivalry between Jewish immigrants and the English 
working class of the East End provided the context to the Russian Jewish 
conscription crisis that dominated race relations in the East End in the later 
years of the war. The external pressures of rationing and bombing raids added 
to the impression that Jews and Gentiles in the East End were fighting separate 
wars. A direct result of this was the violent anti-Jewish disturbances witnessed 
on the streets and back alleys of Bethnal Green in September 1917. The riot, 
whilst specifically anti-Jewish in intent, can be placed within a historic pattern of 
English East End ‘economic xenophobia’ towards competing migrant 
communities that was expressed through physical violence, which in turn was 
intensified by the cumulative impact of rationing, military service, a vitriolic local 
press, and the terror brought by the Zeppelin raids.  
   By the autumn of 1918 however, tensions between the British and Jewish 
contingents in the East End had cooled. The imminent prospect of victory 
coupled with the normalisation of economic conditions reduced the war stress 
that had seen resentments intermittently flash into violence. From the low of the 
Bethnal Green riot in September 1917, Jewish and British workers decreasingly 
saw themselves in direct competition with each other. This was due largely to 
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the strengthening of British labour organisations and Jewish trade unions in the 
East End, most strikingly demonstrated by the joint action by Jewish and 
Gentile unions before the Committee of Production to defend worker’s rights 
within the tailoring industry.879 Shared wartime hardships with the Gentile 
community forged social and economic bonds which paradoxically were 
strengthened, not ruptured, by the controversy and antagonism surrounding 
Jewish non-enlistment. The furore this caused acted as an important tipping 
point for a community in transition since 1881 and which had already exhibited 
incremental evidence of integration before the war. Many of the more ardently 
anti-British and least acculturated members of the Jewish East End had 
returned to Russia in the wake of the double revolutions of 1917. For those that 
remained, belated war service in the British Army fostered a greater sense of 
commitment and involvement within British society. The monetary gains made 
by Jewish tailors as a result of the ‘Khaki boom’ formed the basis for many 
budding Jewish entrepreneurs to forge successful businesses that eventually 
relocated out of the East End in subsequent decades. The enforced enlistment 
of thousands of Russian Jews into the Jewish Battalion in August 1917 
instigated a degree of support for Britain’s cause where before there had only 
existed apathy. Service in the British Army with the Jewish Battalion, and pride 
in the victory won, bred a certain degree of British patriotism amongst a number 
of the recruits, with civic involvement outside of the traditional spheres of the 
shtetl in post-war activities indicated in their testimonials in Avichail. 
 
   To assess the significance of the First World War and its legacy within the 
context of the later development of Anglo-Jewry in the 20th Century and 
beyond, it is important to trace the ongoing processes from 1914-1918 that 
continued into the interwar period. The thesis has examined a series of 
examples of how the First World War led to both a rise in animosity and anger 
as well as co-operation and co-existence between Jews and non-Jews. To 
assess whether the war represented a unique event that temporarily 
transformed Jewish and Gentile relations in London or contributed to an 
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acceleration of a longer-term process of change, it is important to move the 
picture forward into the decades directly proceeding the end of the conflict. This 
thesis has argued that the tensions and controversies of the war divided the 
established and immigrant parts of British Jewry, resulting in two autonomous 
Jewish communities in 1918. However, it will be argued here that the long-term 
ramifications of the war would actually realign the competing groups both 
politically and socially, by accelerating the process worked for by established 
Jewry since 1881: the anglicisation of the Jewish East End. It is important to 
consider here that many of these processes, particularly the split between the 
established and immigrant Jewish communities, had been set in motion many 
years before the outbreak of the First World War. The extent to which the war 
acted as a catalyst for these changes must also be judged in the context of the 
events shaping the decades proceeding 1918. 
   The 1905 Aliens Act had greatly reduced Jewish immigration into Britain. The 
effects of this could already be seen during the war, with two thirds of the 
recruits of the Jewish Battalions having been born in Britain (although the 
pattern for the London recruits is less conclusive, with half-born in Britain and 
half originating in Russia). The war itself was to accelerate this process further. 
The Aliens Restrictions Act of 1914 was ratified and strengthened in 1919, 
virtually eliminating further Jewish immigration into the East End. By 1930, 
foreign-born Jews were an increasingly small minority of the overall Jewish 
population.880 The profits of the war years provided the basis and impetus for 
the later movement away from the East End for many Jewish families and 
businesses. In 1889, 90 per cent of Jewish families in London lived in the East 
End. Forty years later however, this had fallen to just 60 per cent, the majority 
leaving to seek greater space and opportunities north of the City.881 The 
Russian Revolution saw the departure of thousands of the most radicalised and 
anti-integrationist members of the Jewish intelligentsia, and the chaos and 
horror that followed the Bolshevik coup severed for many the final links with the 
old country.882 A more subtle path of integration accelerated by the First World 
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War was the process of anglicisation of Jewish food - or rather, the anglicisation 
of Jewish food tastes. Wartime shortages and the imposition of rationing 
restricted the ability of many Jewish families to uphold Jewish dietary laws and 
forced them to adopt British culinary habits. This was compounded by returning 
Jewish soldiers used to daily bacon rations in the Army, the Chief Jewish 
reverend of the British Army Michael Adler having issued a special exemption 
from observing Sabbath and dietary laws for the duration of the war for Jewish 
troops.883 Sam Stern’s restaurant in Stepney - one of the most popular kosher 
restaurants in the East End during the interwar period - boasted typical Jewish 
food but also served many English dishes, and a menu would not look out of 
place in any 1930s British restaurant.884 Jewish workers in the East End began 
enjoying the leisure pursuits of the English working class, particularly the dance 
halls and the billiards rooms. For many, this was a legacy of the fraternisation 
with English workers during military service, or the shared dangers of the Home 
Front.885 Whilst this process of integration would no doubt have occurred 
naturally over time without the war, the evidence discussed in Chapter one 
suggests the war played a crucial role in accelerating integration. Four years of 
war accomplished more for their aims than thirty-three years of forced attempts 
by the Jewish establishment to integrate the immigrant community. 
   However, peace in 1918 also brought fresh sources of tension between Jews 
and non-Jews in the East End. Returning English soldiers lamented the loss of 
business and jobs taken over by immigrant Jews in their absence. The actions 
of a few unscrupulous Jewish landlords charging exorbitant rents to Gentile 
families struggling to rebuild after the war led to community-wide defamation of 
Jewish business tactics. Walter Southgate, born in Bethnal Green in 1890, 
reflected ruefully on the situation he and his wife found themselves in post-war, 
struggling to pay the rent to their Jewish landlords who in Southgate’s words 
‘Arrived in this country penniless from the ghettoes of Poland to escape the 
pogroms; they had made money and were prosperous. Here we were two 
supplicants for two back rooms and a gas ring in our native borough, and here 
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884 Cited in Panayi, Anglicisation Jewish Food, p.301 
885 Cesarani, ‘A Funny Thing Happened’, p.6 
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was the emergence of the race hatred trouble due to lack of housing’.886 Such 
sentiments helped revive the fortunes of the British Brothers’ League in the 
early 1920s, the group that had led the fight against further immigration into the 
East End before the war. After the disbandment of the BBL in 1923, anti-
immigrant support shifted to the British Union of Fascists. Unlike the BBL which 
had been careful to cultivate an anti- immigration rather than anti-Jewish 
agenda (in the best traditions of civil antisemitism employed by many pre 1905 
anti-immigrant agitators, and lucidly identified by Lara Trubowitz887), the BUF 
was vocally antisemitic in its activities and ambitions.888 The party made 
significant gains at the local London County Council elections of March 1937, 
polling particularly strongly in Bethnal Green and Shoreditch, although 
ultimately failing to secure the election of any of its candidates.889  
   These relative election successes were preceded six months before by the 
fabled clash between the BUF and anti-fascist groups during a march through 
Cable Street on 4 October 1936. Largely forgotten in the immediate aftermath 
of the violence, the event has subsequently developed a central position within 
British collective memory, to the extent that Tony Kushner labelled it ‘excluding 
events connected to the royal family and world wars, the most remembered day 
in British history’.890 In its importance to this study, there are certain parallels 
that can be identified between the events of October 1936 in Cable Street and 
those of September 1917 in Bethnal Green. The scale, celebrity and 
circumstances of these events offer little source for comparison, but it is 
interesting to hypothesise that many of the protagonists on both sides in 1917 
may have taken part in the later event. The disaffected English youths 
responsible for the violence in 1917 would have grown to adulthood in the 
1920s during a period of intense social dislocation in the East End created by 
post war reconstruction. The widely held notion that the Jews were responsible 
for the housing crisis in interwar London was a powerful recruiting issue for the 
                                                          
886 Southgate, That’s the Way it is, p.124 
887 See Trubowitz, Civil antisemitism 
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BUF, and it is possible, and perhaps probable, that the anti-Jewish agitators of 
1917 swelled the ranks of the BUF in 1936.  
   The Battle of Cable Street may not in fact be the most remembered day in 
British history, but the claim is not without some merit. Almost forgotten in the 
upheavals of another world war, it has been re-remembered by subsequent 
generations placing their own assessment of how the events of that day fit into 
concepts of British nationalism, tolerance and defence of minority interests. 
This is in stark contrast to the remembrance of the events of 1917, which 
initially occupied significant newsprint and attention in both Jewish and non-
Jewish circles, but subsequently faded from popular local consciousness and 
now occupies little more than a footnote in most modern assessments of 
Jewish race relations in the 20th century.891 Despite this, Bethnal Green can be 
argued to have had a significant impact on Jewish and non-Jewish relations in 
London after the war. The same tensions that sparked the disturbances in 
Bethnal Green in September 1917 continued and intensified in the interwar 
period, directly motivating the ‘Anti-Jewish’ behaviour of Oswald Mosley’s Black 
Shirts 19 years later.  
   However, it is possible to identify a further legacy of the First World War 
Jewish experience in the circumstances of the Cable Street violence. A high 
number of working class and labour activists were represented amongst the 
anti-fascist crowds that assembled to prevent the BUF’s deliberately 
antagonistic march through a Jewish neighbourhood. Whilst defence of the 
Jewish community was not perhaps the overriding motivator to oppose the BUF 
for the majority of the diverse 100,000 crowd of anti-fascist demonstrators, 
perhaps we can identify here the legacy of the tentative links made between 
Jewish and British trade Unions in the closing stages of the First World War. 
These ties were developed in the months after the Bethnal Green riots as 
Jewish interest groups sought to prevent future violence and secure the 
economic and social security of the Jewish East End by improving ties with 
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English Labour interests.892 Indeed, the bulk of the younger British born Jewish 
working class of the 1930s was largely indistinguishable from their non-Jewish 
equivalents in terms of culture, aspirations and appearance for any perception 
of difference to be negligible. This is reflected in the writings of the Jewish 
Chronicle journalist William Zukerman in 1937 who argued there was ‘so much 
in common between the young post-war English Cockney and the young East 
End Jew’, and that ‘what goes under the name of the East End Jew is in reality 
no specific Jewish type at all, but a general East London labour type’.893 
Yearning the loss of the Jewish East End of his 1930s childhood, Aubrey Rose 
reminisced: ‘This was my upbringing, my rich Jewish world, not a world of 
violence, but of peaceful, poor but happy characters… That world has 
vanished. Attempts to recreate it cannot succeed. The times have changed, the 
people have gone. It was a natural world, a stepping stone from the ghetto of 
Eastern Europe to increasing integration into British society’. But it was the First 
World War that did most to speed up the transition from Eastern European 
character to cockney working class identity of the Jewish East End.894 
   Tony Kushner has suggested that by the late 1920s a ‘new cultural symbiosis 
had been reached between Jew and non-Jew in the East End’ based on class 
and professional ties, and shared social and cultural activities centred around 
East End working class sports, football, boxing and horse betting 
predominating.895 The reality of this symbiosis, acted out in Rose’s idyllic 
memories of the inter war East End, is problematized by the tensions 
surrounding post war reconstruction and the later emergence of local support 
for the BUF’s anti-Jewish agenda. However the emersion of the old immigrant 
Jewish population within the working class culture of the East End - the 
‘cockney-fication’ of the Russian Jews - had reached an advanced stage by the 
end of the twenties. No longer identified as an economic threat or encroaching 
into a traditional English area, immigrant Jews had largely transitioned from 
outsiders to part of the fabric of the East End. This process had begun in 
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embryonic form in the decades before 1914, however the four years of war that 
followed accelerated this process exponentially. 
   The perception that 30,000 Russian Jews deliberately withdrew from the war 
effort whilst simultaneously profiting from it lent powerful ammunition to the anti-
immigrant agendas of groups such as the BBL and the BUF after the war.896 
Such negative perceptions of Jews as both unwilling and unfit for military 
service lingered, not only casting a shadow over the exploits of the Jewish 
Battalions in 1918, but also to an extent animating attitudes to Jewish recruits in 
the 1939-45 conflict. Full conscription for all males aged between 18 and 41 
was passed by the National Service Act the day war was declared on 3 
September 1939. The vast majority of Jews in Britain fell under the jurisdiction 
of this Act, preventing the situation of thousands of visible and un-enlisted Jews 
on the streets reoccurring as in the earlier conflict. The Jewish East End 
mobilised for war in 1939 without contention or controversy, the Jewish 
Chronicle reporting satisfactorily that Jewish East Enders were ‘playing their 
part’.897 Jews were as prominent in the self-defence forces as the main British 
Army, and there is evidence that many former members of the Jewish 
Battalions served in the various volunteer emergency services created to 
protect Britain from invasion in 1940.898 The formation of a new Jewish 
Battalion to fight against Hitler faced few of the political obstacles within the 
Anglo-Jewish establishment or sneers from the British public as the first venture 
in 1917, and watching the future recruits on parade was one of Jabotinsky’s last 
acts before his death in August 1940.899 The late formation of the Jewish 
Brigade as it came to be known in September 1944 was due not to internal 
political wrangling within Anglo-Jewry as in the First World War, but by the 
Government’s reluctance to sanction a Jewish unit in light of the government 
white paper of 1939 that effectively revoked the Balfour Declaration, and the 
war ministry was reluctant to make an overtly Zionist statement whilst it was still 
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in effect. In this regard the British Government’s attitude to the concept of a 
Jewish Battalion in the Second World War largely mirrored that of its 
predecessor in the earlier conflict.  
   This did not, however, prevent a repetition in some circles of popular First 
World War jibes against the Jewish community. The BUF’s populist paper, 
Action, revived the earlier accusation that Jews were shirking their wartime 
responsibilities while brave British soldiers fought at the front, writing in 
November 1939 that the nation would ‘shortly have British Tommies at the front 
while alien Jews take their jobs at home.’900 Later in 1940 the BUF accused 
Jews of attempting to profiteer from the war, an accusation that bares 
comparison to those made against Russian Jews by the East London Observer 
during the ‘Khaki Boom’.901 Support for the BUF was dwindling by the outbreak 
of the war, but their activity had not slackened and their prime target remained 
primarily the Jewish East Ender. Len England, of the Royal Army Ordnance 
Corps, was interviewed by Mass Observation on 14 February 1941: ‘There is a 
great deal of anti-Semitism in the army: there are no Jews in our battalion, and 
the feeling is not so much directed at individuals as at the race. It is not 
confined to the ‘rank and file’, two of the most intelligent people I have yet met 
are confirmed Jew-baiters. The argument usually runs like this: where are the 
Jews in the army? There are none because they all managed to get the soft 
jobs and have wangled out of conscription. In just the same way, the Jews were 
always the first to leave the danger areas. The Jews hold the purse-strings, the 
country has been taken over by them. Individual Jews may be pleasant enough, 
but as a race they are the root of all evil’.902 
   The views held by Len England and his fellow comrades in his battalion are 
stated authoritatively but are far from necessarily representative of British 
Gentiles across the Army, and are even further from being an instructive 
indicator of British society’s concept of Jews and Jewish matters during the 
Second World War. It is somewhat easier to gauge the response to Jews by 
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ordinary British civilians in the Second World War than the First. The Mass 
Observation experiment revealed a fuller picture of British attitudes to Jews and 
other minorities that are unavailable for the historian of the earlier conflict. A 
Mass Observation report into antisemitism in Britain just before the outbreak of 
war in 1938 reveals a general ambivalence towards Jews by other East Enders, 
with Jews generally tolerated, if not liked.903 A greater propensity to journal and 
diary keeping during the Second World War also provides further evidence, 
whilst memoirs detailing experiences of the First World War were predominantly 
written after 1945 and therefore must be treated with caution, due to the 
phenomena of remembering the events of the earlier conflict through the prism 
of the more recent war. In general, public support for BUF attacks on Jews 
during the war against Hitler appears low, although BUF meetings in Bethnal 
Green were often well attended. Sporadic outbreaks of violence against Jews 
occurred in the northern districts of East London during the war; Jewish shops 
in Bethnal Green were attacked and windows smashed as early as the first few 
weeks of hostilities, an uncomfortable echo of the destruction witnessed in the 
same area in September 1917.904  
   It appears however, that war pressures had less to do with the violence than 
pre-existing tensions regarding the encroachment of Jews into areas such as 
Hackney, Stoke Newington and Dalston. The movement north of Jewish 
families into traditionally non-Jewish areas of the East End was a trend 
originating in the upheaval and transformation experienced by East End Jewry 
in the 1914-1918 conflict. The profit of the ‘Khaki boom’ and the accelerated 
process of acculturation linked to the conflict led to a gradual but continuous 
movement away from traditional areas of Jewish settlement, predominantly 
towards the north London suburbs, the northern districts of the East End 
witnessing the early onset of this movement. Interestingly, the East London 
Observer, which rarely missed an opportunity to condemn the Jewish East End 
community in 1914-1918, was largely sympathetic to the community during the 
1939-45 conflict, the paper’s editor going as far as writing to the Board of 
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Deputies to support ‘the Jewish point of view’.905 This shift, which was matched 
by former critics of Jewish immigrations such as the East London Advertiser, is 
perhaps explained by the general opposition to fascist groups such as the BUF 
that characterised the East London press in the 1930s. Overall, Jewish and 
non-Jewish relations improved as the war progressed, with the inclusivity of the 
danger and struggle of the blitz reducing intolerance. This largely matched the 
pattern of the First World War.906 To a large extent, the experience of the 
Second World War by British Jews and attitudes towards them were influenced 




   The First World War permanently transformed the appearance and position of 
London’s Jewish community. The war had a profound impact on Jewish and 
non-Jewish relations in the capital, redefining British concepts of the position of 
the Jewish community within London society, as well as individual Jews’ 
notions of identity and patriotism in connection with Britain. The war did not 
however result in a ‘serious deterioration in the position of the Jews in Britain’ 
as David Cesarani has argued. On the other hand, William Rubinstein’s 
assessment that ‘No other event in modern British history so positively affected 
the acculturation of British Jewry in a brief period of time as did the First World 
War’ must also be treated with caution.907 In his attempts to debunk Cesarani, 
Rubinstein characterises the war as remarkably free of British antisemitism. 
This narrative is however as notable for what he leaves out than in, brushing 
over or ignoring quite glaring evidence that would contradict such an 
assessment.  
   Cesarani points to a number of instances during the war where ‘the Jews 
were rendered distinctive and problematic’ in the eyes of the British public. 
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However, this does not, as Cesarani implies, necessarily lead to the 
disintegration of the community’s position. These instances are offset by 
equally numerous examples of how the war diminished differences between 
Jews and non-Jews in London and strengthened the position of London Jewry, 
either in the greater clout Anglo-Jewish politicians wielded in the aftermath of 
the Balfour Declaration, or the prosperity enjoyed by Jewish tailors in the East 
End that contributed to the decision of many immigrant families to set down 
permanent roots in London, both physically and psychologically.  
    Rubinstein’s scathing attacks on the pessimism of the ‘new School’ of 
historians of Anglo-Jewry in the 1980s and 1990s was returned with withering 
contempt that his research attempted to turn the clocks back to the 
apologeticism of the Roth era. Subsequent research into the topic of British 
Jews and the First World War has largely attempted to steer clear of this 
battlefield, with Jill Hamilton (2004), Alyson Pendlebury (2006) and Anne Lloyd 
(2012) grounding their analysis of the British Jewish experience of the war from 
a Christological perspective, therefore sidestepping traditional debates on 
antisemitism. In recent years antisemitism has been increasingly discarded by 
historians of British Jewry as a tool to investigate British responses to Jews.908 
The British Jewish story lacks the shock and awe narrative associated with 
continental antisemitism, and therefore must be grounded in an examination of 
more subtle and sensitive trends characterised by an emphasis on ‘ordinary 
lives and everyday culture’.909 Since the Rubinstein and Cesarani debates of 
the 1990s brought an uneasy stalemate, such an approach has not been 
applied in an extensive way to the experience of British Jewry in the First World 
War, and in particular in assessing the legacy of this experience. The 
framework of success or failure for assessing the legacy of the war for British 
Jews should be set aside for an approach that acknowledges the complexities 
and contradictions in the Jewish war experience. Such an approach needs to 
be unaligned with the competing schools within British Jewish studies that 
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polarise theoretical debates on the topic. Using the case study of London 
Jewry, this thesis has attempted to apply this approach to the First World War 
experience. The changes to London’s Jewish community in the years 1914-
1918 were a complex mix of the subtle and dramatic, and the war cannot 
adequately be cast as a wholly negative or positive catalyst for societal 
regeneration in the Jewish case. This partisanship detracts from attempts to 
interpret the gritty contemporary experience of Jews adjusting to the calamities 
of war, preventing a true assessment of the First World War as a defining event 
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